NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

Literal Translation of
Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra*
&
Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*
along with a free and abridged translation of the Elucidation by
Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa

[PART II : SECOND ADHYĀYA]

DEBIPRASAD CHATTOPADHYAYA
MRINALKANTI GANGOPADHYAYA

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PREFACE

The translation of the second chapter of *Nyāya-sūtra* follows the same principles as those followed in the translation of the first chapter.

It is considered desirable to give a full list of the *sūtra*-s at the end of the volume. In his Introduction to the first volume of the *Nyāyadarśana*, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa mentions the difficulties he himself felt about the actual reading of the *sūtra*-s. On the whole he preferred to follow the reading of the *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra.

Our translation being based on Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, we give the *sūtra*-s as occurring in his text, though, for the purpose of easier understanding, the compounded and conjoined words are shown separately with hyphen-marks. To these, however, we add in the form of notes the important variants of the *sūtra*-s as these are found to occur in standard Nyāya works. For these variants, along with the references to these, we have drawn upon the *Die Nyāya-sūtra's* by Professor Walter Ruben, Leipzig 1928. We are grateful to Professor Haridas Sinharay for helping us to translate the German language of Professor Ruben's text.

The following abbreviations are used in the notes on the variants of the *sūtra*-s :

ASS : NS, Nbh & NVr ed. Ānandāśrama Saṃskṛta Series.
B : Ballentyne, *The Aphorisms of the Nyāya Philosophy of Gautama*, Allahabad 1850
Bibl. Ind : NS & Nbh ed. Bibliotheca Indica.
ChSS : *Nyāya-darśana and the Bhāṣya with Khadyota by Ganganatha Jha and the Bhāṣyacandra by Raghūttama* (on NS i. 1. 1—iii. 2. 17), ed. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series.
Nbh : *Nyāya-bhāṣya*
NM : *Nyāyamañjarī* by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.
NS : *Nyāya-sūtra.*
NSN : *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha.*
NV : *Nyāya-vārttika*, ed. Bibliotheca Indica.
NVi : *Nyāya-vivaraṇa*, ed. Paṇḍit.
NVr : *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti.* See ASS.
nvr : *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, ed. 1828.
NVTT : *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, ed. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.
R : NS with NVr, ed. Paṇḍit (by Rāmabhavana Śarmā). This does not agree with the edition of the Bibl. Ind. or the ed. nvr.
V : Vidyābhūṣaṇa's translation of NS.
VSS : NS with Nbh, ed. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.

Calcutta,
February 23, 1968.

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya

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Errata

read "probans" for "proban" up to p. 72.

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ADHYĀYA II

Literal Translation of

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CHAPTER II

The second chapter of the *Nyāya-sūtra* is divided into two *āhnika*-s.
The contents of the first *āhnika* are :

Sūtra-s 1-7 : critical examination of Doubt
8-20 : critical examination of *pramāṇa* in general
21-32 : critical examination of Perception
33-36 : critical examination of the Whole (*avayavī*)
37-38 : critical examination of Inference
39-43 : critical examination of Present Time
44-48 : critical examination of Comparison
49-56 : critical examination of Verbal Testimony in general
57-68 : critical examination of the specific form of Verbal Testimony, viz. Veda

The contents of the second *āhnika* are :

Sūtra-s 1-12 : critical examination of *pramāṇas* being specifically four
13-39 : critical examination of non-eternality of sound
40-57 : section on transformation of sound (i.e. of letters)
58-69 : section on the determination of the meaning of a term

Adhyāya II *Āhnika I*

I. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF DOUBT

Bhāṣya

After this [i.e. after naming and defining] follows the critical examination of *pramāṇa* etc. First to be examined is Doubt, because this [critical examination] is nothing but "final ascertainment through thesis and anti-thesis after having an initial doubt" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 41).

Elucidation

In the first chapter, Gautama enumerates and defines the sixteen categories which form the subject-matter of Nyāya philosophy. While doing this, he follows the order

First objection : Doubt arises only from the definite ascertainment of the common characteristics in the object perceived and not from the mere presence of these characteristics in the object. While defining the first form of doubt, Gautama says that it results from the *upapatti* of the common characteristics and the real ground of the objection is that the word *upapatti* means mere presence, whereas doubt presupposes definite awareness of the common characteristics in the object.

Second objection : The apprehension of the common characteristics of the pillar and the person amounts also to the apprehension of the two objects, because the characteristics cannot be apprehended apart from the objects to which they belong. When the objects are thus already apprehended while apprehending their common characteristics, there is left no scope for any doubt about them. Therefore, Gautama cannot even claim that the apprehension of the common characteristics is the cause of doubt.

Third objection : Ascertainment of something cannot lead to the doubt about something different from it. E.g., the ascertainment of colour cannot result in a doubt concerning touch. How, then, can Gautama claim that the ascertainment of the common characteristics leads to a doubt concerning the objects, the objects being completely different from the characteristics themselves.

Fourth objection : Doubt being a form of uncertain knowledge cannot result from the ascertainment of the common characteristics, which is but a form of certain knowledge.

From the four objections mentioned, also follow four similar objections against the second form of doubt mentioned by Gautama, namely, doubt resulting from the apprehension of the unique characteristic. Thus—1. Doubt is due only to the ascertainment of the unique characteristic rather than to its mere presence. 2. Doubt cannot be due to the ascertainment of the unique characteristic, which implies also the ascertainment of the object possessing it. 3. The object being different from the unique characteristic itself, the ascertainment of the latter cannot lead to any doubt concerning the former. 4. The ascertainment of the unique characteristic, being a form of certain knowledge, cannot result in doubt which is a form of uncertain knowledge.

Fifth objection : It cannot be argued that doubt is due to the ascertainment of the characteristics of either a pillar or a person, because the ascertainment of the characteristics of either object amounts to the ascertainment of that object. Thus when the characteristics of a pillar are perceived as belonging to the object, the object is already ascertained as a pillar and as such there remains no scope for any doubt as to whether it is a pillar or a person.

Uddyotakara explains the objection indicated by the present *sūtra* in a somewhat different way. Gautama claims that the apprehension of common characteristics is the cause of doubt. But this cannot be so, because there are cases of the absence of doubt in spite of the said apprehension and, again, there are cases of doubt even without such apprehension. Further, argues Uddyotakara, from the point of view of the objector,

the very concept of common characteristics is untenable. The height etc. belonging to the pillar are peculiarly its own and these cannot belong to the person as well. Thus, the alleged common characteristics being fictitious cannot be the cause of doubt.

Sūtra 2

[Objection continued] Again, [doubt cannot be due to] the ascertainment of 'the contradictory assertions about the same object' (*vipratipatti*) and 'the irregularity [of apprehension and non-apprehension]' (*upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avya-vasthā*). //ii. 1. 2 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] Doubt cannot be due to mere contradictory assertions or the mere irregularity [of apprehension and non-apprehension]. From what, then, [arises a doubt] ? Only the person having a knowledge of the implications of the contradictory assertions can have doubt. So is the case of irregularity [i.e. only the person having a knowledge of the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension can have doubt]. Further, how can one have any doubt [by listening to the two contradictory assertions, that is] having the knowledge that one party claims : "The self exists" and the other claims : "The self does not exist" ? [That is, on listening to the two contradictory claims, one has the mere knowledge that two such views about the self exist ; but this does not necessarily mean that the listener himself will have any doubt about the self]. Similarly, there can be no doubt from the separate knowledge that there is irregularity of apprehension and again, that there is irregularity of non-apprehension.

Elucidation

According to Gautama, the third, fourth and fifth forms of doubt are due respectively to contradictory assertions about the same object, irregularity of apprehension and irregularity of non-apprehension (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 23).

As against Gautama's third form of doubt, it is objected that mere contradictory assertions about the same object do not result in doubt. Doubt arises only when one fully comprehends the implications of both the assertions and further fails to accept one of the alternatives rejecting the other. If mere contradictory assertions could produce

in which these are mentioned in the first *sūtra*. However, while proceeding to the critical examination of the categories, he begins with the category mentioned third in the list, viz. Doubt, instead of *pramāṇa* which occurs first in the list. Why does he change this order ?

Vātsyāyana answers that any critical examination presupposes doubt, for critical examination is nothing but final ascertainment and final ascertainment follows an initial doubt. Therefore, the first precondition of any critical examination is a clear idea of the nature of doubt itself.

In this connection, Vācaspati draws our attention to the distinction between 'the textual order' (*pāṭha-krama*) and 'the order of logical sequence' (*ārtha-karma*), the former being followed by Gautama in the first chapter and the latter in his critical examination of the categories.

As against Vātsyāyana, however, it may be argued that he himself admits (on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 41) that final ascertainment is not necessarily preceded by doubt. How, then, does critical examination, which is identified here with final ascertainment, necessarily presuppose doubt ? Uddyotakara answers that though final ascertainment in all forms does not presuppose doubt, there can be no question of any critical examination without an initial doubt.

[It may be pointed out that this defence by Uddyotakara does not fully agree with Vātsyāyana's view identifying critical examination with final ascertainment.]

In *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 23, Gautama says that depending on its five-fold causes doubt assumes five forms. The present critical examination of doubt is intended to explain and defend this view of five-fold doubt by way of answering various possible objections raised against it.

In the first five *sūtra*-s of the second chapter are raised various possible objections against the view of doubt expressed in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 23.

Sūtra 1

[Objection] Doubt is not due to the 'ascertainment' (*adhyavasāya*) of 'common characteristics' (*samāna-dharma*) or 'unique characteristic' (*aneka-dharma*) or the ascertainment of either.
// ii. 1. 1. //

Bhāṣya

[Objection 1] Doubt arises from the ascertainment of common characteristics rather than from the mere [presence of] the common characteristics.

[Objection 2] Nor is there scope for doubt when the characteristics as well as the objects characterised are apprehended [in the following form] : "I apprehend the common characteristics of these two."

[Objection 3] Nor is there any proper scope for doubt even from the ascertainment of the common characteristics of the objects, [the characteristics being] completely different [from the objects themselves]. There can never be any doubt about the quality of touch from the knowledge of the quality of colour, these two being completely different from each other.

[Objection 4] Nor is there any proper scope for doubt, which is but uncertain knowledge, arising from ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*), which, in its turn, is in fact 'certain knowledge' (*avadhāraṇa*), because in that case there remains no resemblance between the cause and the effect.

This [i.e. the group of objections to the possibility of doubt from the apprehension of common characteristics] also explains [the impossibility of doubt] arising from the apprehension of the unique characteristic.

[Objection 5] Doubt cannot be due to the ascertainment of the characteristic of either of the two objects, because in that case there will be the ascertainment of either [of the objects].

Elucidation

The Nyāya methodology requires that the critical analysis of any topic presupposes an explicit explanation of the doubt concerning it. Doubt implies alternative possibilities, only one of which is to be finally established and this by way of refuting the others. The alternative to be refuted is mentioned first and is called the *pūrva-pakṣa*. The alternative eventually established after refuting the *pūrva-pakṣa* is called the *siddhānta*.

Doubt being the precondition of critical examination, Gautama begins his critical examination with an analysis of doubt itself. The facthood of doubt is, of course, beyond any question. However, there may be doubt as to the nature and cause of doubt. Gautama, therefore, begins with an enumeration of the possible objections against his own view of doubt.

In *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 23, Gautama mentions the first form of doubt, which is as follows : In the dusk, the visual sense of somebody comes in contact with an object having a certain height etc., i.e. having characteristics that are common to both a pillar and a person. He, therefore, has the doubt whether the object before him is actually a pillar or a person. Such a doubt is due to the apprehension of common characteristics.

Various objections may be raised against the conception of such a form of doubt. In this *sūtra*, Gautama mentions five of these objections.

doubt, then a person completely ignorant of the meaning of these assertions would have felt doubt. Similarly, the irregularity of apprehension or of non-apprehension by itself does not lead to doubt. Only when a person is clearly aware that an existing object is apprehended as much as a non-existing object may be wrongly apprehended, he can, from the irregularity of apprehension, have any doubt. Again, only when he is clearly aware that even an existing object can be non-apprehended as much as a non-existing object is non-apprehended, he can, from the irregularity of non-apprehension, have any doubt.

In defence of Gautama, it may be argued that his real intention is to refer to *the knowledge of* contradictory assertions and of the irregularity of apprehension or non-apprehenson as causes of doubt. In that case, the afore-mentioned objection against Gautama becomes redundant. This leads Vātsyāyana to offer an alternative interpretation of the objection. Thus one, listening to contradictory assertions about the same object, may fully understand both ; but this does not necessarily lead one to have any doubt about the object. Similarly, one may be fully aware of the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension ; but this does not necessarily lead one to have a doubt about an object.

Sūtra 3

[Objection continued] [Doubt is not due to] contradictory assertions, because these are 'well-ascertained conclusions' (*sampratipatti*) [of the respective parties themselves]. //ii. 1. 3//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The contradictory assertions alleged [i.e. by Gautama] to be the grounds of doubt are in fact well-ascertained conclusions, expressing the contradictory positions of the two parties. Thus, the claim that doubt is due to contradictory assertions amounts to the assertion that doubt is due to well-ascertained conclusions.

Elucidation

In continuation of the objection raised in the preceding *sūtra*, viz. that even the knowledge of contradictory assertions cannot lead to doubt, it is argued that contradictory assertions are, as a matter of fact, positive conclusions reached by the contesting

parties. Thus, one of the contestants has reached the positive conclusion that the self exists, while the other contestant has reached the positive conclusion that the self does not exist. In such a circumstance, the knowledge of the existence and of the non-existence of the self constitute the contradictory assertions of the two. Therefore, both the assertions represent well-ascertained conclusions of the opposing parties and as such there is nothing called knowledge in the form of *vipratipatti*, i.e. of contradictory assertions. Thus, to claim that the knowledge of contradictory assertions leads to doubt amounts to the absurd claim that well-established conclusions land one in doubt.

Sūtra 4

[Objection continued] [Doubt cannot be due to] irregularity [of apprehension and non-apprehension], because irregularity as irregularity is subject to regularity. // ii. 1. 4 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Doubt is not [due to irregularity of apprehension or non-apprehension]. If this irregularity is restricted by its intrinsic nature, then it amounts to regularity and as such it ceases to be irregularity. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that doubt is due to irregularity. On the other hand, if irregularity is not restricted by its intrinsic nature, then it ceases to be irregularity because of losing its intrinsic nature. Thus there can be no doubt [due to irregularity of apprehension or non-apprehension].

Sūtra 5

[Objection continued] Then [i.e. assuming Gautama's claim that doubt is due to common characteristics] there results the absurdity of 'perpetual doubt' (*atyanta-saṃśaya*), because of the ever-presenee of the common characteristics. // ii. 1. 5 //

N. ii. 2

Bhāṣya

[Objection] In the [first] form [of doubt], in which you [i.e. Gautama] conceive that doubt is due to the presence of common characteristics—in that form there results the absurdity of ceaseless doubt. Since the common characteristics persist to be, the doubt [resulting from these] will never cease to be. The object about which we have a doubt is never apprehended as devoid of the common characteristics, but invariably as characterised by the common characteristics.

Elucidation

According to Gautama, the first two forms of doubt are due to the *upapatti* of common characteristics and of the unique characteristic respectively. The word *upapatti* may mean, as it was actually taken to mean by many older authorities, mere presence. Accepting this meaning of the word, the objector argues that since the common characteristics never cease to be, i.e., always persist in the object, the doubt resulting therefrom will also be so. Even the perception of a special distinguishing mark in the object will not dispel this doubt, because the real cause of this doubt, viz. the common characteristics, still persists and the object can never be perceived without these common characteristics. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa shows that the same objection can be extended to Gautama's conception of the second form of doubt, viz. doubt due to unique characteristic.

Bhāṣya

These objections are being briefly replied to :

Sūtra 6

[Answer] From the ascertainment of the previously mentioned [causes of doubt, viz. common characteristics, unique characteristic, etc.] along with 'the dependance on the remembrance of the unique characteristic of each' (*viśeṣāpekṣa*) results doubt and there is no

absurdity [in the form of] either "No doubt" (*a-saṃśaya*) or "Perpetual doubt" (*atyanta-saṃśaya*) // ii. 1. 6 //

Elucidation

In *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 23, Gautama says that *the ascertainment of* the common characteristics etc is the real cause of doubt. As such it is useless to argue against him that the mere presence of the common characteristics etc can never cause doubt nor is there any real ground to object that the common characteristics etc, being ever-present, the resulting doubt is bound to be perpetual. Gautama further adds that a precondition for doubt is *the remembrance of* some specific distinguishing maık of the object. This implies that when *this remembrance is replaced by an actual perception* of the specific distinguishing mark, the doubt is bound to be dispelled and this in spite of the persistence of the apprehension of the common characteristics etc. Thus, in short, the objections raised against Gautama are due to misunderstanding the real implications of his *sūtra.*

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that in this connection a question may be raised as to the real cause of doubt. Are we to consider the ascertainment of common characteristics etc *as qualified by* the absence of perception of the spcific distinguishing mark to be the cause of doubt ? Or, is the absence of the perception of the specific distinguishing mark to be considered *as the auxiliary cause* (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*) of doubt, its principal cause being the ascertainment of common characteristics etc ? Following Vātsyāyana, Vācaspati and Viśvanātha, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa is inclined to think that the former interpretation is truer to the spirit of Gautama, though he does not go to the extent of positively committing against the second interpretation which is favoured by the Navya Naiyāyikas.

Bhāṣya

There is no absurdity of either 'doubt being never produced' or of 'doubt never coming to an end.' Why ? Because, the cause of doubt is the *apprehension of the common characteristics* and not *merely the common characteristics.* Let it be so. Why, then, is it not expressed in that way ? Because, this is implied by the word *viśeṣāpekṣa* [in the *sūtra*]. [The word *viśeṣāpekṣa* means] the desire (*apekṣā*) or the longing (*ākāṅkṣā*) for [the perception of] 'the specific distinguishing mark' (*viśeṣa*), which is possible so long as the special distinguishing mark is not

apprehended. But [the *sūtra*] does not state *samāna-dharma-apekṣa* [i.e. 'depending on the desire for the perception of the common characteristics']. When is there no desire for [the perception of] the common characteristics? Only when these are actually perceived. Because of this implication it becomes clear that [doubt is] due to the apprehension of common characteristics.

Elucidation

Why does not Gautama say in so many words that the apprehension of common characteristics is the cause of doubt—a statement that would have eliminated the possibility of the various objections against him? Vātsyāyana answers that Gautama actually means this, though by implication, and the word *viśeṣāpekṣa* contains this implication. The word *viśeṣāpekṣa* means the desire of perceiving the specific distinguishing mark and the presence of such a desire means that the said perception is yet to take place, though its remembrance is there. Further, the absence of the perception of the specific distinguishing mark means, in the case of doubt, the presence of the apprehension of the common characteristics, which, therefore, is considered by Gautama as the cause of doubt.

Bhāṣya

Or, this [viz. the view that the apprehension of the common characteristics is the cause of doubt] is implied by the word *upapatti* [in the *sūtra*]. It has been said [in the *sūtra* that doubt is due to] *samāna-dharma-upapatti* and this *samāna-dharma-upapatti* is nothing different from the apprehension of the existence of the common characteristics. [Even assuming the word *upapatti* to mean mere presence, Vātsyāyana argues that the presence of the common characteristics can be spoken of only so long as these are actually apprehended]. If the existence of the common characteristics is completely unknown then these can have a status no better than that of the non-existent.

Or, the word denoting the object (*viṣaya*) is actually used to mean the 'knowledge of the object' (*viṣayi-pratyaya*). [In other words, in the *sūtra* 'common characteristics' actually means 'the knowledge of common characteristics.'] Thus, e.g., in common use the statement 'fire is inferred from smoke' is understood to mean 'fire is inferred from the perception of smoke.' How? Fire is inferred only when smoke is perceived and not before it is perceived. However, in the statement itself the word 'perceived' does not occur. Still, the listeners take for granted the sense intended by the statement [viz. perception of smoke]. From this we consider

that a person capable of understanding takes for granted that the word denoting the object is actually used to mean the knowledge of the object. Similarly, in this case also [i.e. in the *sūtra*[by the expression 'common characteristics' is meant 'the definite knowledge of the common characteristics.'

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana claims that the word *viśeṣāpekṣa* in the *sūtra* is intended to indicate that the definite knowledge of common characteristics rather than the characteristics themselves is the cause of doubt. Such a claim, however, may be considered unsatisfactory. First, the word *viśeṣāpekṣa* simply excludes the perception of the specific distinguishing mark but does not positively imply the perception of the common characteristics as the cause of doubt. Secondly, since the word *viśeṣāpekṣa* in the *sūtra* is equally applicable to the five forms of donbt, if it is taken to mean the perception of common characteristics, such a perception becomes a precondition for all forms of doubt and that is simply absurd.

Because of these difficulties, Vātsyāyana offers a number of alternative answers. As the first alternative, he says that the word *upapatti* in the expression *samāna-dharma-upapatteḥ* of the *sūtra* itself implies the perception of the said characteristics inasmuch as the existence of the common characteristics is nothing different from the perception thereof. In other words, the objection that Gautama does not clearly mention *the perception of* common characteristics becomes redundant. Though the word *upapatti* literally means existence only, yet in this context the word obviously implies the knowledge of that existence, because the common characteristics, if not known, amounts almost to the non-existent.

However, the word *upapatti* usually means mere presence and as such the expression *samāna-dharma-upapatti* means mere presence of common characteristics. To avoid this difficulty, Vātsyāyana suggests the second alternative interpretation, according to which *samāna-dharma* itself means—by implication—the perception of *samāna-dharma* and as such *samāna-dharma-upapatti* means the presence of the perception of common characteristics. That the word denoting the object (*viṣaya*) may often imply in a secondary sense (*lakṣaṇā*) the 'knowledge of the object' (*viṣayī*) is illustrated by a common example. Thus, we often say, "Fire is inferred from smoke", which really means, "Fire is inferred from the perception of smoke." Smoke here obviously means the perception of smoke.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa sums up by observing that all these difficulties arise from the assumption that *upapatti* means mere existence. But the word can and does also mean knowledge. In fact, Gautama uses the word in that sense. On this assumption we can easily avoid all the objections raised against him.

Bhāṣya

As against your claim that doubt is impossible inasmuch as the characteristics (*dharma*) as well as the 'object characterised' (*dharmī*) are already known, when we have knowledge in the form, "I apprehend the common characteristics of these two objects"—[we answer] that knowledge of this form is about the objects previously perceived, [to explain :] "I now perceive the common characteristics of the two objects which I previously perceived, but I do not perceive the specific distinguishing mark [of any at the moment]. How can I perceive the specific distinguishing mark [of any of the two] so that I can definitely assert either [to be there] ?" This doubt [indecisive knowledge] is not dispelled merely by the knowledge of the characteristics and the objects characterised, [which knowledge] is acquired through the perception of the common characteristics [as the objector claims].

Elucidation

According to the second objection [raised in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 1], doubt cannot result from the apprehension of common characteristics, because the perception of common characteristics is at the same time the perception of the objects characterised and when the objects along with their characteristics are perceived, there is left no scope for doubt.

To this Vātsyāyana answers that when one perceives the common characteristics the actual impression that one has is as follows : "I now perceive in the object before me the characteristics common to a person and a pillar, both of which I previously perceived. But I now fail to perceive any specific distinguishing mark of either the person or the pillar, which I want to perceive in order to be certain about what precisely is there before me." Such a state of doubt can be dispelled only by the perception of the specific distinguishing mark of either the pillar or the person and not by, as the objector imagines, the mere perception of the common characteristics entailing the perception of the objects characterised by these.

Uddyotakara, as we have seen, explains the fifth objection against Gautama's first form of doubt in a different way. According to this explanation, the very concept of common characteristics is an undue one : the peculiar height etc of the pillar are exclusively its own and cannot belong to the person as well. To this objection, Uddyotakara answers that by common characteristics are really meant similar characteristics and not identical characteristics. Thus, e.g., when we speak of height being a common characteristic of the pillar and the person, what we only mean is that the two have similar height and not that the same height which is there in the pillar exists also in the person.

Bhāṣya

And as to your claim that the knowledge of one object cannot result in doubt regarding another,—[we answer] such an objection can be raised only against one who considers the mere knowledge of a different object as the cause of doubt.

And moreover, as to your claim that [doubt is impossible] because of the absence of resemblance between the cause and the effect,—[we answer] the resemblance between cause and effect is nothing but the presence and absence respectively of the effect in the presence and absence of the cause. That which, when present, produces something else and, moreover, when absent, does not produce this something else, is the cause. That something else is the effect. Resemblance between the two is nothing but this [relation between them]. Such [a relation of] resemblance exists between the cause of doubt [viz. the apprehension of common characteristics and] its effect [viz.] doubt.

By these [considerations] is also refuted the objection that doubt cannot be due to the apprehension of the unique characteristic.

Elucidation

The contention of the third objection is that the apprehension of one object cannot result in doubt about another. Thus, e.g., the apprehension of colour cannot cause doubt about touch. To this Vātsyāyana answers that such an objection does not at all apply to the position of Gautama, who never claims that the apprehension of something causes doubt about something else. What Gautama contends instead is that the characteristics common to two objects, when apprehended in one of these two objects and when, moreover, there is no perception of the specific distinguishing mark of either of these objects, there arises doubt.

The contention of the fourth objection is that there must be basic resemblance between the cause and the effect, whereas Gautama claims that the apprehension of common characteriscs, which is a form of definite knowledge, is the cause of doubt, which is a form of indefinite knowledg. To this Vātsyāyana answers that the real meaning of the resemblance between the cause and the effect is the invariable relation between them. That is, this resemblance simply means that the presence of the cause is followed by the presence of the effect and the absence of the cause is followed by the absence of the effect. Such a relation is bound to exist between the apprehension of common characteristics and the occurence of doubt and as such there is the said resemblance between the two.

Uddyotakara, however, argues that the said invariable relation constitutes only the intrinsic nature of the cause and effect. Therefore, this is not to be taken as the

basic resemblance between the two. What, then, is the basic resemblance between doubt and its cause ? Uddyotakara answers that this basic resemblance consists in the absence of the perception of the specific distinguishing mark, which exists in the cause of doubt, viz. the apprehension of common characteristics, as well as in the effect, viz. doubt itself.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that Vātsyāyana categorically asserts that the resemblance between the cause and the effect consists specifically in their invariable ralation and without asserting this the objection under consideration cannot be really refuted.

After answering the four objections against Gautama's first form of doubt, viz. doubt due to the apprehension of common characteristics, Vātsyāyana argues that four similar objections against Gautama's second form of doubt due to the apprehension of the unique characteristic, are to be similarly answered.

Bhāṣya

As to the further claim that doubt cannot be due to the knowledge of 'the contradictory assertions about the same object' (*viprapatipatti*), as well as 'the irregularity [of apprehension and non-apprehension]' (*avyavasthā*, i.e. *upalabdhi-anupalabdhi-avyavasthā*), [we answer that on listening to two contradictory assertions about the same object, one feels] : "I apprehend the contradictory meanings of the two assertions and I fail to ascertain any specific ground [in favour of either]. That is, I cannot find that [ground] on the strength of which I can assert either of the alternatives. Where am I to seek that specific ground by which I can decide in favour of either [of the two assertions] ?" Such a state of doubt, which results from the contradictory assertions about he same object, cannot be removed merely by comprehending that the two contestants maintain two contradictory theses. Similarly is to be understood the case of doubt resulting from the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension. [That is, the two forms of doubt resulting from the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension cannot be removed by any form of knowledge other than the knowledge of the specific distinguishing mark.]

Elucidation

As against Gautama's third form of doubt, viz. doubt due to the contradictory assertions about the same object, it is objected that the mere comprehension of the meanings of two contradictory statements cannot result in any doubt. Vātsyāyana answers that one who understands such contradictory claims is bound to suffer doubt so long as one fails to find any specific ground in favour of either.

In answer to the objections raised against Gautama's fourth and fifth forms of doubt, viz. doubts due to the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension, Vātsyāyana answers that the mere knowledge of the existence of such irregularities does not remove the doubts. These doubts can be removed only by the definite knowledge of the specific distinguishing mark indicating the actual existence or non-existence of the object.

As we have already seen (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 23), Uddyotakra differs from Vātsyāyana in interpreting Gautama's *sūtra* defining doubt and claims that there are, as a matter of fact, only three forms of doubt, viz. doubts due to i) the apprehension of an object with common characteristics, ii) the apprehension of an object with a unique characteristic and iii) the apprehension of contradictory statements. Gautama, according to Uddyotakara, uses the expression 'due to the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension' to characterise all the three forms of doubt, rather than to indicate any fourth or fifth form thereof. This expression really means the absence of any definite proof to establish or to reject either of the alternatives comprising the doubt. Vātsyāyana's view that the expression 'due to the irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension' indicates two separate forms of doubt, argues Uddyotakara, is untenable because in that case the perception of the specific distinguishing mark will not be able to dispel any doubt, as there will arise the further doubt whether this specific distinguishing mark perceived is actually exsistent or non-existent.

In defence of Vātsyāyana Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that irregularity of apprehension and non-apprehension does not invariably and indiscriminately lead to doubt. When the specific distinguishing mark is definitely and firmly known, there can be no question of any further doubt about the mark itself. Moreover, from the fact that Gautama himself mentions specific objections against five forms of doubt, it is clear that according to him doubt is five-fold rather than three-fold, as Uddyotakara claims.

Bhāṣya

As against your claim [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 3] that [doubt is not due to] contradictory assertions, because these are well-ascertained conclusions [of the respective parties],—[we answer that the understanding of the] real cause of doubt [depends on] the ascertainment of the meaning of the word *vipratipatti* as accompanied by the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark. And it [i.e. its causal efficacy in producing doubt] is not negated by a mere verbal substitute. The word *vipratipatti* means two contradictory statements about the same object. The definite knowledge of this, accompanied by the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark, is the cause of doubt. Its causal efficacy in producing doubt

is not negated because of substituting it by the word *sampratipatti* (well-ascertained conclusion). Therefore, this [objection of yours] is designed only to make a fool of the ignorant.

Elucidation

The objection mentioned in *Nyaya-sūtra* ii. 1. 3 against Gautama's third form of doubt really rests on a wrong understanding of the word *vipratipatti*. It actually means contradictory assertions about the same object and not—as the objector imagines—the contradictory theses of the two contestants. When one listens to two contradictory assertions about the same object and further fails to have any specific distinguishing ground in favour of either, one is bound to suffer doubt as to the real nature of the object. This fact cannot be disproved by a mere verbal manipulation, namely by claiming that *vipratipatti* is but *sampratipatti*.

Bhāṣya

As against your claim (*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 4) that [doubt is not due to] irregularity [of aprehension and non-apprehension] because irregularity as irregularity is subject to regularity,—[we answer that] the substitution of a different word [i.e. regularity for irregularity] on other considerations is futile, since by this is not rejected its causal efficacy [i.e. the causal efficacy of the irregularity] and moreover since by this is tacitly assumed irregularity itself. The word-substitution is as follows : It is regularity and cannot be irregularity, because *as irregularity* it is subject to regularity. This substitution does not negate that the irregularity of apprehension and the irregularity of non-apprehension, accompanied by the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark, produce doubt. Moreover, since *irregularity as irregularity* is [according to the objection] subject to regularity, it [i.e. irregularity] does not surrender its intrinsic nature [i.e. remains irregularity and is not really transformed into regularity]. Therefore, irregularity is to be admitted [even by the opponent]. Thus, even this word-substitution fails to establish something else [i.e. does not prove irregularity to be regularity].

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana admits that irregularity as irregularity may be called a form of regularity. But that does not prove that there is nothing called irregularity as such.

nor does it go against Gatama's view that irregularity of apprehension or non-apprehension is the cause of doubt. Moreover, the very attempt to prove that irregularity as irregularity is nothing but regularity tacitly assumes the facthood of irregularity.

Bhāṣya

As against your claim [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 5] that then [i.e. assuming Gautama's claim that doubt is due to common characteristics] there results the absurdity of perpetual doubt because of the ever-presence of the common characistics—[we answer] this doubt is not due to the mere presence of the common characteristics etc. From what then ? From the definite ascertainment of the common characteristics accompanied by the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark. Hence there is no [absurdity of] perpetual doubt. [Again, as against your claim] that doubt cannot be due to the ascertainment of the characteristic of either of the two objects—[we answer that] this is not acceptable, because it has been said that doubt is the contradictory apprehension about the same object, which depends on the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark of each. The specific distinguishing mark belongs exclusively to one of the two objects and if it is definitely known then there is no dependence on the remembrance of the specific distinguishing mark. [In other words, when the specific distinguishing mark is already perceived, there is no question of mere remembrance of it and as such, in Gautama's view, no question of any doubt arising therefrom.

Elucidation

It is objected that common characteristics etc being considered the cause of doubt, the doubt becomes perpetual inasmuch as the common characteristics etc remain ever-present. Vātsyāyana answers that Gautama does not consider the mere presence of common characteristics etc as the cause of doubt. His point is that doubt arises from the definite ascertainment of common characteristics along with the absence of the perception of the specific distinguishing mark of one of the objects. To indicate this absence of perception, Gautama refers to the *mere remembrance* of the specific distinguishing mark. Doubt persists so long as there is this mere remembrance. But when this remembrance is replaced by the perception of the specific distinguishing mark, the doubt comes to an end.

To sum up: all the objections raised against Gautama's view of five-fold doubt rest upon misunderstanding the real implications of his *sūtra*. Why, then, Gautama himself raises all these futile objections and answers them? The purpose is to make his own *sūtra* secure from any possible misunderstanding.

Sūtra 7

Wherever there is doubt, these successive steps [i.e. these objections and their answers] are to be discussed. // ii. 1. 7 //

Bhāṣya

Wherever in 'a branch of study' (*śāstra*) or a 'public debate' (*kathā*), there is critical discussion after an initial doubt, there should be offered these answers to those who [intend to] refute doubt itself. Therefore, doubt being presupposed by all forms of critical discussion, is itself critically discussed first.

Elucidation

The special purpose of this *sūtra* is to show why, of all the categories, doubt is critically discussed first. As Vātsyāyana concludes, the reason is that doubt is the indispensable precondition of critical examination in any form and, therefore, Gautama gives priority to the critical discussion of doubt itself.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF DOUBT

(*saṃśaya-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

II. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL

Bhāṣya

Next is the critical examination of the 'instrument of valid knowledge' (*pramāṇa*).

Sūtra 8

[Objection] Perception etc are 'without validity' (*aprāmāṇya*), because of their 'ineffectiveness in the three times' (*traikālya-asiddhi*). //ii. 1. 8//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Perception etc have no validity [i.e. these cannot be the instruments of valid knowledge], because of their ineffectiveness in the three times, i.e. these cannot logically be either prior to or posterior to or coexistent with [the objects of valid knowledge].

Elucidation

Doubt being the precondition of critical examination itself, Gautama first critically examines doubt. After this, he passes on to examine critically the categories in the order in which these are mentioned in the *sūtra*. Logically, therefore, he now takes up *pramāṇa* and begins with the critical examination of its general possibility. The doubt which is presupposed by the critical examination of *pramāṇa*, as explained by Uddyotakara, is as follows : Since *pramāṇa* itself is an object of knowledge and since the objects of knowledge are existent or non-existent, the question arises whether *pramāṇa* as an object of knowledge is existent or non-existent. In accordance with the second alternative, Gautama begins the critical examination of *pramāṇa* by raising the objection that the forms of *pramāṇa*—i.e. *pramāṇa* as such—are non-existent, which means that they have no validity. Vācaspati argues that this objection represents the standpoint of the Mādhyamikas, according to whom, the so called *pramāṇa*-s, failing as these do to prove the existence of the objects in the three dimensions of time, are non-existent. According to Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, since Gautama is earlier than the Buddhist

philosophers, this claim of Vâcaspati is to be understood in the sense that Gautama actually anticipates the objection eventually raised by the Mādhyamikas.

The main point of the objection is that *pramāṇa* cannot exist either before or after or simultaneously with the object. Hence *pramāṇa* never exists. As such, *pramāṇa* cannot prove its object. In the next three *sūtra*-s Gautama elaborates this objection.

Bhāṣya

The implication of this general statement [i.e. of the previous *sūtra*] is elaborated [as follows] :

Sūtra 9

[Objection] If *pramāṇa* exists prior to its object, then there will be no perçeption resulting from sense-object contact. //ii. 1. 9 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] Perception is the knowledge of objects like smell etc. If this [knowledge] is prior and the existence of smell etc is posterior, then this knowledge cannot be due to the contact with smell etc.

Elucidation

Explaininig this objection, Gautama first shows that *pramāṇa* cannot exist prior to its object. Perception is defined as the knowledge due to sense-object contact. Therefore, if perception itself is conceived as prior to the existence of its object, there is no scope for such a contact. Though the *sūtra* refers only to perception, the implication is that similar objections can be raised against the other forms of *pramāṇa* as well.

Sūtra 10

[Objection] If [*pramāṇa*] exists posterior to [its object] then the objects cannot be determined by the *pramāṇa*-s. // ii. 1. 10 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] If *pramāṇa* itself does not exist [which is implied by the assumption that *pramāṇa* is posterior to its objects], what is there to rightly determine the object so that it can acquire the status of an 'object of valid knowledge' (*prameya*) ? An object becomes an object proper only when it is rightly determined by a *pramāṇa*.

Elucidation

Assuming *pramāṇa* to be posterior to its objects, we are to admit that it is non-existing while the object exists. In that case, an object cannot be proved by a *pramāṇa*, since the *pramāṇa* itself is yet to come into existence. It may be argued that an object as object may exist even before it becomes an object of valid knowledge. To this Vācaspati answers that the real point of the objection is that though the existence of an object as object may be independent of a *pramāṇa*, its status as an object of valid knowledge is determined by a *pramāṇa* and, therefore, *pramāṇa* cannot be posterior to an object as an object of valid knowledge.

Sūtra 11

[Objection] If [*pramāṇa*] exists simultaneously with [its object], then there will be the absence of the succession of one knowledge after the other, because each knowledge is restricted to its specific object. // ii. 1. 11 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] If *pramāṇa* is simultaneous with its object, then the knowledge restricted to their respective objects of smell etc perceived by the senses would be simultaneous. Since cognitions are restricted to their respective objects, there results the absence of succession. These cognitions [of different objects] which arise one after another—their succession would be unaccountable. There results also a contradiction with the *sūtra* : "The absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is a proban for [the inference of] the mind" [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 16].

These are the possible temporal orders in which *pramāṇa* and *prameya* may exist. But each of these is [shown to be] logically impossible. Therefore, there can be no validity of perception etc.

Elucidation

The assumption that *pramāṇa* and its object are simultaneous grossly violates the Nyāya thesis that the simultaneity of knowledge is impossible. If the object exists simultaneously with its *pramāṇa*,—e.g., if there co-exist the contact of the visual sense with colour as well as the contact of the olfactory sense with smell,—both colour and smell would be the objects of their respective senses and as such there will be simultaneous knowledge of these two. On the Nyāya view, however, it is an accepted fact that simultaneous cognitions are impossible. Gautama himself makes this the ground for the inference of mind.

Though Vātsyāyana illustrates the objection only with perception, the implication is that the same objection can be extended to inference and other instruments of valid knowledge. Inference as an instrument of valid knowledge is itself a form of knowledge and its object is the resulting inferential knowledge. Thus, to assume that inference as an instrument of valid knowledge coexists with its object amounts to the assertion of the simultaneity of two cognitions.

Vātsyāyana sums up the objections and says that these are the only three possible forms of time-relation between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. All these three forms being shown to be impossible, *pramāṇa* can never prove its object and as such there can be no category called the *pramāṇa*.

Bhāṣya

Here are the answers. Since there is no fixed order of being anterior, posterior or coexistent between the cause of knowledge [i.e. *pramāṇa*] and the object known [i.e. *prameya*], the relation [between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*] is to be specifically stated as actually observed in the different cases. In some cases the cause of knowledge exists beforehand and the object of knowledge comes into being later. E.g., the illumination of the sun for the objects under the process of being produced. In some cases, the object of knowledge exists beforehand and the cause of knowledge comes into being later. E.g., light of the lamp for the objects already existing. In some cases, the cause of knowledge and the object of knowledge coexist. E.g., the knowledge of fire from smoke.

Pramāṇa is the cause of knowledge and *prameya* is the object of knowledge. Therefore, in the absence of any fixed order of being anterior, posterior or coexistent between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, the relation between them is to be stated specifically in the form in which the object is actually observed. Thus, the objections do not hold if the objects are viewed in their specific forms. But the objections are raised by taking the objects indiscriminately.

Elucidation

The real ground of these objections is that, of the three possible forms of time-relation, none can exist between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*. But Vātsyāyana argues that it is wrong to imagine that one of these three forms of time-relation must exist between *pramāṇa* and *prameya* in general. In different cases, the time-relation between *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is observed to be different. *Pramāṇa*, argues Vātsyāyana, is afterall a cause of knowledge and we find that in different cases the cause of knowledge has different forms of time-relation with the object of knowledge.

Bhāṣya

It is so termed, because the ground for using the term is present in the three times. [You raise the objection] that if *pramāṇa* is posterior then in the absence of *pramāṇa* no object can acquire the status of the *prameya* ; only the object rightly determined by *pramāṇa* is known as *prameya* [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 10]. [We answer] the ground for the use of the term *pramāṇa* is "being the cause of knowledge" and this [i.e. the ground] is connected with the three times, viz. "one knew", "one knows" and "one will know." It has been so termed, because the ground for using the term is connected with the three times. [It is] *pramāṇa*, [because] by it an object was rightly determined, is being rightly determined and will be rightly determined. Similarly, [it is] *prameya* [because] it was rightly determined, is being rightly determined and will be rightly determined. Such being the case, all statements like "it is a *prameya*", "it will be known by the appropriate cause [of knowledge, i.e. *pramāṇa*]", "this object will be rightly determined", etc are all permissible. The denial of this connection with the three times leads to the violation of usual practice. One denying all these cannot logically say : "bring the cook, he will cook", "bring the wood-cutter, he will do the cutting", etc.

Elucidation

In *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 10, the objection is raised that if *pramāṇa* is viewed as posterior to *prameya*, then the use of the terms *pramāṇa* and *prameya* becomes illegitimate, because a *pramāṇa* is a *pramāṇa* only when it actually proves a *prameya* and a *prameya* is a *prameya* only when it is actually proved by a *pramāṇa*. Vātsyāyana answers that *pramāṇa* means something which has the capacity to prove an object and *prameya* means something which has the possibility of being proved by a *pramāṇa*. Such a capacity and possibility may have reference to the past, present and future,—i.e. may be connected with the three times. Therefore, there is no absurdity in conceiving an object as *prameya* even when it is yet to be proved.

Bhāṣya

Pramāṇa is sought to be refuted with the argument : perception etc are without validity because of their ineffectiveness in the three times [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 8]. But let us ask him [i.e. the objector] : Now, what precisely do you intend to achieve by your objection ? Do you propose to deny their existence (*sambhava*) or do you want to prove their non-existence (*asambhava*) ? If you want to deny their existence, [the very act of such a denial] implying [the admission of] their existence, the attempt to refute perception etc becomes illogical. If, on the other hand, you intend to prove their non-existence, then your refutation itself will acquire the status of *pramāṇa*, inasmuch as your refutation will become the ground for the knowledge of the non-existence of *pramāṇa*.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana argues that the objection, viz. perception etc are without validity, may be intended either to deny their existence or to prove their non-existence. The first alternative is impossible, because the very attempt to deny their existence presupposes the admission of their existence inasmuch as there is no sense in demolishing the possible existence of something which has no existence at all, just as it is impossible to smash with a stick the jar which does not exist. But the objector may claim that the non-existence of perception etc is an accomplished fact and he intends simply to express this. Vātsyāyana answers that the very argument expressing the non-existence of the *pramāṇa*-s will be considered as a *pramāṇa*, because the argument itself ascertains a knowledge, which is precisely the function of a *pramāṇa*.

Bhāṣya

Moreover—

Sūtra 12

[Answer] The refutation [i.e. the objection raised against *pramāṇa*] is untenable, because of its [i.e. of the refutation itself] ineffectiveness in the three times. // ii. 1. 12 //

Bhāṣya

This [i.e. the statement of the *sūtra*] is explained as follows. If the refutation is prior, then there being nothing to be refuted what can be refuted by it ? If [the refutation] is posterior, there can be nothing called the refuted, because there is no refutation. If the two are coexistent, then the refutation becomes redundant, because the refuted is already accepted. Thus, the arguments for refutation being untenable, the validity of perception etc is established.

Elucidation

Ineffectiveness in the three times, the alleged ground for refuting the validity of *pramāṇa*, is shown by Gautama to be the ground for the refutation of the objections themselves.

In the *sūtra*, "refutation" means the statement refuting the validity of perception etc, viz. "Perception etc have no validity because of their ineffectiveness in the three times." The "refuted" (i.e. the thesis which is refuted) is the validity of perception etc.

Gautama asks whether the "statement" is to be viewed as prior to or posterior to or coexistent with the "refuted" ?

If the "statement" is assumed to be prior, i.e. admitting that perception etc have no validity, there remains no thesis to be refuted over again by the "statement", i.e. the "refuted" becomes redundant.

If the "statement" is assumed to be posterior, i.e. admitting that perception etc have validity prior to the "statement", there results the impossibility of refuting the validity of perception etc which is already admitted to be an accomplished fact.

If the "statement" and the "refuted" are viewed as coexistent, the latter becomes independent of the former, which means that the "statement" itself becomes irrelevant or useless.

In this connection, Uddyotakara raises a new issue. The objector contends that the validity of perception etc does not exist. This is either meaningless or this amounts to the admission of the validity somewhere else. There is no sense in denying the absolutely non-existent like the flower imagined to blossom in the sky. The denial of something can have sense only when its existence is admitted somewhere else, e.g., to say that there is no jar in the room means that it exists elsewhere. Similarly, the claim that there is no validity in perception etc amounts to the admission of the existence of the validity in something else. That something, however, being characterised by validity, will have to be considered as *pramāṇa*. Thus the objector cannot deny *pramāṇa* altogether.

Sūtra 13

[Answer continued] The refutation [i.e. the objection raised against *pramāṇa*] is untenable, because of the total denial of *pramāṇa* // ii. 1. 13 //

Bhāṣya

How? If any exemplification (*udāharaṇa*) is offered in favour of your proban, viz. "ineffectiveness in the three times", then in this corroborative instance is to be shown the efficacy of this proban in proving the probandum. In that case, perception etc cannot be without validity, because [if it is still claimed] that perception etc have no validity, the probandum will not be proved in spite of the exemplification being offered. Thus the proban offered by you, being contradicted by all the instruments of valid knowledge, becomes a pseudo-proban [viz the pseudo-proban called "the contradictory" (*viruddha*), for it is claimed] "the pseudo-proban called the contradictory means a mark which is in contradiction with one's own accepted thesis." [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 2. 6]. His [i.e. of the objector] conclusion is contained in the implication of his statement and the implication of his statement is: "Perception etc cannot rightly determine their objects." The inference-components are to be mentioned for establishing this conclusion. If [these inference-components] are not mentioned, then the refutation itself remains unaccomplished, because the efficacy of the proban in proving the probandum is

not shown with the help of an exemplification, inasmuch as [the alleged mark] is yet to acquire the status of a real proban. [In other words, Vātsyāyana shows that the objection itself is a case of flat contradiction. The objector is using inference-components to prove his thesis ; but to use the inference-components is to admit the validity of the four *pramāṇa*-s, inasmuch as the inference-components are based on these. At the same time, the objector wants to conclude that the *pramāṇa*-s have no validity.

Elucidation

Gautama argues that without assuming the validity of any *pramāṇa* whatsoever, it is impossible to prove that perception etc have no validity. Vātsyāyana explains this as follows.

First, the objector is in fact trying to prove his contention with the help of an inference. The proban of this inference is : "ineffectiveness in the three times." But the inferential procedure demands that one must mention the exemplification,—showing the coexistence of the proban and the probandum in an instance,—without which the proban itself becomes illegitimate. Exemplification depends on perception. Therefore, in order to mention the exemplification, the objector has to admit the validity of perception. But this is in contradiction with his contention that perception etc have no validity.

Further, as already shown (on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 1), inference-components are based on the four *pramāṇa*-s. One cannot, therefore, deny the *pramāṇa*-s and at the same time take resort to an inference.

Sūtra 14

[Answer continued] [If it is claimed that] these [i.e. *pramāṇa*-s underlying the inference-components of the opponent himself] are valid, the negatin (*vipratiṣedha*) of all *pramāṇa*-s cannot be established. // ii. 1. 14 //

Bhāṣya

If it is claimed that perception etc forming the basis of the inference-components of the statement [refuting the validity of *pramāṇa*-s] are valid, then it

will have to be admitted that [perception etc] similarly underlying the inference-components of others are also valid, because there is no fundamental difference between the two cases. Therefore, all *pramāṇa*-s are not negated. The prefix *vi* in the word *vipratiṣedha* is used in the sense of "particularly" and not in the sense of "contrariety", because in that case [the *sūtra*] makes no sense.

Elucidation

As we have seen, according to Phaṇibhūṣaṇa the *pūrvapakṣa* here represents the view of the Śūnyavādins. They may claim that the *pramāṇa*-s underlying their own inference-components are assumed to be only empirically valid (*avicārita-siddha*, i.e. generally assumed to be valid irrespective of critical examination). But the question is what exactly is meant by being empirically valid ? Is it thus called because it cannot really stand critical examination proper ? Or is it thus called because it is simply indisputable ? In the former case, the so-called empirical validity means a denial of validity proper and, therefore, on the strength of this it is impossible to refute the position of anybody else. In the latter case, it means real validity and, therefore, cannot be the ground for destroying the validity of *pramāṇa* as such.

Though according to some the 13th and the 14th *sūtra*-s are not admitted to be independent *sūtra*-s, in Vācaspati's *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* these two are read as separate *sūtra*-s.

Sūtra 15

[Answer continued] Further, ineffectiveness in the three times is not established, because it [i.e. *prameya*] is established [by the *pramāṇa* which is posterior], just like proving the musical instrument from its sound [which is produced later]. // ii. 1. 15 //

Bhāṣya

Why is it said over again ? To show the connection with what is already said. [This is said over again] to convey that we have here the root of what was previously stated, viz. "since there is no fixed order of being anterior to or posterior to or coexistent with between the cause of knowledge and the object

known, the relation is to be specifically stated as actually observed in the different cases." [*Bhāṣya* on ii. 1. 11]. The sage, observing the irregularity [of the time-relation] is rejecting the objection based on the assumed regularity [of the said time-relation] and says that ineffectiveness in the three times is not valid. He cites the example of only one [form of time-relation with the words] "just like proving the musical instrument from its sound." Just as from the sound, which is produced later, is inferred the musical instrument, which is already existing,—the probandum here is the musical instrument and the proban proving it is its sound—even when the musical instrument is out of sight, it is inferred from its sound. The lyre (*vīṇā*) is being played, the flute (*veṇu*) is being blown—[in these ways] from the peculiarity of sound is inferred the particular instrument. Similarly, the object of knowledge, which is already existing is known by the cause of knowledge, which occurs later. The instance cited being only a specimen, [it is implied that] the examples of the other two forms [of time-relation] are to be similarly collected.

[Objection] But why is it not mentioned here ? Further, what is said there [i.e. on *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 11] should have been stated here.

[Answer] The point is to state these implications and it makes no difierence whether it is stated here or elsewhere.

Elucidation

This *sūtra* contains the final refutation of the objections raised against *pramāṇa*. Viśvanātha shows that by this *sūtra* Gautama intends to silence the Śūnyavādins who claim that the universe is mere void (*śūnya*), *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are unreal and as such there is no need from their point of view to prove any *prameya* with the help of a *pramāṇa*. Hence, claims the Śūnyavādin, he has no need to prove any thesis of his own. He simply shows that the believers in *pramāṇa* are wrong, inasmuch as *pramāṇa* can exist in no time-relation with *prameya*. As against this, Gautama finally says that the alleged absence of time-relation, which is the ultimate ground of the Śūnyavādins, is untenable.

Bhāṣya

The terms *pramāṇa* and *prameya* may coexist [i.e. may be interchangeable] in the same object, if there is adequate ground for using the terms [inter-changeably]. And the grounds for using the terms are [as follows] : *pramāṇa* is that which produces knowledge and *prameya* is that which becomes the object of

knowledge. In the event of an object of knowledge becoming instrumental to producing the knowledge of something else, the same object is termed both a *pramāṇa* and a *prameya*. To convey this implication is said the following—

Sūtra 16

Just as the 'measuring instrument' (*tulā*) [which usually has the status of a *pramāṇa*] can be a *prameya* as well [i.e. when its own accuracy is subject to investigation]. // ii. 1. 16 //

Elucidation

Vâcaspati says that this *sūtra* is in answer to a possible objection. According to the objection, the absence of any fixed characterisation is indicative of the unreality of the characterisations. Thus, e.g., when a rope is characterised as a snake or as the edge of a sword, the characterisations, viz. snake etc, are unreal. In answer to this, the *sūtra* shows that the absence of fixed characterisation is not necessarily indicative of the unreality of the characterisations. Thus, the same measuring instrument is characterised as a *pramāṇa* when it determines the weight of an object ; when, however, its own accuracy is subject to investigation, it is characterised as a *prameya*. Both the characterisations here are well-accepted in life and as such there is no question of the unreality of the characterisations. Thus the same thing in different circumstances can really be both a *pramāṇa* and a *prameya*.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa draws our attention to the point that the measuring instrument is here characterised both as a *pramāṇa* and a *prameya*. But Gautama's lists of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* do no include anything like the measuring instrument. This shows that Gautama is here using the words *pramāṇa* and *prameya* in wider senses. *Pramāṇa* here means whatever that gives us right knowledge about something, and *prameya* means whatever that becomes the object of right knowledge.

Bhāṣya

The measuring instrument is a *pramāṇa* when it gives the knowledge of correct weight. The objects of knowledge, in this case, are gold etc which have weight. If, however, the accuracy of another measuring instrument is determined by gold etc then for the knowledge of the other measuring instrument, gold etc

are *pramāṇa*-s. And the other measuring instrument is *prameya*. Similarly are to be understood all the categories enumerated [in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 1]. Thus the self is mentioned in the list of *prameya*-s, because of it being the object of knowledge. It is [also] considered *pramātā* (knower), because of its independent role in producing knowledge. Knowledge (*buddhi*) is considered to be a *pramāṇa* when it leads to another knowledge, it is a *prameya* when it is itself the object of another knowledge, it is *pramiti* (right knowledge) when it is neither of the two [i. e. neither a *pramāṇa* nor a *prameya*]. In this way, the assemblage of different epithets in the same category is to be understood.

[Vātsyāyana gives the analogy of grammatical use]. Thus, the words denoting grammatical cases (*kāraka*-s) can assemble in the same thing when there is ground for their use. [In the sentence] "The tree exists", the tree is the subject (*kartā*), because it depends upon nothing else for its existence. [In the sentence] "One looks at the tree", the tree is the object (*karma*), because by the act of seeing this is sought to be attained above all. [In the sentence] "One indicates the moon with the tree [as the pointer]", the tree is used in the instrumental (*karaṇa*), because in this case the pointer is 'most efficacious' (*sādhakatama*). [In the sentence] "One sprinkles water to the tree", the tree is used in the dative (*sampradāna*), because by the water sprinkled one tends to be related to the tree. [In the sentence] "Leaves fall from the tree", the tree is used in the ablative (*apādāna*), because the ablative is that which remains constant in the case of disjunction. [In the sentence] "There are birds in the tree", the tree is used in the locative (*adhikaraṇa*), because the locative is the substratum of the verb.

As thus shown, neither the substance by itself nor the action by itself forms a grammatical case. What then ? The grammatical case consists in being instrumental to the action as well as being characterised by some activity of its own. The subject is that which is an aid to action as well as which remains independent,—and not the substance by itself nor the action by itself. The object is that which is sought by the action and which is the most desired,—and not the substance by itself nor the action by itself. Similar are the cases of the 'most efficacious' etc [i.e. of *karaṇa* etc]. Thus, the grammatical cases are justified by logical demonstration as well as the definitions [of Pāṇini]. Thus the term 'grammatical case' does not apply to the substance by itself or the action by itself. What then ? Something which is instrumental to the action and is characterised by some activity of its own [is considered as a grammatical case]. *Pramāṇa*, *prameya*, etc are [also in a sense] 'words denoting grammatical cases' (*kāraka-śabda*). As such, these cannot renounce the nature of grammatical cases.

Elucidation

With the illustration of the measuring instrument, Vātsyāyana shows that the same thing may be, according to circumstances, an instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and an object of valid knowledge (*prameya*). The argument is further corroborated by the analogy of the use of the grammatical cases and Phaṇibhūṣaṇa elaborately explains these grammatical cases by quoting the original *sūtra*-s of Pāṇini.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Let all these be admitted [viz.] that the words denoting grammatical cases can assemble in the same thing when there is ground for their use; that perception etc are the instruments of valid knowledge in their capacity of producing knowledge and [at the same time] are objects of valid knowledge in so far as these are subjected to another knowledge; that perception etc may themselves be known and each of these [viz. perception etc] is distinctly known [in the following forms :] "I apprehend by perception", "I apprehend by inference", "I apprehend by comparison", "I apprehend by verbal testimony" ; "My knowledge is perceptual", "My knowledge is inferential", "My knowledge is comparison-acquired", "My knowledge is verbal" ; that all these are known distinctly when they are known from their definitions offered, viz. "The knowledge resulting from sense-object contact", etc.

[Even assuming all these] is this apprehension, having perception etc for its object, derived from some source of valid knowledge different [from perception etc i.e. the sources of knowledge acknowledged by Gautama himself] or is it without any need of *pramāṇa* ? What actually is the distinguishing feature of the two alternatives ?

Sūtra 17

[Objection] If the knowledge of the *pramāṇa*-s is determined by some *pramāṇa*, then it results in the assumption of some instrument of valid knowledge other then [those admitted by Gautama]. // ii. 1. 17 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] If perception etc are apprehended by some *pramāṇa,* then the *pramāṇa* by which these are apprehended, being another *pramāṇa*, leads to the admission of some *pramāṇa* other than [the recognised ones]. Thus [Gautama] hints at an infinite regress [in the following form] : This other *pramāṇa* is to be apprehended by another *pramāṇa* and this another *pramāṇa* by a still other one,—and so on. Such an infinite regress is inadmissible, because it has no logical justification.

Elucidation

As against Gautama's claim that perception etc are themselves objects of valid knowledge, an objection is raised : Are perception etc apprehended by some *pramāṇa* other than the recognised ones or not ? In the present *sūtra* is shown the difficulty of the first alternative and that of the second will be shown in the next *sūtra.*

Since a *pramāṇa* cannot apprehend itself just as the same sword cannot cut itself, the assumption that perception etc are apprehended leads to the admission of some *pramāṇa* other than perception etc,—i.e. other than the four recognised ones. Such an admission results in an infinite regress, because this other *pramāṇa* needs to be apprehended by a further one, and so on.

Of course, all cases of infinite regress are not illegitimate. There are cases where both the contestants in a debate are forced to admit the same infinite regress and as such none of the two can prove the infinite regress to be fallacious. These are cases of 'legitimate infinite regress' (*prāmāṇikī anavasthā*). E.g., the seed produces the tree and the tree produces the seed *ad infinitum.* But the infinite regress involved in the assumption that perception etc are apprehended by *pramāṇa* is not such a legitimate one.

Bhāṣya

This being so, will it be admitted that [perception etc are] apprehended without any additional *pramāṇa* ?

Sūtra 18

[Objection continued] If no additional *pramāṇa* is admitted [for the apprehension of perception

etc] then let the apprehension of the *prameya*-s be same as the apprehension of *pramāṇa*-s [i.e. let the *prameya*-s as well be apprehended without any *pramāṇa* like perception etc.] //ii.1.18//

Bhāṣya

[Objection continued] If the apprehension of perception etc be without any special *pramāṇa*, then let there be in the apprehension of the self also no special *pramāṇa*, because the two cases are not different. Thus results the denial of all *pramāṇa*-s.

Elucidation

If, as the second alternative, it is claimed that there is no need for admitting any special *pramāṇa* for the apprehension of perception etc, then there will result the denial of all *pramāṇa*-s. If perception etc can be apprehended without any special *pramāṇa*, then the *prameya*-s may as well be apprehended without any *pramāṇa*. Thus, in short, no *pramāṇa* is needed for the apprehension of either perception etc or of the *prameya*-s : as such all *pramāṇa*-s become unnecssary.

Bhāṣya

That is why [Gautama] says—

Sūtra 19

[Answer] No. Because these [i.e. perception etc] are apprehended in the same way as the light of a lamp. // ii. 1. 19 //

Elucidation

Gautama answers that perception etc are apprehended by *pramāṇa*-s of the same nature. Thus, a perception may be apprehended by another perception. E. g., the

light of the lamp is a cause of perceptual knowledge and, therefore, is an instrument of perceptual knowledge, i.e. a *pramāṇa*. At the same time, the light of the lamp is apprehended through its contact with the visual sense, which contact, again, is an instrument of perceptual knowledge. Thus a perception can be apprehended by another perception. Hence is rejected the objection that the admission of the apprehension of perception etc results either in a vicious infinite regress or in the denial of all *pramāṇa*-s.

It may be objected that the object of apprehension cannot itself be the cause of that apprehension. How can the same perception perceive itself ? The answer is that Gautama does not claim that the same perception perceives itself. On the contrary, his contention is that one perception is apprehended by another similar one. In the same way, an inference can be apprehended by another similar inference. Further, it is wrong to assume that something cannot be instrumental to its own apprehension. E.g., when one infers the mind, the mind itself is one of the instruments of this inference, because without the instrumentality of mind there can be no knowledge whatsoever.

It may be objected that the above assertion does not fully remove the possibility of a vicious infinite regress. Even assuming that a *pramāṇa* is apprehended by another similar one, the need of apprehending this second *pramāṇa* remains, which can be fulfilled only by a third *pramāṇa*,—and so on. Thus, there will never be any final knowledge of any *pramāṇa*. In answer it is said that the need of apprehending a *pramāṇa* does not necessarily arise. When the object is apprehended by a *pramāṇa*, we do not usually feel the necessity of apprehending this *pramāṇa* itself, just as when an object is revealed by a lamp, we do not feel the need of separately revealing the lamp itself. Even in exceptional cases where such a need is felt, only a subsequent apprehension of the *pramāṇa* is enough to meet this need.

Bhāṣya

As for example, the light of the lamp, which is an auxiliary cause of perception, is itself an instrument of knowledge in the perception of the visible objects and it is apprehended over again by another instrument of valid perceptual knowledge, viz. its contact with the eyes. [The lamp] is inferred to be a cause of visual perception, because the presence and absence of the lamp are followed by the presence and absence of visual perception. Further, [the lamp] is known to be [the cause of visual perception] also from verbal testimony. [As it is advised :] "The lamp is to be taken up in darkness." In this way, perception etc are apprehended by perception etc, as is observed in actual cases. However, the sense-organs are inferred from the apprehension of the respective objects by them. The objects of the senses are apprehended by perception. The sense-object contact is inferred by the proban in the form of obstruction (*āvaraṇa*). The knowledge

resulting from sense-object contact is, like pleasure etc, apprehended from the peculiar conjunction of the self with mind and from the relation of inherence with the self. Similarly, the different *pramāṇa*-s are to be separately explained. Just as the light of the lamp, after being itself perceived, becomes instrumental to the perception of other visible objects and attains 'the status of both the object as well as the cause of visual perception' (*dṛśya-darśana-vyavasthā*), so also something, in spite of being an object of knowledge, acquires the status of both an instrument as well as the object of valid knowledge by virtue of its producing knowledge. Thus, the apprehension of perception etc are effected through perception etc as actually observed and not by any separate *pramāṇa*, nor without the instrumentality of any *pramāṇa* whatsoever.

It cannot be argued, "It [perception] cannot be apprehended by itself", because the general definition is applicable to various objects [i.e. the general definition of perception is applicable to all the factors producing the perceptual knowledge]. [Objection] It is illogical that perception etc are apprehended by perception etc themselves, because the apprehension of something is due to something else. [Answer] No; the general definition is applicable to various objects. The definition of perception is applicable to various factors. Among these, one is apprehended by another and as such there is nothing illegitimate [about it]. Similar is the case of inference etc. E.g., from the water fetched is apprehended the water of the tank.

Again, [the objection is untenable because the characteristics of the apprehender and the apprehended] are observed [at the same time] both in the self and in mind. [In knowledge like] "I am happy", "I am unhappy", is found the apprehension of the same knower by itself. In [the *sūtra* i. 1. 16] "the absence of simultaneous cognitions is the proban for the inference of mind", the same mind is inferred by itself. [In these two cases] there is identity of the knower and the identity of the apprehender and the apprehended.

If it is objected that [in the cases of the self and the mind apprehending themselves] there are involved other factors, [our answer is] the same point [applies to all cases of apprehension]. [To the objection that] the knower does not know the self without the aid of other factors or that the mind is not apprehended by the mind without the aid of other factors, [our answer is] the same point [applies to all cases of apprehension]. In the case of the apprehension of perception etc through perception etc, no distinctive feature presents itself [i.e. the same point raised by the objector applies to all cases of perception].

It cannot be logically claimed that there is anything outside the objects of perception etc [i.e. whatever exists is the object of any of the four *pramāṇa*-s]. Had there been any kind of object which cannot be an object of perception etc, i.e. which cannot be apprehended by perception etc, [only] for the apprehension of that an additional *pramāṇa* would have been postulated. But since such kind of object cannot be pointed to by anybody [it is to be admitted] that all these objects

—both positive (*sat*) and negative (*asat*)—must be apprehended by perception etc, as these are actually observed. Without referring to any special ground, some offer the instance [of the lamp] alone—unconnected with any real proban—for proving the probandum. [Thus it may be claimed] "Just as the light of a lamp is apprehended without the aid of another lamp, so also the instruments of valid knowledge are apprehended without the aid of any other instrument of valid knowledge." Such an instance is—

Sūtra 20

Irregular [i.e. cannot prove the probandum], because in certain cases is observed the want of the need [of another *pramāṇa*] and in certain cases is observed the need [of another *pramāṇa*]. [In the case of the apprehension of the lamp, there is no need of any further lamp ; whereas in the case of the apprehension of a jar, there is the definite need of a *pramāṇa*]. // ii. 1. 20 //

Bhāṣya

Just as this point (*prasaṅga*) [viz. the instance of the lamp] is offered to prove the apprehension of the instruments of knowledge [without the aid of any further *pramāṇa*] because of the observed want of need [in the case of the lamp], similarly it [viz. the instance of the lamp] may as well be offered to prove the apprehension of the objects of valid knowledge [without the aid of any *pramāṇa*], because there is nothing to differentiate between the two cases. Just as in the case of the apprehension of the colour of the cooking pot etc, the light of the lamp is resorted to for apprehending the object of knowledge, similarly it [i.e. some *pramāṇa*] should be resorted to for apprehending the instruments of valid knowledge also, because there is nothing to differentiate between the two cases. Thus the mere instance unaccompanied by the mention of any real ground, becomes irregular, because it is admissible in one case [i.e. in the case of the apprehension of a *pramāṇa*] and inadmissible in another [i.e. in the case of the apprehension of the objects of valid knowledge]. The instance, being appropriate for merely one of the cases, is irregular because there is no definite ground.

Elucidation

According to Uddyotakara and Viśvanātha, this *sūtra* does not actually form part of Gautama's text. It is in fact a statement of Vātsyāyana intended to refute the interpretation of Gautama's view, according to which the instruments of valid knowledge like perception etc are not in need of any further *pramāṇa* for their apprehension, just as the lamp does not need another lamp to reveal it.

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa accepts it as an independent *sūtra* on the authority of Vācaspati's *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha.*

In any case, the view refuted here is that just as the lamp is not in need of any other lamp for proving its own existence and for its apprehension, so also perception etc are not in need of any further *pramāṇa* for proving their own existence and for their apprehension. This could have been the view of the upholders of the 'doctrine of intrinsic validity of knowledge' (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya-vāda*). In refutation of this view, it is pointed out that a mere instance does not prove any thesis. A thesis can be established by an instance only when it is substantiated by a proban. In the absence of such a proban, the instance by itself becomes irregular : it may be applied to prove that a *pramāṇa* is not in need of any further *pramāṇa* but it cannot be applied to prove that a *prameya* is not in need of any *pramāṇa*. If it is admitted that a *prameya* like the cooking pot is inevitably in need of a *pramāṇa* for its apprehension, Vātsyāyana argues that the same should be true of *pramāṇa*, that, in other words, a *pramāṇa* also is in need of a further *pramāṇa* for its apprehension.

Bhāṣya

If any specific ground is mentioned, the refutation [offered above] will be untenable because of the resulting regularity of [the instance] to one of the alternatives. An instance accompanied by the mention of a specific ground, being invariably connected with one of the alternatives, cannot be questioned. This being so, the refutation [that the instance is] irregular, becomes untenable.

Elucidation

By adding a specific ground to the instance of the lamp, it may be claimed : "A *pramāṇa* is not in need of any further *pramāṇa*, because it reveals an object, like the lamp." Stated thus, with the specific ground viz. "because it reveals an object", the instance becomes applicable only to the case of the *pramāṇa* and is inapplicable to the case of the *prameya* which does not reveal an object. Thus is avoided the possibility of the irregularity of the instance.

This is how Uddyotakara interprets Vātsyāyana. However, Vācaspati adds that the real intention of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara is to show that though in this way the objector may avoid the difficulty of irregularity of the instance, he nevertheless remains committed to other difficulties. Though the lamp does not need another lamp to reveal itself, still it requires something apart from itself in order to be revealed. The lamp is not revealed without any contact with the visual sense. This shows that the revelation of the lamp, though independent of something similar (*sajātīya*), is dependent on something dissimilar (*vijātīya*). Thus, even by adding the specific ground to the instance cited, it may at best be claimed that a *pramāṇa* is not in need of any further similar *pramāṇa*.

If the objector accepts this position, then the further question will be : What exactly does he mean by a similar *pramāṇa* ? Does it mean something absolutely similar or only partly similar ? In the former case he seeks to prove what is already accepted by us, for we also admit that a *pramāṇa* is not in need of any further absolutely similar *pramāṇa*. E.g., the visual sense is apprehended not by another sense-organ but by an inference. If, on the other hand, the objector wants to prove that a *pramāṇa* is not in need of any further partly similar *pramāṇa*, then the instance of the lamp will not be of any use for him, because the lamp and the visual sense, being revealers, are partly similar and since the lamp is in need of the visual sense for its apprehension, the instance does not prove the redundance of the partly similar.

Thus, claims Vācaspati, by adding a specific ground to the instance of the lamp, the objector may evade the charge of the irregularity of the instance; but he remains open to other fallacies.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, does not accept this interpretation. According to him, the real point of Vātsyāyana is that the objector could have avoided the charge of the irregularity of the instance only if he could successfully add specific ground to the instance of the lamp. But the objector fails to do so and as such remains open to the charge of irregularity.

Bhāṣya

It cannot be objected that if perception etc are apprehended through perception etc, there results infinite regress because the activities of practical life are based on the knowledge of the objects rightly known and the causes thereof [i.e. of the knowledge]. The activities in practical life relating to the attainment of virtue (*dharma*), wealth (*artha*), pleasure (*sukha*) and liberation (*apavarga*)—as well as [relating to] the avoidance of their opposites—are successfully carried on by one who acquires the knowledge of the objects rightly known and the causes thereof

[i.e. of the knowledge] in the following form : "I apprehend by perception", "I apprehend by inference", "I apprehend by comparison" and "I apprehend by verbal testimony" ; again, "My knowledge is perceptual", "My knowledge is inferential", "My knowledge is comparison-acquired" and "My knowledge is verbal." Now, these activities are fulfilled only by this much and there is not any other form of activity indicative of an infinite regress, being compelled by which one takes resort to an infinite regress.

Elucidation

The definite knowledge of an object resulting from perception etc is called *vyavasāya.* This is followed by a subsequent internal perception having for its object this knowledge itself. Such a subsequent internal perception is called *anu-vyavasāya.* Thus one perceives the jar first and has the subsequent internal perception in the form : "I have knowledge of the jar." For the activities of practical life, these cognitions are sufficient and there is no question of any further knowledge of this subsequent internal perception, the postulation of which may result in an infinite regress.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PRAMĀṆA IN GENERAL

(*pramāṇa-sāmānya-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

III. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PERCEPTION

Bhāṣya

After the critical examination of the *pramāṇa*-s in their general aspect, [Gautama] examines these in their specific form. Of these—

Sūtra 21

[Objection] The definition of perception is untenable, because of the incomplete statement [of all the causes thereof]. // ii. 1. 21 //

Bhāṣya

Because, the contact of the mind with the self—which is one of the causes [of perception]—is not mentioned.

Elucidation

Uddyotakara explains the objection as follows. In *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 4, Gautama says that perception is the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact. But is this supposed to be an enumeration of the causes of perception, or is this intended to be a proper definition of perception? It cannot be an enumeration of the causes, because it leaves out some other factors producing perception, e.g. the contact of the self with the mind. It can neither be a definition proper, because a definition is not the same as a partial enumeration of the causes.

Uddyotakara himself answers the objection by claiming that in this *sūtra* Gautama states the 'most specific cause' (*asādhārana-kāraṇa*) of perception and thereby satisfies the demand both of an enumeration of the causes and of definition proper.

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] The quality resulting from conjunction cannot be

produced in a substance which is not conjoined. The contact of the mind with the self is a cause [of perception] because knowledge is found to be produced [in the self from it]. The contact of the mind [with the sense-organ] is also a cause [of perception], because, if the sense-object contact is viewed as the cause of perceptual knowledge independent of the contact of the mind [with the sense], then the cognitions will arise simultaneously. Now, this *sūtra* [i.e. the succeeding one] is explained here beforehand.

Sūtra 22

[Objection continued] There can be no perception in the absence of the contact between the self and the mind. // ii. 1. 22 //

Bhāṣya

There can be no perception in the absence of the contact between the self and the mind, just as [there can be no perception] in the absence of the sense-object contact.

Elucidation

The main point of the objection is that Gautama's definition of perception is incomplete because it leaves out two important factors contributing to perception, viz. 1) the contact of the self with the mind and 2) the contact of the mind with the sense-organ.

Bhāṣya

It is claimed by some that [the sense-object contact] becomes the cause [of perception], because the production of perceptual knowledge is found to be preceded by the presence of the sense-object contact.

Sūtra 23

But then [i.e. assuming mere sense-object contact to be the cause of perception],

direction (*dik*), place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*) and 'empty space' (*ākāśa*) would also be so [i.e. would be the causes of perception]. //ii. 1. 23 //

Bhāṣya

Since in the presence of direction etc there results perceptual knowledge, let these also be [considered] the causes [thereof]. Perceptual knowledge is produced [in the presence of direction etc] though these are not causes, because their presence is unavoidable. Though direction etc are not the causes of perceptual knowledge, still perceptual knowledge must arise when direction etc are present, because it is not possible to avoid the presence of direction etc. If direction etc are claimed to be the causes [of perceptual knowledge], then some specific ground for this must be stated [in the following form] : Direction etc are the causes of perceptual knowledge because of such and such consideration.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana argues that direction etc, though invariably precede the perceptual knowledge, cannot be considered the causes thereof. The cause is that 'the presence of which is invariably followed by the presence of the effect' (*anvaya*) and 'the absence of which is invariably followed by the absence of the effect' (*vyatireka*). The sense-object contact is the cause of perceptual knowledge, because whenever there is this contact there is perception and whenever there is no such contact there is no perception. On the other hand, direction etc cannot be so considered, because, though their presence is invariably followed by the presence of perception, there is no case to prove that their absence is invariably followed by the absence of perception—the absence of direction etc anywhere being inconceivable.

Vācaspati considers this to be a *pūrvapakṣa-sūtra* i.e. a *sūtra* stating a possible objection. According to him, the objection is that anything preceding cannot be considered the cause of that which succeeds, for in that case direction etc become the causes of perceptual knowledge. Therefore, the sense-object contact, like the self-mind contact, or the mind-sense contact, though preceding perceptual knowledge, cannot be considered its causes.

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that this cannot be taken as a *pūrvapakṣa-sūtra*, for its refutation is to be found nowhere in the succeeding *sūtra*. According to the interpretation of Uddyotakara also, rather than mentioning any objection, the real purport of the *sūtra* is to show the futility of the view of those who consider sense-object contact to be the cause of perception by virtue of its *mere precedence*.

Bhāṣya

With regard to the claim that the contact of the self with mind should also be mentioned [in the definition of perception], it is said—

Sūtra 24

[Answer] There is no exclusion (*anavarodha*) of the self, because knowledge is its specific mark. [It is shown that knowledge is a proban for the inference of the self and this implies that the contact of the self with mind is a cause of all forms of knowledge]. // ii. 1. 24 //

Bhāṣya

Knowledge is a specific mark [i.e. a proban for the inference] of the self, because it is a quality inhering in it. The quality resulting from conjunction cannot be produced in a substance which is not conjoined.

Elucidation

As against the objection that the conjunction of the self with mind is not mentioned in the definition of perception, Vâtsyāyana answers that when knowledge is said to be a proban for the inference of the self it is already implied that knowledge inheres in the self and therefore the self is a cause of all forms of knowledge. Therefore, the conjunction with the self exists in all cases of knowledge including perception.

Sūtra 25

[Answer continued] [There is no exclusion of the] mind because its specific mark is the absence of simultaneous cognitions. [That the contact with mind is a cause of perceptual knowledge is already

implied by the assertion that the mind is inferred from the absence of simultaneous cognitions]. // ii. 1. 25 //

Bhāṣya

The word exclusion (*anavarodha*) is carried over to this *sūtra*. From the assertion that "the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is a proban for the inference of the mind" (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 16) follows that only when accompanied by the contact of the mind with the sense, the sense-object contact is a cause of [perceptual] knowledge.

Sūtra 26

[Answer continued] The sense-object contact is mentioned in so many words, because it is the [specific] cause of perceptual knowledge. // ii. 1. 26 //

Bhāṣya

The contact of the self with the mind is the common cause of perceptual, inferential, comparison-acquired and verbal knowledge. However, the specific cause of perceptual knowledge alone is the sense-object contact. Because of this speciality it is mentioned [in the *sūtra* defining perception].

Elucidation

This *sūtra* contains the final refutation of the objections raised against the definition of perception. Gautama mentions only the distinguishing cause of perceptual knowledge, viz. the sense-object contact. Though the contact of the self with mind as well as the contact of the mind with sense are also causes of perceptual knowledge, Gautama does not mention these in his definition of perceptual knowledge because the mention of the former makes the definition too wide and the mention of the latter makes it too narrow. The contact of the self with mind is a cause not only of perception but also of all forms of knowledge, while the contact of the mind with the sense does not exist in the case of internal perception.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the preceding two *sūtra*-s interpreted as containing the refutation of the objections against Gautama (i.e. as *siddhānta-sūtra*-s) may also alternatively be taken to mean as continuing the objection itself (viz. that it is necessary to mention the self-mind and the mind-sense contacts in the definition of perception) and all these objections are finally silenced in this *sūtra*.

Sūtra 27

[Answer continued] [The sense-object contact is specifically mentioned in the definition of perception] because even the knowledge of a person asleep and of a person inattentive are due to the sense-object contact. [It is found that the knowledge of even the person asleep or inattentive is due to sense-object contact and this shows the primacy of the sense-object contact in perception ; hence this alone is mentioned]. // ii. 1. 27 //

Bhāṣya

[In the *sūtra*] is mentioned the sense-object contact and not the contact of the self with mind. A person goes to sleep after deciding upon a particular time for waking up ; he wakes up [in time] because of his decision. When, however, a loud sound and a violent push are the causes of waking up, the knowledge relating to the waking up of the person asleep results from sense-object contact. At that time there is no primacy of the contact of the self with mind. [The primacy] of what then ? Of the sense-object contact. Because at that time, the self, without having any desire for knowledge, does not lead the mind [to acquire such knowledge] through motivation.

Sometimes a person, whose mind is preoccupied with a different object and who is desirous of knowing something else because of his conscious resolution, knows that something else by way of relating the sense with the mind which is led by motivation. When, however, he is without any conscious resolution, without any desire for knowledge and is inattentive, acquires the knowledge of an object suddenly presented before him,—in such a case there is the primacy of the sense-object contact. Because at that time he is not, being desirous of having that knowledge, guiding his mind through motivation.

Therefore, the sense-object contact is to be mentioned because it is primary, and not the contact of the self with mind because that is secondary.

Elucidation

Compared to the contact of the self with mind, the sense-object contact is primary in producing perceptual knowledge. This is illsutrated by the following examples.

A person after resolving to wake up at a particular time may wake up at that time because of his resolution. By contrast, however, a person without any such resolution, suddenly wakes up because of a loud sound or a violent push, the primary cause of the knowledge that wakes him up is the sense-object contact and not any conscious guidance of his mind by the self. In this second case, we clearly see that sense-object contact is primary and self-mind contact secondary in producing the perceptual knowledge. The same is seen in the case of an inattentive person who perceives an object suddenly presented before him and this in spite of the absence of his intention of perceiving it.

Bhāṣya

Another ground for the primacy of the sense-object contact is—

Sūtra 28

[Answer continued] The different perceptions are [differently] designated by the senses and their objects. // ii. 1. 28 //

Bhāṣya

The different perceptions are differently designated by the senses and their objects. How ? "One smells with the olfactory sense", "One sees with the visual sense" and "One tastes with the gustatory sense." [Again], "the olfactory perception", "the visual perception" and "the gustatory perception." [Again], "the perception of smell", "the perception of colours" and "the perception of taste." Five forms of perception [are spoken of] because of there being five specific external senses and their respective objects. Therefore is the primacy of the sense-object contact [in perception].

[Objection] You assert, "The mention of the sense-object contact is necessary and not the contact of the self with the mind. Why ? Because even the knowledge

of a person asleep and of a person inattentive are due to the sense-object contact." Such an assertion is—

Sūtra 29

[Objection] Illogical, because of being contradicted. // ii. 1. 29 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] If you do not admit that the contact of the self with mind is never the cause of knowledge, then there results contradiction with [your thesis] that the absence of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions is a proban for the inference of the mind. Now, the sense-object contact becomes independent of the contact with the mind and if the sense-object contact does not depend on the contact with the mind then there results the objection of the occurrence of simultaneous cognitions. To avoid the contradiction, if the contact of the self with mind is admitted to be the cause of all knowledge, then it [viz. the objection] remains in tact, i.e. the mention of the contact of the self with mind is necessary because of its being a cause of knowledge.

Elucidation

Vâtsyâyana explains the objection that if sense-object contact alone is taken to be the cause of perception and the contact of the self with mind is not mentioned as a cause of perception, then there results the contradiction with the argument by which the mind is inferred, viz. the absence of simultaneous cognitions. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that the said contradiction results not merely from the absence of the mention of the contact of the self with mind but also from the absence of the mention of the contact of the mind with the senses, because the possibility of simultaneous cognitions results from the latter. Therefore, in Vātsyāyana's statement "the absence of the contact of the self with mind" is really to be understood as "the absence of the contact of the self with mind as characterised by the contact with the senses."

Sūtra 30

[Answer] No [i.e. there is no contradiction], because of 'the predominance of the specific object' (*artha-viśeṣa-prāvalya*). // ii. 1. 30 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] There is no contradiction. It is not denied that the contact of the self with mind is a cause of knowledge. [Only] the primacy of the sense-object contact is indicated. Because of the predominance of the objects, sometimes arises the knowledge of a person asleep or of a person inattentive. The 'specific object' (*artha-viśeṣa*) means any object of the senses. Its predominance (*prāvalya*) means prominence (*tīvratā*) and coerciveness (*paṭutā*). The predominance of a specific object is related to the sense-object contact and not specially related to the contact of the self with mind. Hence is the primacy of the sense-object contact.

The contact of the mind is also a cause of the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact even in the absence of a resolution and in the absence of thoughtful consideration of a person asleep or a person inattentive. Therefore is to be mentioned the cause that makes the mind active.

Just as the knower has motivation as that which activates the mind—which [motivation] is produced by desire and which is a quality of the self—so also it will have to be admitted that there must be an independent quality of the self [viz. *adṛṣṭa*], which will be the common cause of all objects and will be produced by motivation and evil and which, moreover, forces the mind to come in conjunction with the sense. If the mind is not activated by it, then from the resulting absence of contact there will be no knowledge and as such its characteristic of being the cause of everything ceases to be. But it will have to be admitted that this quality [viz. *adṛṣṭa*] is the cause of substance, quality and action ; otherwise there remains no other agent to activate the four kinds of atoms—the minutest parts of the material elements—as well as the minds and as such the body, the senses and the objects will not come into being. But this is absurd.

Elucidation

Vâtsyâyana shows that in the case of a person asleep or of an inattentive person, the primary cause of perceptual knowledge is the sense-object contact. The contacts of the self with the mind and of the mind with the senses remain in these cases, though without actively contributing to the knowledge. What then activates the mind to come in contact with the self and the senses in such cases ? Vâtsyâyana answers that it is *adṛṣṭa* or the unseen merits and demerits resulting from actions. In the case of a person awake or attentive, the mind is activated by motivation which results in his self from the desire to know such object. Such a desire being absent in the case of a person asleep or inattentive, it must be admitted that there must be some other quality to activate the mind to come in contact with the self and the objects. Such a quality is *adṛṣṭa*, which is the

universal cause of everything and is itself the result of good and bad actions and evils like attachment etc. Vātsyāyana lastly argues why *adṛṣṭa* is to be regarded as the universal cause and therefore there is nothing wrong in admitting that it leads the mind to come in contact with the self and the senses.

Sūtra 31

[Objection] Perception is not different from inference, because [perceptual] knowledge results from apprehension of a [mere] part. // ii. 1. 31 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] The knowledge in the form—"This is a tree"—arising from the sense-object contact is called a perception. But it is nothing but inference. Why ? Because the apprehension of the tree is due to the apprehension of a [mere] part [of the tree]. A person apprehends the tree by perceiving only a part of the tree which is in front of him. But this part itself is not the entire tree. Therefore, this is like the case of a person inferring fire from the perception of smoke.

But what, apart from the part peceived, is inferred here ? According to those who view an object to be [nothing but] an assemblage of its constituent parts [i.e. atoms], what is inferred is the group of the other [i.e. unseen] constituent parts [i.e. atoms]. According to those who view an object as a whole to be something over and above the constituent parts, what are inferred are the other constituent parts [i.e. atoms] as well as the whole [which stands over and above the parts].

[Vātsyāyana proceeds to show the fallaciousness of the objection in both its forms.] For those viewing the object to be nothing but the assemblage of parts, from the perception of some of the parts there cannot be the knowledge of the tree because like the perceived parts the other unseen parts do not constitute the tree. If it is argued that when from the perception of some of the parts are inferred the other parts and from the [eventual] recollection (*pratisandhāna*) of these together there results the knowledge of the tree, [the answer is that] in that case the knowledge of the tree should not be [considered] as an inferential one. For those viewing the object to be something over and above the constituent parts, the object as a whole cannot be inferred, because there is no knowledge of the object as a whole being related to the observed constituent parts. If claimed [that the object as a whole] is apprehended then it [i.e. the whole] is not the object of inference, because of the absence of any difference [between the knowledge of some of the constituent

parts and the knowledge of the whole]. Therefore, the knowledge of the tree is not inferential.

Elucidation

In refutation of the objection under consideration, Uddyotakara goes into a lengthy critical discussion. Those who consider the object to be nothing but an assemblage of the constituent parts cannot argue that from the perception of some of the parts the object as such is inferred. Since in their view there is no object apart from the parts, what they can at best claim is to infer the unobserved parts from the observed ones. But such an inference is impossible inasmuch as it is impossible to determine an invariable relation between the observed and the unobserved parts. They may argue that the knowledge of the parts observed and the knowledge of the parts inferred may be amalgamated together to form another knowledge and from this amalgamated knowledge results the knowledge of the object as a whole. But this is untenable. The amalgamated knowledge is but a combination of two separate cognitions, viz. the knowledge of the parts observed and the knowledge of the parts inferred. This cannot be the same as the knowledge of the object as a whole, because neither the parts observed nor the parts inferred constitute the object.

Others view the object as a whole to be something over and above its constituent parts. It is impossible for them also to claim that from the observed constituent parts is inferred the object as a whole, because in their view there can be no knowledge whatsoever of the object as a whole before this alleged inference. Something which is previously absolutely unknown cannot be inferred.

Bhāṣya

The inferential character of perception is sought to be shown on the basis of the knowledge of the parts. But that is—

Sūtra 32

[Answer] Not possible, because [at least] some of the parts are apprehended through perception. // ii. 1. 32 //

Bhāṣya

Perception is not inference. Why ? Because the knowledge [of the parts observed] is due to perception. The apprehension of the parts which is assumed to be the basis [of the inference] is itself an apprehension due to perception. No

apprehension is without an object. The parts, as far as these are revealed by that knowledge, are to be acknowledged as its object and these parts prove the independent existence of perception. What can be the object there apart from the parts [perceived] ? The whole [over and above the parts] or the assemblage [of the constituent parts] ? This apprehension of the parts cannot be considered inferential, because there is no ground for proving that.

Elucidation

Gautama refutes the objection by showing that since, on the admission of the objector himself, the parts are perceptually known, it is impossible for him to deny perception as such and to claim that perception is nothing but inference. Vâtsyâyana argues that it is immaterial whether the objector claims that from the perception of the parts is inferred the remaining unobserved parts or the object as a whole standing over and above the parts. What is important instead is to note that in any case, he has to acknowledge perception for the apprehension of the parts observed and, therefore, he forfeits himself the right to question the possibility of perception as such. If, however, the objector claims that the initial apprehension of the parts is itself inferential then he will have to mention the proban for this inference. But how is the apprehension of the proban itself to be determined ? Denying as he does the possibility of perception, the objector can only claim that this proban itself is to be known by another inference. But, then, a further inference will be necessary to ascertain the proban of this inference, and so an *ad infinitum.*

Bhāṣya

The [alleged] inferential character of perception is disproved on other considerations also, because inference is preceded by perception. Inference is preceded by perception, because only one who previously apprehended fire and smoke as related to each other can infer fire from the perception of smoke. There is no possibility of inference without the perceptual knowledge of the proban and the probandum as related to each other as well as the perceptual knowledge of the proban itself. These two cognitions cannot be inferential, because they result from sense-object contact. Inference is never due to the contact of the sense with the object to be inferred. This basic difference between the nature of perception and inference is to be clearly noted.

[The objector cannot claim that] there is perception of the mere parts [and not of the tree as a whole], because there exists the whole [over and above the parts] (*avayavi-sadbhāvāt*). The perception is not of the knowledge of the mere parts. Of what then ? There arises the perceptual knowledge of the mere parts as well as of the whole as related to the constituent parts. Why ? Because of the existence of the whole. There actually exists the whole over and above the parts.

Now, the want of the perception of the whole—which [whole] has for its locus the parts and which satisfies the conditions of being perceived—cannot be proved when there is perception of the parts.

Elucidation

The objector may modify his original position and claim that his real purpose is not to deny perception as such ; he admits the perception of the parts but denies the possibility of the perception of the whole. The knowledge of the whole is inferred from the perception of the parts. Or the objector may deny the reality of the whole over and above the parts. From this point of view, therefore, there is perception only of some of the parts, the other parts being inferred. Thus the object cannot be perceptually known—be it viewed either as the whole over and above the parts or simply as the totality of the parts.

As against all these, Vātsyāyana argues that the existence of the whole over and above the parts is a fact and this whole inheres in all the constituent parts. Therefore, the contact of the sense with some of the parts is at the same time a contact with the whole. From this follows that the perception of the parts is at the same time the perception of the whole.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] [The whole cannot be perceived] because of the non-awareness of the totality (*kṛtsna*). [Answer] No, because of the absence of any part which is not a cause of the whole.

[Objection elaborated] The parts are not apprehended in their totality, because some of the parts are themselves separated from some others. The whole also is not apprehended in its totality, because it does not exhaust itself only in the parts which are apprehended. [This being so, the objection] that there is the perception of parts only remains sustained.

[Answer elaborated] The word totality (*kṛtsna*) is used to mean the inexhaustibleness of many things and the word non-totality (*a-kṛtsna*) is used to mean the exhaustibleness of many things. There is the apprehension of non-totality with regard to many parts, because apprehension is possible when there is no obstruction and apprehension is not possible when there is obstruction. But, O you objector, please answer when we ask the question : "What precisely about the whole [which we view as] being apprehended, do you consider to remain unapprehended, [which consideration] leads you to assert the apprehension of mere parts ?"

[The circumstance of some parts remaining unapprehended does not prove that the whole also remains unapprehended]. Because there is no part which is not a cause of the whole. [That is, the parts themselves are the causes of the whole]. The peculiar characteristic of the whole cannot be present in the parts.

The peculiar characteristic of it [i. e. of whole] is that it is apprehended along with the parts which are perceived because of their contact with the sense and that it is not apprehended along with the parts which are not apprehended because of obstruction. There is no difference [of the whole] on account of this [i. e. on account of the apprehension of the non-totality]. [In other words, the whole is different from its parts. The parts are innumerable. Of these parts, some may be apprehended and some may remain unapprehended. This leads us to accept a difference between the parts apprehended and the parts unapprehended. But this makes no difference for the whole, which is unique and as such cannot be characterised either as the totality or as the mere parts. If it is once apprehended along with the parts apprehended, there remains no question of the whole remaining unapprehended on account of the other parts being unapprehended.]

[As against the Buddhist view denying the existence of the whole apart from the parts, Vātsyāyana asks :] Is the tree merely an assemblage of the various parts or is it [the result of] a specific form of conjunction [of these parts] ? In both the alternatives, there can be no knowledge of the tree. Is the tree a mere assemblage of different parts, viz. the root, trunk, branches and leaves ? Or is it [the result of] a specific form of conjuction of these parts ? In both the alternatives, there can be no knowledge of the tree as a whole, because all the parts cannot be apprehended due to the obstruction of some of the parts by some others. The specific form of conjunction also cannot be apprehended, because of the non-awareness of all the parts in which the conjunction inheres. Therefore, the perception of the tree resulting from the perception of some of its parts can only be explained [by assuming] the origination of a different entity [viz. the whole known as the tree, which stands over and above the parts] and not [by assuming] a mere assemblage.

Elucidation

Gautama will presently show why it is necessary to admit the existence of the whole over and above the parts. For the present, Vātsyāyana argues that even admitting the Buddhist view, viz. the whole is a mere aggregation of the parts, there is no conceivable explanation of the apprehension of the whole. For the question is : What exactly is meant by this aggregation ? Does it mean a mere lump of un-conjoined parts or does it mean some specific conjunction effected among the parts ? In the former case, some of the parts will obstruct some others and, in the absence of the perception of the obstructed parts, the aggregation of all the parts will never be perceived. In the latter case, the specific conjunction among all the parts will never be perceived, because the conjunction inheres in all the parts and as such can be perceived only when all the parts are perceived.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PERCEPTION

(*pratyakṣa-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

IV. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF 'THE WHOLE'

Sūtra 33

[Objection] There is doubt about the existence of the whole [*avayavī*, i.e. the whole standing over and above the parts], because it [i.e. the whole] is 'not yet proved' (*sādhya*). // ii. 1. 33 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The ground referred to by the expression "because of the existence of the whole" (*avayavi-sadbhāvāt*) [i.e. as occurring in the preceding *bhāṣya*], is not a valid ground, because it [the whole] is yet to be proved. It is yet to be proved that an entity [viz. the whole] distinct [from the parts themselves] is produced by the causes [i.e. the constituent parts]. That is, this has not yet been logically demonstrated. Thus, there is the knowledge of two contradictory assertions [viz. "the whole exists" and "the whole does not exist"] and from this knowledge of the contradictory assertions there results the doubt about the [existence of the] whole.

Elucidation

There is some controversy here about the reading of the text. The sentence with the expression "because of the existence of the whole", occurring in the commentary on the previous *sūtra*, is taken by Viśvanātha as a separate *sūtra* of Gautama. From Vātsyāyana's commentary on the present *sūtra* also, this appears to be quite plausible. However, on the authority of Uddyotakara and Vācaspati, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa prefers to read it as forming part of Vātsyāyana's commentary.

According to the Nyāya methodology, any critical examination presupposes doubt. Therefore, the critical examination of the whole is introduced here with the doubt necessitating its critical examination. The doubt arises here from the two contradictory theses, viz. "the whole exists" and "the whole does not exist." The former is the thesis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas while the latter that of the early Buddhists, viz. the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. According to both the theses, however, by parts are meant the atoms, the ultimate material cause of everything. Yet the two theses are in contradiction : According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the thing as a whole is a distinct entity, i.e.

something over and above the parts or the atoms. According to the Buddhists, the thing as a whole is nothing more than the peculiar combination of the constituent atoms.

Sūtra 34

[Answer] If the existence of the whole (*avayavī*) is denied, then there can be no knowledge of anything. // ii. 1. 33 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If the whole does not exist, everything will remain unknown. What is meant here by everything ? Substance, quality, activity, universal, particularity and inherence. But how [are we to understand that without admitting the whole everything remains unknown] ? The [mere] assemblage of the atoms cannot be the object of visual sense, because the atoms are imperceptible. [In your view] there is no other entity in the form of the whole, which can be the object of the visual sense. But these substance etc are apprehended as the object of the visual sense. Therefore, they cannot be apprehended without having any real basis. But [substance etc] are perceived in the form : "This jar is black ; is one ; is big ; is conjoined ; is vibrating ; is existing and is made of earth." And [also in the form] "The quality etc exist." Therefore, from the perception of everything we observe that there is a distinct entity [known as the whole],

Elucidation

If the existence of the whole is not admitted, then everything becomes imperceptible. The Buddhists deny the whole and view everything as but an aggregate of atoms. But an atom is by nature imperceptible and therefore an aggregate of atoms would be as imperceptible as an individual atom. But the fact is that things are perceived. Therefore, the existence of the whole is to be admitted.

The objector may argue that all these prove the impossibility of perception—a position already referred to in the preceding section. But this, the objector may continue, will not mean that the knowledge of everything is impossible, for though there can be no knowledge due to perception, there can be knowledge due to inference etc. Uddyotakara indicates an objection like this and refutes it simply by pointing out that inference etc are not possible without a prior perception.

But the main point of the *sūtra*, says Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, is to indicate the following inference which proves the existence of the whole : "The visible objects like the tree etc are not mere aggregates of atoms, because these objects are perceptible ; whatever is not different from atoms is not the object of perception."

Sūtra 35

[Answer continued] Also from being gripped (*dhāraṇa*) and pulled (*ākarṣaṇa*) [is proved the existence of the whole as distinct from the aggregate of parts or atoms]. // ii. 1. 35 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The whole is an entity distinct [from the aggregate of atoms, because things like the tree can be gripped and pulled].

[Vātsyāyana raises a possible objection against this argument and refutes it. The objection is :] The cause of being gripped and pulled is the collectivity (*saṃgraha*) [of the atoms]. Collectivity implies a distinct quality coexisting with conjunction and produced by viscosity (*sneha*) and fluidity (*dravatva*). [E.g., the quality produced] in the unbaked jar due to the conjunction of water and in the baked jar due to the conjunction of fire. Had [the peculiarity of being gripped and pulled] been due to the [presence of] the whole, then it would have been possible even in the case of a handful of dust etc. [Further, in your view] in the cases of grass, pebble and wood, lumped together with lac, there would have been no [possibility of being gripped and pulled] because in this case no distinct entity is produced. Now, what question are you going to put to those who deny the existence of the whole and, in defence of perception, admit the aggregate itself to be the object of perception ?

[Answer] The question to be asked is : What exactly is the object of knowledge when it [i.e. the knowledge] takes the form, "This is *one single* substance ?" Does this knowledge of one single substance reveal one object or a multiplicity of objects ? [If it is assumed that] it reveals one single substance, then the whole will be proved from the admission of a distinct entity [as the object of that perceptual knowledge].

[If it is assumed that] it reveals a multiplicity of objects, then the knowledge of one single substance cannot belong to such a multiplicity of objects. The

self-contradictory knowledge, viz. "This is a single substance" in respect of a multiplicity of objects is never observed.

Elucidation

Gautama shows here another argument for proving the independent existence of the whole. The fact is that when we have a grip of only one part of a jar or a piece of wood and pull it, the jar or the wood in its entirety—and not the mere part on which we have the grip—is drawn towards us. This proves that the jar or the piece of wood exists as a whole, i.e. over and above the mere aggregate of parts or atoms. Thus, being gripped and pulled are the grounds of proving the whole: where these exist the whole exists; where these do not exist, the whole does not exist.

Vātsyāyana raises a possible objection to this. In the case of a handful of dust there exists the whole [in the Nyāya view], but there is no grip or pull. Again, in the case of the grass, pebble and wood lumped together by lac, there is grip or pull but no whole [even in the Nyāya view]. Therefore, argues the objector, the actual cause of being gripped and pulled is not the whole but the quality called collectivity which is coexistent with conjunction and which arises from viscosity and fluidity.

In Vātsyāyana's commentary itself, we do not come across any specific answer to this specific objection. He proves the existence of the whole on independent grounds. This leads Uddyotakara and others to think that Vātsyāyana is somehow or other casually mentioning here a view refuting the existence of the whole.

Sūtra 36

[Objection] [In spite of there being nothing called the whole] we have the perception of the [aggregate of atoms] like [the perception of] the army or the forest. [Answer] This is not possible, because the atoms are [intrinsically] imperceptible. // ii. 1. 36 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as in the case of the army-units (*senāṅga*) [viz. the elephant-riders, cavalry, charioteers and infantry] and in the case of the forest-units (*vanāṅga*) [viz. the groups of trees constituting the forest], where the perception of individual differences is not possible due to distance, we have knowledge in the

form of : "This is one" [viz. "This is *an* army" and "This is *a* forest"]. Similarly, when the atoms are collected together and the individual difference of each is not perceived, we have the apprehension in the form : "This is a single object".

[Answer] The individual differences of the army-units and forest-units are not perceived from a distance because of the presence of some special cause ; nevertheless the individual differences of these are perceived [in the absence of the specific cause preventing their perception]. For example, in the case of the forest, though the differences among the species are perceptible, these are not perceived as *palāśa* or *khadira* from a distance. Similarly, [in the case of the individual trees] though the movements [of leaves and branches] are perceptible, yet these are not perceived from a distance. Thus, there is 'the wrong perception that this is one' (*bhākta eka-buddhi*) only in objects [intrinsically] perceptible when their individual differences are not perceived [due to some specific cause, viz. distance]. But there can be no such wrong perception in the case of the atoms as : "This is one". Because the atoms are intrinsically imperceptible, [though the objector wrongly claims] that the individual differences of these are unperceived simply because of the presence of some specific cause.

Elucidation

Objection : Though each atom is imperceptible, yet an aggregate of these becomes perceptible just as in the case of the army or the forest.

Answer : The analogy of the army or the forest does not hold good. In the case of the army or the forest, each unit can be separately perceived. Only when there is some special cause like distance preventing their separate perception, we wrongly perceive the aggregates of these units as a single object. But an atom is intrinsically imperceptible and there is no special cause to lead us to perceive wrongly their aggregate as a single object. Since the atoms are intrinsically imperceptible, their collectivity also must be so. If the objector argues that the collectivity of the atoms is something more than their individuality, then he will commit himself to the doctrine of the whole.

Bhāṣya

The question being examined is : Is the aggregate of the atoms the real object of the 'knowledge of oneness in a thing' (*eka-buddhi*) or is it not so ? [The objector may claim], the army-units and the forest-units are nothing but aggregates

of atoms. [Our answer is] But it is illogical to cite as an instance a phenomenon under investigation, 'because it is yet to be proved' (*sādhyatvāt*). [The objector may claim], it is an observed fact. [We answer] No ; because its object is to be critically established. Even though you consider that because of the non-awareness of individual differences, the army-units and the forest-units are found to be apprehended as single units and that the observed fact cannot be denied,—still the case is not so, because its [i.e. of the knowledge] object is to be critically established. The nature of the object of what is observed is being examined. [That is, the real implication of] 'the knowledge of oneness in a thing' (*eka-buddhi*) is being examined. The mere knowledge [of oneness in an object] cannot prove either of the alternatives, namely that the object of that knowledge is an independent entity or that it is an aggregate of atoms.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana argues that the Buddhists cannot depend on the example of the army-unit or of the forest-unit, because the question whether such a unit is an aggregate of atoms or not is itself yet to be answered. Something yet to be proved cannot obviously be used as an example. The Buddhist may claim that even the Naiyāyika is obliged to admit that, because of the absence of the knowledge of individual difference, the army-unit or the forest-unit is apprehended as one and this apprehension of oneness serves the purpose of the example. Vātsyāyana answers that this is not logical, because the real point at issue is whether the observed oneness in the army-unit or in the forest-unit is the knowledge of an independent entity or of a mere aggregate of atoms ? In the former alternative is admitted the existence of the whole over and above the parts while the latter alternative is, from the Nyāya standpoint, destructive of the very possibility of the apprehension of oneness, inasmuch as the atoms being intrinsically imperceptible a mere assemblage of these also remains so.

Bhāṣya

Again, because of the multiplicity of the atoms and moreover because of the absence of the knowledge of individual differences, their apprehension as one single entity is the knowledge of something as something else, like the knowledge of a person in a pillar. [Objection] So what ? [Answer] Since the knowledge of something as something else [i.e. erroneous or secondary knowledge] presupposes a primary knowledge [i.e. the knowledge of something as it is=valid knowledge], it

[i.e. the erroneous knowledge of something as something else] proves the existence of the primary knowledge. In the case of the knowledge of a person in a pillar, which is the primary knowledge ? The knowledge of the person as the person ; only when there is such a primary knowledge, there can be [the secondary or erroneous] knowledge of a person in a pillar from the apprehension of the similarity [of the pillar] with a person. Similarly, the [secondary or erroneous] knowledge of oneness in a multiplicity of objects [i.e. in the atoms] is possible from the apprehension of oneness only when there is the primary knowledge [of oneness]. But this primary knowledge is not possible [in the Buddhist view], because of the absurdity of the non-awareness of everything. Therefore, this perception of non-difference in the form, "This is one", is actually a perception of a single object [i.e. of the whole].

Elucidation

According to the Buddhists, the object apprehended as one is really a mere aggregate of many atoms. Therefore, like the knowledge of a person in a pillar, it has got to be considered as a form of erroneous knowledge. But an erroneous knowledge presupposes a primary or valid knowledge. Thus, the erroneous knowledge of a person in a pillar presupposes another primary or valid knowledge, viz. of a person in a person. Similarly, even assuming the Buddhist claim that the knowledge of one in many atoms is actually a from of secondary or erroneous knowledge, such a knowledge must presuppose a primary or valid knowledge of one which is really a single entity. The Buddhists cannot point to any such primary knowledge. For the Naiyāyikas, however, this problem does not arise, because in their view the knowledge of the whole over and above the parts or the atoms is itself primary or valid.

Bhāṣya

[The Buddhists may argue that] the primary knowledge will be the knowledge of non-difference in respect of the object of another sense-organ [viz. the perception of sound by the auditory sense]. [Answer] No ; in the absence of a specific ground the example cited is of no use.

[Objection elaborated] In respect of the secondary or erroneous perception of one in the many, the primary knowledge is the perception of oneness in respect of sound, which is one and is the object of the auditory sense.

[Answer elaborated] Even if this be so, the use of the example is not legitimate, because there is no specific ground. [Even granting this example, there will be the question] "Is the knowledge of oneness in the aggregate of atoms like

the knowledge of a person in a pillar,—the knowledge of something as something else,—or is it the knowledge of something as it is, because the object known is really the same as the way in which it is known, just as sound is known as one because of its oneness ?" In the absence of the mention of any specific ground, the two alternatives result only in doubt.

Like the jar, smell etc [as viewed by the opponent] are mere aggregates of atoms and as such smell etc cannot be used as examples. [The objector] is to be further questioned regarding the knowledge of quality, conjunction, movement, universal and particularity. In the case of these cognitions also, there will be the same problem.

Elucidation

The Buddhists may argue that in the case of sound we have actually the knowledge of one as one. Therefore, this is an example of primary knowledge, in the standard of which the knowledge of the one in the many, as in the case of a jar, is to be considered secondary. But Vâtsyāyana replies : It remains yet to be established that, in the case of the jar, we have knowledge of one in the many. In the Nyāya view, even in the case of the jar, we have knowledge of one in one, i.e. of the whole. Further, from the Vaibhāṣika point of view, even smell, sound etc are but aggregates of atoms. In their view, therefore, the knowledge of smell, sound, etc are as secondary as the knowledge of the jar, which is claimed to be the knowledge of one in many.

Bhāṣya

The knowledge of oneness is the knowledge of something as it is [i.e. a valid or primary knowledge]. There is specific ground for this [assertion], because [the knowledge of oneness] is coexistent with the knowledge of 'the perceptible magnitude' (*mahat*). The two cognitions, viz. "This is one" and "This is of perceptible magnitude", are possible with respect to the same object and as such are coexistent. From this follows that whatever is of perceptible magnitude is one.

If you claim that the knowledge of perceptible magnitude is nothing but the knowledge of the plurality of atoms, [then we reply] that the knowledge of the perceptible magnitude in the atoms, which are intrinsically without perceptible magnitude, is a knowledge of something as [something else i.e. an erroneous knowledge]. So what ? The knowledge of something as something else, presupposing as it does a primary knowledge, proves the existence of a primary knowledge

[i.e. the knowledge of something as it is]. Therefore, the knowledge of perceptible magnitude must be with respect to an object which has perceptible magnitude.

The opponent may argue : The primary knowledge is proved by the 'definite knowledge' (*vyavasāya*), viz. "Sound is feeble (*aṇu*)" and "Sound is loud (*mahat*)." [We answer] No. The knowledge ["Sound is feeble" or "Sound is loud"] is the mere knowledge of its feebleness or loudness, not an ascertainment of its physical magnitude as in the case of physical substances. The knowledge "Sound is feeble" is the knowledge of its weakness or deficiency. The knowledge "Sound is loud" is the knowledge of its strength or conspicuousness. Why ? Because there is no ascertainment of physical magnitude [by such knowledge]. No one, while ascertaining that sound is loud determines its physical quantity as is done in the case of the knowledge of *vadara*, *āmalaka* and *vilva* etc [i.e. three species of fruits with varying magnitudes]. [Sound is not an appropriate example, because its feebleness or loudness is not indicative of physical magnitude as in the case of the jar or the fruit].

Elucidation

Sound is itself a quality, just like 'perceptible magnitude' (*mahat-parimāṇa*). A quality cannot reside in another quality. Therefore, sound cannot be characterised as *mahat* in the sense of having a perceptible magnitude. Thus, when sound is called *mahat*, we refer only to its loudness rather than to any perceptible magnitude. So the Buddhists cannot claim that the knowledge of sound as feeble (*aṇu*) or as loud (*mahat*) proves a primary knowledge.

Bhāṣya

Conjunction is apprehended as inhering in two objects in the form : "These two are conjoined." [Objection] Supposing it is claimed that conjunction inheres in two aggregates ? [Vātsyāyana asks] What is meant by the aggregate ? [Objector] Supposing we claim that the aggregate is either the many [atoms] grouped together by conjunction or the conjunctions of the many grouped together ? [Vātsyāyana answers] There can be no knowledge of conjunction as inhering in conjunction itself. In the knowledge "These two objects are conjoined", the conjunction of two conjunctions is not apprehended. [Objection] Supposing it is claimed that the aggregate is the totality of the many ? [Answer] No ; because the conjunction is apprehended as inhering in the two. When there is the apprehension that these two objects are

conjoined, the conjunction is not apprehended as inhering in the totality of the many, nor is there the knowledge of two separate atoms. Therefore, [it must be admitted that] the conjunction inheres in two objects, which have perceptible magnitude and are the basis of the characteristic of being two.

Elucidation

As a further argument against the Buddhists, Vātsyāyana says that the conjunction of two objects cannot mean the conjunction of two aggregates, because an aggregate means a multitude of atoms and as such two aggregates cannot mean two objects. Vātsyāyana shows that there is no conceivable defence of the concept of the conjunction between two aggregates.

Bhāṣya

The opponent may claim that conjunction is not an independent category, because conjunction is nothing but the limit of contiguity which, if violated, one object encroaches on the other. [Answer] No ; because there is ground for admitting conjunction to be an independent category. Conjunction is the cause of sound, colour, etc and movements, because without admitting the emergence of an independent quality inhering in two substances, [the two substances] cannot be conceived as causing sound, colour, etc and movement. Therefore, it [conjunction] is an independent quality. Moreover, the knowledge [in the form of the qualifier and the qualified] reveals either a separate object or its absence. For example : "The preceptor has a pair of ear-rings" and "The disciple is without any ear-ring". If the awareness of conjunction does not reveal a separate object, then it must reveal the absence of the separate object. Then, [from the point of view of the opponent denying conjunction] is to be mentioned that which is absent in the case of the knowledge : "These two substances are conjoined." That elsewhere-observed object, the absence of which is indicated by this knowledge, is to be mentioned. [But the opponent will not be able to indicate any such object and as such he is obliged to admit conjunction as an independent category]. Since the conjunction is apprehended as inhering in two objects having perceptible magnitude, [it cannot be claimed] as inhering in atoms.

Elucidation

The opponent may argue that conjunction as a separate category does not exist.

Vātsyāyana therefore offers proofs for the existence of conjunction. Something, without being real, cannot produce anything. But conjunction is the cause of sound, colour, etc and movements. Sound, colour, etc and movements are produced as a result of the conjunction of two substances. Moreover, in the case of a knowledge in the form of the qualifier and the qualified, there are two distinct elements, namely "that which is qualified" and "that which qualifies." Of these, the latter must indicate either the presence of something [e.g. in the knowledge "The preceptor has a pair of ear-rings", the presence of the ear-rings qualifies the preceptor] or the absence of something [e.g. in the knowledge "The disciple is without any ear-ring", the absence of ear-ring qualifies the disciple]. Therefore, in the knowledge, "Two things have conjunction"—that which is qualified is "the two things." But what is that which qualifies "the two things" ? Those who admit conjunction to be an independent category will claim that it is the presence of conjunction. There is nothing else in this case which may be indicated as that which qualifies. Those who deny conjunction cannot point to either the presence or absence of anything which qualifies "the two things." Thus is proved the existence of conjunction.

Bhāṣya

[Vātsyāyana lastly shows that without the admission of the whole, there can be no explanation of the perception of the universal]. The category known as the universal (*jāti*), which is the cause of the 'continuity of apprehension' (*pratyaya-anuvṛtti*), cannot be denied. If it is denied, then there is no explanation of the law regulating knowledge. [For example, only because of the presence of the universal "cowness", we can have the continuous apprehension of "the cow" in the different individual cows. Similar is the case of continuous apprehension of "the horse" in different individual horses. Without the assumption of the universal, there can be no explanation of the law regulating knowledge of this kind]. Since a universal without substratum cannot be apprehended, a substratum of the universal has got to be mentioned. [Objection] Let it be said that the substratum is the aggregate of atoms. [Answer] But then it will have to be specifically stated whether the capability of producing the knowledge of the universal belongs to [the aggregate of atoms] conjoined with the eye or to [the aggregate of atoms] not conjoined with the eye. Is the universal apprehended as inhering in the aggregate of atoms which is not conjoined with the visual sense or as inhering in an aggregate which is conjoined with the visual sense ? If claimed that [the universal] is apprehended [as inhering in an aggregate of atoms]

which is not conjoined [with the visual sense], then there will be the absurdity of the perception of even the obstructed aggregate of atoms and there would have been the apprehension of the universal which inheres in that obstructed aggregate of atoms. If claimed that [the universal] is apprehended [as inhering in an aggregate of atoms] which is conjoined [with the visual sense], then there will be no perception of the universal, because of the absence of conjunction of the visual sense with the [atoms forming] the middle and other parts [e.g. of the tree]. If claimed that the universal is apprehended as inhering in the atoms [which form the portion of the tree,—the portion which is conjoined with the visual sense], then only that part of the aggregate of atoms will be the substratum of the universal. Thus it follows that only that portion of the aggregate of atoms is the substratum of the universal, which being conjoined with the visual sense, there results the knowledge of the universal. In that case, if there is the perception of one aggregate there will result the multiplicity of objects in the same object. Assuming this, there will be the knowledge of the multiplicity of trees in the one aggregate of atoms perceived as the tree, because all the portions of this aggregate of atoms [forming the tree as a whole] in which is perceived 'treeness' will themselves become trees. [According to the opponent, the tree is only an aggregate of atoms. If he further admits that only that portion of the tree which actually comes in contact with the visual sense is the substratum of the universal treeness, he will be led to the absurdity of admitting a number of different trees in the same tree, inasmuch as the visual sense comes in contact with the different parts of the same tree at different times and each of these parts, being the substratum of the universal treeness, will be equal to a tree]. Therefore, the object of the knowledge of the universal being an entity distinct from the mere aggregate of atoms, the whole [is to be admitted] as a distinct entity.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana concludes by proving the existence of the whole from the evidence of the universal. According to the Buddhists, however, like the whole, the universal itself is unreal. Therefore, Vātsyāyana first demonstrates the existence of the universal. Without assuming the universal, there is no conceivable explanation of the continuity of apprehension—e.g. of "the tree" in different trees. Now, assuming the universal, the opponent has got to account for its substratum. According to him, a tree is nothing but the aggregate of atoms ; therefore this aggregate of atoms can alone be the substratum of the universal treeness. But Vātsyāyana shows that the universal treeness cannot have for its substratum the mere aggregate of atoms. If the aggregate of atoms is claimed to be the substratum of the universal, then either the aggregate as a whole or

a mere part thereof will have to be considered as the said substratum. But the aggregate as a whole cannot be this substratum, because the entire aggregate cannot be conjoined with the visual sense at the same moment. The parts of this aggregate cannot be the said substratum, because in that case there results the absurdity of admitting a number of different trees in the same tree : different parts of the tree come in conjunction with the visual sense at different moments and if each of these parts is considered to be the substratum of the universal treeness, then we are to admit the different parts of the same tree to be separate trees themselves.

Thus, the aggregate of atoms cannot be the substratum of the universal. Something over and above the mere aggregate—viz. the whole—has therefore to be admitted as the substratum of the universal.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF 'THE WHOLE'

(*avayavi-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

V. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF INFERENCE

Bhāṣya

The critical examination of perception is over. Now inference is being critically examined.

Sūtra 37

[Objection] Inference is 'not valid' (*a-pramāṇa*), because [in the typical examples of inference] there is irregularity (*vyabhicāra*) due to embankment (*rodha*), damage (*upaghāta*) and similarity (*sādṛśya*). // ii. 1. 37 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection explained] The expression 'not valid' [in the *sūtra*] implies the incapacity of determining the object in any of the three times [i.e. past, present and future]. [Thus, in the typical examples of inference], the fullness of the river may as well be understood as due to embankment ; even in such a case there may be the wrong inference that the deity above has showered. [Similarly] the movement of the ants with their eggs may as well be due to the damage done to their habitation; even in such a case there may be the wrong inference that it is going to shower. [Again] the peacock's cry may as well be imitated by a human being ; even in such a case, because of the similarity there may be a wrong inference.

Elucidation

It is objected that the inference of the past, present and future may be wrong, because of the irregularity of the proban. The typical example of the inference of something belonging to the past is the inference of past rain from the fullness of the river. But the fullness of the river is an irregular proban for the inference of rain, inasmuch as this fullness may as well be due to the obstruction caused by an embankment. The typical example of the inference of something belonging to the future is the

inference of future rain from the movement of the ants with their eggs. But such a movement is an irregular proban, inasmuch as it may be due to the damage done to their habitation. The typical example of the inference of something belonging to the present is the inference of the peacock from the peacock's cry. But such a sound is an irregular proban, inasmuch as it may be due to the similarity of the human voice imitating the peacock's cry.

The evidence of irregularity in these three examples causes doubt as to the possibility of valid probans in general. Therefore, inference is not valid ; it cannot prove anything belonging to the past, future or present. In other words, this shows that inference as such is unreal, because the proban of any inference can similarly be shown to be irregular.

It may be objected that if inference itself is viewed as unreal, how can one claim that it has no validity ? Is there any sense in saying that the flower blossoming in the sky has no fragrance ? The answer is that what is denied here is the alleged validity of what is called inference by others. What is actually unreal may wrongly appear to be real. In the same way, though inference is actually unreal, it wrongly appears to be real to others.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa elaborately discusses in this connection the different views expressed by the Naiyāyikas on the nature of the three forms of inference mentioned in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 5, namely *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. One of these views is that of Viśvanātha, according to which by *pūrvavat* is meant a proban which proves something belonging to the past, by *śeṣavat* is meant a proban which proves something belonging to the future and by *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* is meant a proban which proves something belonging to the present. Assuming these meanings, the present *sūtra* points to the irregularity of the proban in these three forms of inference.

Sūtra 38

[Answer] No [i.e. inference is not invalid], because [the probans for the inference of past rain, future rain and present peacock, viz. the fullness of the river, the movement of the ants with their eggs and the sound of the peacock's cry respectively] are different from [the fullness of the river due to] embankment, [the movement of the ants with their eggs due to] fear (*trāsa*) [caused by the damage done to their habitation] and [the sound having] similarity [with the peacock's cry when the human voice imitates it]. // ii. 1. 38 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] This is not irregularity of inference, but the illusion (*abhimāna*) of inference in what is not an inference. How ? Something not being specifically dertermined cannot be a real proban. A person observing [in the river] the rain-water as different from the water previously existing—the swiftness of the current and the floating of profuse foam, fruits, leaves and wood, etc—infers from the fullness of the river that the deity above has showered and not from the mere swelling of the river. There is the legitimate inference "It will rain," only when there is everywhere the movements of the ants with their eggs, and not from stray cases of it. From the absence of the knowledge of the specific difference in the form "This is not the cry of a peacock but a sound merely imitating it"—there is the wrong inference [of the present peacock]. However, for one who can discriminate the real peacock's cry from the sound merely imitating it, the specific sound of the peacock's cry, when apprehended, becomes the proban [of a right inference], as it happens in the case of the serpents etc [i.e. the serpent can correctly differentiate the actual sound of a peacock from other sounds resembling it and can thus rightly infer the presence of the peacock therefrom].

Therefore, the error is that of one who [wrongly] infers and not of the inferential process itself. In other words [the error is of one who] wants to infer from an unspecified observation a specific object which can be proved only by a specific ground.

Elucidation

After explaining the main points of Vātsyāyana above, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa discusses many important issues relating to the nature and validity of inference.

Uddyotakara, already in his explanation of the previous *sūtra*, points to the futility of the objections raised against the validity of inference. The objector himself has to take recourse to an inference to prove the invalidity of inference, his own proban being the irregularity of the probans of three types of inference. But this is flatly self-contradictory. The objector cannot deny inference and at the same time take recourse to an inference to prove this. Further, does the objector intend to prove the invalidity of inference in general or only of certain specific cases of it ? The former alternative is impossible, inasmuch as the objector has at least to assume his own inference to be valid. The latter alternative entails the 'fallacy of proving what is already proved' (*siddhasādhana-doṣa*), for it is alrerdy accepted by everybody that the specific cases of inference committing the fallacy of the irregular proban are invalid.

The Cārvākas do not admit any *pramāṇa* except perception. According to them

that which is not perceived cannot be admitted as existent : its non-apprehension proves its non-existence. There is no *pramāṇa* like inference etc. Human activity (*loka-vyavahāra*) is based on probability. From the perception of a specific smoke, people are led to believe in the probable existence of fire there and, when this fire is actually obtained there, people are wrongly led to believe in a *pramāṇa.* Udayana, in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* (iii. 6), refutes this position. He argues that probability is a form of doubt and, from the Cārvāka point of view, there is no explanation for such a doubt : when the fire is actually perceived, its existence is positively proved and so long as the fire is not perceived, it is proved to be non-existent in the Cārvāka view, according to which the unperceived does not exist. Thus the perception of a specific smoke cannot result in any doubt of the nature of probability concerning fire ; the absence of the perception of fire proves it to be non-existent. Further, the Cārvāka assertion that whatever is not perceived is proved to be non-existent leads to sheer absurdities. One leaving one's home does not perceive his relations and therefore should believe in the non-existence of these relations and even of his home itself. There will be no point for such an one to return home.

The Cārvākas, however, propose to disprove the validity of inference also on various other grounds. Their main argument is that inference is impossible because it is impossible to establish any *vyāpti* or invariable relation between the probans and probandum. *Vyāpti* is said to be ascertained (positively) by the 'knowledge of co-existence' (*sahacāra-grahaṇa*) and (negatively) by the 'absence of the knowledge of any contrary instance of co-existence' (*vyabhicāra-agrahaṇa*). But it is impossible to ascertain the absence of any knowledge of any contrary instance of co-existence, because there is always the scope for doubt of the probans as existing without the probandum. How can one be absolutely sure that smoke exists in no case of the absence of fire ?

In a more sophisticated form the Cārvāka position is as follows : The Naiyāyikas claim that *vyāpti* is an 'unconditional relation' (*anaupādhika-sambandha*) or a 'natural relation' (*svābhāvika-sambandha*), i.e. a relation free from any 'adventitious condition' (*upādhi*). Thus, e.g., fire is inferred form smoke because the relation between fire and smoke is a natural one, and not a relation due to any adventitious condition.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa examines at length various definitions of *upādhi* or adventitious condition. Of these, the usually accepted definition is that an adventitious condition is one which invariably co-exists with the probandum but not with the probans. Thus in the wrong inference, "This contains smoke because it contains fire"—the probans is fire, the probandum is smoke and the adventitious condition is 'the presence of wet fuel'. The 'presence of wet fuel' invariably co-exists with the probandum 'smoke' but not with the probans 'fire'. For example, in the red-hot iron-ball, fire exists without the wet fuel.

With this idea of adventitious condition, we may proceed to understand the Cārvāka position more fully. Since, according to the defenders of inference themselves, a real probans must be free from any adventitious condition, without a positive proof that the

probans is absolutely free from any adventitious condition, no inference is possible. But it is impossible for the Naiyāyikas to prove that a probans is absolutely free from all possible adventitious conditions. The mere non-perception of any adventitious condition cannot be, for a Naiyāyika, a positive proof of the non-existence of any such condition. Only from the Cārvāka point of view, what is not perceived is non-existent,—a view which the Naiyāyikas want above all to refute. Nor can it be claimed that the absence of all adventitious conditions is proved by inference, because this absence is a precondition for inference itself.

Thus, in short, it is impossible to prove that in an inference the probans is absolutely free from all possible adventitious conditions. The probans of an inference may be vitiated by the presence of an adventitious condition in some possible place or time beyond the range of actual perception. Therefore, because of the possibility of being vitiated by an adventitious condition, no inference is beyond doubt.

Udayana answers this argument by showing that the doubt concerning inference, based on the possible existence of an adventitious condition in some place or time beyond the range of actual perception, is inadmissible for the Cārvāka himself, according to whom nothing not actually perceived can be possible. Thus, since this alleged doubt concerning inference is itself inadmissible, inference must be admitted as valid.

Says Udayana : *śaṃkā cet anumā asti eva, na cet śaṃkā tatastarām.* This means, "If you admit that there is doubt, then inference has got to be admitted ; if there is no doubt, then all the better [for inference]".

But the Cārvākas may argue that even admitting the refutation of their above argument, how can the Naiyāyikas completely eliminate the possibility of the irregularity or variability (*vyabhicāra*) of the probans-probandum relation ? How can they positively prove the co-existence of the probans and the probandum *in all cases* ? Observed cases of this co-existence, however numerous these may be, can never be equated to all cases and it is well-known that even the evidence of thousands of cases is disproved by the evidence of a solitary contrary instance. Therefore, there always remains a doubt concerning the invariability of the probans-probandum relation.

To this Udayana answers : *tarkaḥ śaṃkā-avadhiḥ-mataḥ.* This means, "Hypothetical argument is to be regarded as the dispeller of doubt". In other words, this doubt concerning the invariability of the probans-probandum relation is finally eliminated by a 'hypothetical argument'. Thus, in the inference of fire from smoke, the possible doubt is : Is smoke really invariably related to fire ?" This doubt is dispelled by the following hypothetical argument : "If smoke were not invariably related to fire, then smoke would have never been due to fire." But the fact is that smoke is due to fire.

The Cārvākas may argue that the hypothetical argument itself presupposes an invariable relation and as such another *tarka* is necessary to dispel the doubt concerning the invariable relation presupposed by this *tarka* itself—and so on *ad infinitum.* Thus, the doubt concerning the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum cannot really be dispelled by a *tarka.*

As against this, Udayana says : *vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśaṃkā*. This means, "Doubt is permissible only so long as there is no contradiction." In other words, one can continue to doubt only so long as this doubt does not contradict one's own practical activity. Thus a person cannot have any doubt concerning the invariable relation between smoke and fire inasmuch as, in his practical life, he unhesitatingly seeks fire for obtaining smoke. If he really has any doubt concerning the invariable relation between smoke and fire, why should he at all seek fire in order to obtain smoke ? His own activity, therefore, is itself an indication of the absence of the doubt.

Thus the full statement of Udayana, in the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* iii. 7, is—

śaṃkā cet anumā asti eva, na cet śaṃkā tatastarām /
vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśaṃkā, tarkaḥ śaṃkā-avadhiḥ mataḥ //

Śrīharṣa, the great exponent of Advaita Vedānta, in his *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya*, proposes to refute elaborately the above arguments of Udayana. He sums up his refutation by formulating a counter-*śloka* showing slight verbal variations with Udayana's *śloka* but intended to rebut it. Before quoting this counter-*śloka*, we may sum up Śrīharṣa's main arguments against Udayana.

Udayana claims that contradiction (*vyāghāta*) with practical activity (*pravṛtti*) dispels doubt concerning the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum. But this is impossible. A contradiction implies the contradicted, i.e. there must be two alternatives one of which contradicts the other. In the present context, the two alternatives are : (1) the doubt concerning the invariable relation, and (2) the practical activity. Therefore, to admit the contradiction means to admit [both these alternatives, i.e. also the] presence of the doubt. In other words, doubt is one of the supports (*āśraya*) of this contradiction. Wherever there is contradiction. there is doubt. Thus, far from dispelling the doubt, contradiction implies its presence. Śrīharṣa expresses this by saying : *vyāghātaḥ yadi, śaṃkā asti*. This means, "If there is contradition, there must be doubt". If, in order to avoid this difficulty, Udayana goes to the extent of denying the contradiction, then, argues Śrīharṣa, it is all the better for doubt, because there remains nothing to contradict it. So Śrīharṣa adds : *na cet śaṃkā tatastarām*. This means, "If not [i.e. if there is no contradiction], it is all the better for doubt."

It cannot thus be said that the contradiction is the dispeller of doubt, and as such the doubt concerning the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum remains ever undispelled. If the invariable relation is never free from doubt, then *tarka* itself becomes doubtful ; for *tarka* depends on an invariable relation. It is thus futile to imagine that *tarka* dispels doubt concerning the invariable relation. Argues Srīharṣa : *vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśaṃkā tarkaḥ śaṃkā-avadhiḥ kutaḥ*. This means, "How can contradiction dispel doubt or how can hypothetical argument dispel doubt ?"

Therefore, as Śrīharṣa claims, only a little variation in the wordings makes Udayana's verse go in favour of Śrīharṣa's own view :

vyāghātaḥ yadi śaṃkā asti, na cet śaṃkā tatastarām /
vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśaṃkā tarkaḥ śaṃkā-avadhiḥ kutaḥ //

That is, "If there is contradiction, there must be doubt; if not [i.e. if there is no contradiction], it is all the better for doubt. How can contradiction dispel doubt or how can hypothetical argument dispel doubt ?"

As against this, Gaṅgeśa argues that Śrīharṣa is here distorting the real purport of Udayana's claim. The real point of Udayana is that a clash with practical activity removes the very possibility of doubt. Udayana does not claim that "contradiction", in the sense in which Srīharṣa takes it, is the cause of the removal of doubt. Gaṅgeśa further argues that even admitting Śrīharṣa's interpretation of "contradiction", his conclusion does not follow. It is a fact that doubt is dispelled by the perception of specific characteristics. Thus, e.g., when we have the doubt : "Is this a pillar or a person ?"—the perception of the specific characteristics of a person in the object like arms, legs, etc, dispels the doubt and results in the definite knowledge : "This is a person." But how can this perception of specific characteristics remove the doubt ? Only by contradicting the latter. Thus is seen that the perception of specific characteristics, by contradicting the doubt, removes it. Assuming Srīharṣa's contention that contradiction implies the presence of two factors, one of which is doubt,—he cannot explain the fact of the removal of doubt by the perception of specific characteristics.

Śrīharṣa's other contention is that doubt concerning irregularity cannot be silenced by *tarka*. This *tarka* is dependent on a casual relation. However, though in the cases observed, the relation between the cause and the effect holds good, this is not bound to be so even in the unobserved cases. In other words, the causal relation cannot be a universal or invariable one. Thus, e.g., though in the cases observed, smoke is caused by fire, there is no ground to assume that in all cases smoke is related to fire in the same way.

To this Raghunātha replies that when in numerous cases are observed the relation between fire and smoke, there actually results the ascertainment of a causal connection between fire as such and smoke as such.

After elaborately discussing all these, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa concludes that the objections raised against inference by the Cārvākas and others are not tenable. Even one, wanting to prove that inference is invalid, has to depend upon inference itself. It is futile to claim that inference as such is invalid merely by pointing to certain cases of inference committing the fallacy of irregularity (*vyabhicāra*). A case of genuine inference is free from any irregularity. Thus, in short, the objection that inference is invalid cannot be sustained.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF INFERENCE

(*anumāna-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VI. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE 'PRESENT TIME'

Bhāṣya

It is asserted [on *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.5] that inference has for its object things belonging to the three times [i.e. past, present and future], because of its capacity for knowing objects belonging to the three times. Of these [three times]—

Sūtra 39

[Objection] The present time does not exist, because for a falling body is only known [either] the time it has already taken to fall [i.e. the past time] or the time it would take to fall further [i.e. the future time]. // ii. 1. 39 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] For a fruit severed from its stem and approaching the ground, the space above [i.e. from the fruit to the stem] is space already covered and the time connected with it is 'the time already taken to fall' (*patitakāla*=the past) ; the space below [i.e. from the fruit to the ground] is the space yet to be covered and the time connected with it is 'the time it will take to fall further' (*patitavya-kāla*= the future). There is no third [kind of] space in connection with which the present time can be known [in the form] : "It is falling." Therefore, there is nothing called the present time.

Sūtra 40

[Answer] The denial of the present time amounts also to the denial of the other two [viz. past and future], because of their dependence on it [i.e. present]. // ii. 1. 40 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Time is not known in terms of space. What then ? Time is known

in terms of function [i.e. movement etc], e.g. in the form : "It is falling." The time when the function of falling terminates is 'the time already taken to fall' (*patita-kāla*=past). The time when the function will take place is 'the time of subsequent falling' (*patitavya-kāla*=future). The time when the function is known as actually existing in an object is the present time. If a person [i.e. the opponent] cannot apprehend the function of falling [i.e. present] as residing in the object, the destruction or origination of what would be left to understand? 'The time already taken to fall' points to the movement already ceased and 'the time of subsequent falling' points to the movement that will come into being in the future. In both these times, the object is without movement. But when it is said, "It is falling",—the object is connected with movement. Now, the time in which he [i.e. the opponent] knows the object as related to movement is the present time. The other two times [i.e. past and future] are dependent on it [i.e. on the present] and in the absence of it [i.e. of the present, the other two times] do not exist.

Further—

Sūtra 41

[Answer continued] The past and future cannot be proved by their mutual dependence.
// ii. 1. 41 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If past and future could be proved by their mutual dependence, then there would have been the denial of the present. But the future cannot be proved by its dependence on the past and the past cannot be proved by its dependence on the future. On what ground ? If the present is denied then there can be no explanation of [the following questions] : How does the past become [the past] ? How is the future proved by its dependence on the past ? And, how does the future become [the future] ? You may argue that [by mutual dependence] past and future are proved in the same way [in which is proved by mutual reference the pair of contraries, namely] the long and short, the highland and lowland, the shadow and light. This is not logical, because of the absence of specific ground. [Mere examples without the mention of logical ground cannot prove any thesis. If you seek to establish your view on the basis of mere examples, then] counter-examples may be offered against your examples. Thus, just as colour and touch, smell and taste, are proved not by their mutual dependence, so also are the past and future. Nothing can be proved by its dependence on something else,

because in that case, in the absence of one will result the absence of the other and [as a consequence] both will be absent. If the one is proved by its dependence on the other, then depending on what will the other be proved ? If the other is proved by its dependence on the one, then by depending on what will the one be proved ? In this way, the absence of the one proving the absence of the other, there actually results the absence of both.

The present time is known by the [function namely of] existing. [For example,] the substance exists, the quality exists, the movement exists. For him who does not admit it [i.e. present],—

Sūtra 42

[Answer continued] The denial of the present entails the non-apprehension of everything, because of the impossibility of perception. //ii.1.42//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Perception results from sense-object contact. But that which is absent [i.e. belong to the past or future] cannot come in contact with the sense. This person [i.e. the opponent denying the present] admits nothing as existing in the present. [In that case] the cause of perception [viz. the sense-object contact], the object of perception and perceptual knowledge itself—none of these can be admitted. In the absence of the possibility of perception, inference and verbal testimony, which are preceded by it [i.e. by perception] cannot be admitted. [Comparison is not separately mentioned here, evidently because it rests on an initial verbal testimony]. The denial of all *pramāṇa*-s results in the non-apprehension of everything.

The present time is apprehended in two ways. In some cases, it is known by the existence of the object. For example, the substance exists. In some other cases, it is known by a series of actions. For example, one is cooking, one is cutting. By a series of actions is meant a number of different actions having the same goal or the repetition of the same movements. In the case of cooking, we have different actions leading to the same goal. [The different actions are :] Placing the cooking-pot on the oven, pouring water into the pot, putting rice into it, placing fuel under the oven, lighting the fire, stirring with the ladle (*darvī*), draining the fluid and taking down the pot. In the case of cutting, there is repetition of the same movements. One is said to be cutting [the wood] when one repeatedly raises the axe and strikes the wood. Now, the thing which is being cooked or which is being cut is being accomplished. [In other words, things being cooked or being cut, attain existence because of their relation to the present time.]

In respect of the thing related to present movement—

Sūtra 43

[Answer continued] There being the apprehension of past action and future action, the present time is known in two ways. // ii. 1. 43 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The time yet to come [i.e. future] is [indicated by] a series of actions which has not yet started but the performance of which is contemplated. For example, one is going to cook. The past time is [indicated by] the cessation of a series of actions the design of which is fulfilled. For example, one has cooked. The present time [is indicated by] a series of actions which is just started. For example, one is cooking.

The characteristic of having been already accomplished belongs to [the action] that has ceased. The characteristic of being yet to be performed belongs to [the action] under contemplation. The characteristic of being performed belongs to [the action] which is actually existing. By the apprehension of the present time in the form, "One is cooking" or "Something is being cooked"—is apprehended the three times [i.e. past, future and present] collectively existing in the series of actions. What is referred to here is the continuity of the series of actions and neither its beginning nor its cessation.

Thus the present is apprehended in both ways, namely as being related to and also as being unrelated to the past and the future. The present time is revealed by the existence of an object [i.e. without being related to the past and the future] in the case of [the knowledge]: "The substance exists." The present time is revealed as being related to the three times in the case [of the knowledge]: "One is cooking" or "One is cutting," which is expressive of the continuity of the series of actions.

In common conversation when the sense of [temporal] contiguity etc is sought to be conveyed [e.g. "I am just here," "I start tomorrow," etc.], we are to understand various other expressions revealing the present time.

Therefore, the present time exists.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE 'PRESENT TIME'

(*vartamāna-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VII. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF COMPARISON

Sūtra 44

[Objection] Comparison cannot be established by similarity in all points or by similarity in the majority of points or by scanty similarity. // ii. 1. 44 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Comparison cannot be established by similarity in all points. [The proposition conveying a comparison] cannot take the form: "The cow is just like the cow." Comparison cannot be established by similarity in the majority of points. [The proposition conveying a comparison] cannot take the form: "The ox is like the buffalo." Comparison cannot be established by scanty similarity, because all objects are not comparable to one another [in spite of there being scanty similarity among all objects. Thus, e.g., though the mountain has a remote resemblance with a grain of oil-seed, there cannot be any proposition conveying the comparison as: "The mountain resembles the grain."]

Elucidation

The critical examination of the present time is but a sequel to the critical examination of inference. After this, Gautama logically passes on to the critical examination of comparison, the *pramāṇa* mentioned next in his list. Comparison is defined (in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 6) as the instrument of valid knowledge of an object derived through its similarity with another well-known object. To this is raised the objection that similarity, taken in either of its three conceivable senses, cannot establish any valid knowledge.

Sūtra 45

[Answer] The objections raised are unsustained, because comparsion is established by the similarity with a well-known object. // ii. 1. 45//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Comparison is not employed on the basis of an assessment of the similarity as 'total' or 'almost' or 'scanty'. How then? Comparison is employed on the basis of the similarity with a well-known object, [which similarity] has attained 'the status of that which proves what is proved' (*sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*). It is impossible to reject comparison where this similarity exists. Therefore, the objections raised are unsustained.

Elucidation

In the case of comparison, there is no fixed law regarding the extent of similarity. As required by the context, it may be total or almost or scanty. As Vācaspati points out, depending on the nature of the context, the extent of the similarity is to be ascertained. Thus, e.g., the proposition: "A *gavaya* resembles a cow",—will be understood by one already acquainted with a buffalo that the similarity referred to is exclusive of the similarity of a cow with a buffalo; on the other hand, a person unacquainted with a buffalo will simply understand by this proposition that a *gavaya* resembles a cow.

But what exactly is the instrument of the knowledge derived through comparison? Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains that in Gautama's view the process involved is as follows: A person knows the cow well but has never seen a *gavaya* nor knows the animal denoted by the word *gavaya*. A forester, who has seen a *gavaya*, tells him that a *gavaya* resembles a cow. After this, he comes across a *gavaya*. He perceives its similarity with the cow. This leads to the recollection of what he previously heard from the forester. He then knows that the animal before him is called *gavaya*. Thus, the actual instrument of knowledge here is the perception of the similarity combined with the recollection of the implication of a previous verbal communication.

According to Jayanta, a section of older Naiyāyikas maintained that the proposition conveying the comparison is the actual instrument of this knowledge. However, assuming this, comparison ceases to be an independent *pramāṇa*, inasmuch as it becomes indistinguishable from verbal testimony. From the point of view of the older Naiyāyikas, it may be contended that in spite of this proposition being the real instrument of the knowledge in question, comparison is not to be equated to verbal testimony, because, in the case of comparison, an auxiliary factor in the form of the perception of similarity is also necessary. Jayanta thinks that Vātsyāyana also subscribes to this view. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa argues that this does not appear to be so. On the contrary, since Vātsyāyana considers *karaṇa* or the instrument to be the immediate antecedent, in his view the instrument of *upamiti* is presumably the perception of similarity, though along with the recollection of the previous verbal communication.

Jayanta says that the later Naiyāyikas view the perception of similarity to be the real instrument of *upamiti*, the recollection of 'what is previously heard' (*atideśa-vākya*) being but a 'functional intermediary' (*vyāpāra*) for this knowledge.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Let, then, comparison be equated to inference.

Sūtra 46

[Objection] Because [in the case of comparison also] the unperceived is known by the perceived. // ii. 1. 46 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as [in the case of inference] the unperceived fire is known from the perceived smoke, so also [in the case of comparison] the unperceived *gavaya* is known from the perceived cow. Hence it [comparison] is not different from inference.

Elucidation

Viśvanātha explains the objection in a different way : On perceiving the similarity of the cow in the object before one, one infers the denotation of the word *gavaya* in it in the form : "This animal is denoted by the word *gavaya*, because it resembles the cow."

Bhāṣya

[Answer] But [Gautama] says that [comparison] differs [from inference]. On what ground ?

Sūtra 47

[Answer] [In spite of hearing that the *gavaya* resembles the cow] we do not obtain the result

of comparison [i.e. the knowledge resulting from comparison] so long as we do not actually perceive the *gavaya*. // ii. 1. 47 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Because, when a person already aware of both a cow and the assertion conveying its similarity with *gavaya*, observes an animal resembling the cow, he understands the use of the denoting word as being restricted to [the animal before, i.e. he understands that this peculiar animal is denoted by the term *gavaya*]. But inference is not of such nature. Comparison serves the purpose of others. Because, for the sake of one who has no knowledge of 'the compared' (*upameya*) [e.g. the *gavaya*] is employed [the statement] by a person who has the knowledge of both. [In other words, a person already aware of both 'the compared' and 'by which is compared' (*upamāna*)—e.g. both the *gavaya* and the cow—employs the 'statement conveying the similarity' (*atideśa-vākya*) for the sake of the knowledge of another person who is unaware of 'the compared'].

[Objection] You claim that comparison serves the purpose of others. No [i.e. this is not true], because there is ascertainment for one's own sake. He [i.e. the person making the statement] has himself the definite knowledge implied by the statement : "The *gavaya* resembles the cow."

[Answer] His knowledge [i.e. of the person making the statement] is not denied. But this [knowledge] is not due to comparison, because comparison is the ascertainment of an object through its similarity with another well-known object. For him who has the knowledge of both, there is no such 'relation of that which proves and that which is proved' (*sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*) [i.e. between the statement and the object known].

[Thus, comparison differs from inference also in this respect that comparison is always for the sake of others while inference is both for one's own self as well as for the sake of others].

Moreover—

Sūtra 48

[Answer continued] [Comparison] is to be distinguished from [inference] because in 'knowledge due to comparison' (*upamiti*) the final assertion takes the form : "Similarly." //ii.1.48//

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The knowledge due to comparison results from the final assertion in the form : "Similarly." But inference is not such. This also differentiates comparison from inference.

Elucidation

The after-knowledge (*anu-vyavasāya*) or 'internal perception' (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*) of knowledge due to comparison takes the form : "I am having knowledge through comparison", while that of inferential knowledge is : "I am having knowledge through inference." From this difference also follows the difference between the two *pramāṇa*-s.

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, comparison being nothing different from inference, is not an independent *pramāṇa*. But the Naiyāyikas argue that the knowledge gained through comparison cannot be due to inference. Comparison gives the knowledge of the relation between the naming word and the object denoted by it. Thus, e.g., from the knowledge of similarity between a cow and a *gavaya*, we know that the word *gavaya* has for its denotation the peculiar animal presented before. This knowledge cannot be due to any form of inference. The 'similarity with the cow' cannot be the probans of alleged inference, because there cannot be any *vyapti* in the form : "Wherever there is similarity with the cow, there is the denotation of *gavaya*." One without any previous perception of *gavaya* cannot have the knowledge of *vyāpti* like this. It cannot be claimed that the statement conveying the similarity gives the knowledge of such a *vyāpti*, because the statement simply describes the similarity and indicates no invariable relation. Even admitting that the statement indicates a *vyāpti*, the form of the *vyāpti* will be : "Whatever is denoted by the word *gavaya* is similar to the cow." But such a *vyāpti* cannot give us the knowledge concerned. The Vaiśeṣikas may claim that the inference is as follows : "The word *gavaya* denotes the peculiar animal, because it is not applied to denote any other animal, or because experienced people use the word *gavaya* to denote only this kind of animal." But such a claim is untenable, because before knowing what actually is being denoted by the word *gavaya*, it is impossible to ascertain that the word *gavaya* denotes this kind of animal and nothing else.

Thus, in short, comparison cannot be reduced to inference.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF COMPARISON

(*upamāna-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

VIII. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF VERBAL TESTIMONY IN GENERAL

Sūtra 49

[Objection] Verbal testimony is but inference, because the objects denoted by the words being unperceived [at that time] are inferentially known. // ii. 1. 49 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Verbal testimony is but inference and is not an independent instrument of knowledge. Why ? Because the objects denoted by the words are known inferentially. Why [are these known] inferentially ? Because these are not known by perception. Just as it is called inference because the unperceived probandum is known from the probans rightly perceived, so also verbal testimony should be regarded as inference because the unperceived objects are known from the words rightly perceived [by the auditory sense].

Elucidation

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa suggests that in this *sūtra* Gautama is representing the position of Kaṇāda. According to Kaṇāda, there are only two *pramāṇa*-s, namely perception and inference. Therefore, it is appropriate for him to argue that since knowledge due to verbal testimony is not perceptual, it must be admitted to be inferential.

Bhāṣya

Further, verbal testimony is inference also—

Sūtra 50

[Objection continued] Because there is no difference between the two cognitions [viz. knowledge acquired through inference and through verbal testimony]. // ii. 1. 50 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Had the two *pramāṇa*-s been different, the resulting knowledge [also] would have been different. It has been shown that there is one specific form of knowledge in the case of inference and another specific form in the case of comparison. However, there is no such difference between the cognitions in the cases of verbal testimony and inference. Just as it [knowledge] takes place in the case of inference, so also [it takes place] in the case of verbal testimony. Because of the absence of any specific difference, verbal testimony is but inference.

Sūtra 51

[Objection continued] [Verbal testimony is but inference also] because it proves [like inference] a related object. // ii. 1. 51 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The expression 'verbal testimony is but inference' is to be read here also. The perception of the word can lead to the knowledge of the object only when the relation which interrelates the word and the object is properly apprehended. This is the same [as in the case of inference] : the perception of the probans can lead to the knowledge of the probandum only when the relation which interrelates the probans and the probandum is properly apprehended.

The claim that [verbal testimony is inference] because the objects denoted are inferentially known, is untenable [because]—

Sūtra 52

[Answer] The object denoted is rightly known because of the efficacy of the communication of a trustworthy person. // ii. 1. 52 // Answer ad 49)

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The unperceived objects like heaven, nymph, Uttara-kuru, the Seven Islands, the ocean and the different worlds [*loka*-s like *bhū-loka* etc] are not

known merely from hearing the words. How then? The objects are rightly known due to the fact that the trustworthy persons speak of these [and moreover] in the contrary case [i.e. when these are not spoken of by trustworthy persons] right knowledge does not result. But inference is not like this.

As to the further claim that [verbal testimony is inference] because there is no difference between the two cognitions [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 50],—we answer that the difference between verbal and inferential knowledge consists precisely in this [viz. in what is just shown]. Because of there being this difference [between verbal testimony and inference] the claim [that the two are the same] since no difference exists between them,—is untenable.

As to the further claim that [verbal testimony is inference] because it proves a related object [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 51],—we answer that the relation between the word and the object denoted is both accepted and denied [i.e. accepted in some sense and denied in some other sense]. "This denotation belongs to this word" (*asya idam*)—in such a case of the use of the 'possessive' [*ṣaṣṭhī-viśiṣṭa*, i.e. the sixth case-ending in Sanskrit] is admitted the 'denoter-denoted relation' (*vācya-vācaka-bhāva*) between the words and the objects. However, any 'natural relation' (*prāpti-sambandha*) between the word and the object is denied. Why? Because [such a relation] is not established by any *pramāṇa*. The natural relation between the word and the object, being beyond the range of the senses, cannot be apprehended by perception. The sense-organ, which makes us aware of the word, cannot apprehend an object which is beyond its range. Moreover, there are objects outside the purview of any sense. A natural relation is perceived only between two objects, both of which are apprehended by the same sense. [Thus, for example, the conjunction between air and tree is not perceived, because air is the object of tactual sense and tree that of the visual sense. Hence there can be no knowledge of any natural relation between air and tree. Similarly, there can be no knowledge of any relation between the word and the object denoted by it. The absence of any natural relation between the word and the object denoted means the absence of any *vyāpti* between the two. Vātsyāyana proves the absence of the natural relation in order to show that there is no *vyāpti* in the case of verbal testimony and hence it cannot be equated to inference].

If it is claimed that the [alleged] natural relation between the word and the object is known [by inference], [then we ask]: Is the object contiguous with the word? Or, is the word contiguous with the object? Or, are they mutually contiguous?

Supposing these are [claimed to be] mutually contiguous, [then]—

Sūtra 53

[Answer continued] Because also (*ca*) of the absence of [the mouth] being filled, burned or

cut [by the utterance of the words "food", "fire" and "sword" respectively], there is no mutual relation [between the word and the object]. // ii. 1. 53 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The word "also" (*ca*) [in the *sūtra*] implies [two other grounds, namely] the impossibility of the location and the internal effort [of uttering the word].

This [natural relation between word and the object] cannot also be proved by inference. In the alternative, namely, the object is contiguous with the word, —i.e. the object is contiguous with the word the utterance of which has a specific location and a specific internal effort—there would have been the sensations [in the mouth] of being filled, burnt or cut by the utterance of the words "food", "fire" and "sword" respectively. But such sensations do not take place. Therefore, in the absence of such sensations, no natural relation can be inferred.

In the alternative, namely that the word is contiguous with the object, there would be no presence of the word itself in the place where the object exists, because of the absence of the specific location and the specific internal effort [required for the utterance of the word]. The location [is the vocal organ consisting of] throat, palate, etc and the instrument is the specific internal effort. These [which are presupposed by the utterance of words] cannot be present near the object [i.e. these are present within the body whereas the objects are present somewhere on the ground].

By the rejection of both these alternatives is also rejected [the alternative of] mutual contiguity.

Therefore, there is no natural relation between the word and the object.

Elucidation

After showing that any natural relation between the word and the object denoted cannot be proved by perception, it is now shown that such a relation cannot be proved by inference either. In order to prove this relation inferentially, one has to show either that the object is contiguous with the word or that the word is contiguous with the object or that the two are mutually contiguous. But Vātsyāyana shows that none of the three alternatives is tenable.

Sūtra 54

[Objection] The [natural] relation between the word and the object denoted [by it] cannot be denied, because there is the fixed law restricting [the use of a specific] word [for denoting a specific] object. // ii. 1. 54 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] There being observed the fixed rule regarding the denotation of a specific object by a specific word, it is inferred that there is a natural relation between the word and the object, which [relation] is the cause of the fixed rule. In the absence of such a relation, any word could have denoted any object. Therefore, the relation cannot be denied. [Thus is shown that the natural relation between the word and the object denoted by it is proved by an inference.]

The answer to this objection is—

Sūtra 55

[Answer] No [i.e. there can be no such natural relation between the word and the object], because the apprehension of the object from the word is 'due to convention' (*sāmayika*). // ii. 1. 55 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The restriction of the use of a specific word to denote a specific object is not due to a natural relation. To what, then, [is it due] ? [It is] 'due to convention' (*samaya-kārita*). We have already referred to the convention while remarking [on *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 52.] : "This denotation belongs to this word"—in such a case of the use of the "possessive" is admitted the denoter-denoted relation between the word and the object.

What exactly is this convention ? [This convention is] the employment of the rule regulating [the fixation of] the denoter and the denoted in the form : "This specific word denotes this specific object." Only when this convention is known, there is the knowledge of the object from the word. On the contrary, [i.e.

in the absence of the knowledge of this convention], there is no awareness [of the object] in spite of the word being heard. This cannot be denied even by those who assume the existence of a natural relation [between the word and the object]. The common people acquire the convention from [the observation of] the use [by elders] of specific words to denote specific objects. Grammar, which is but an explanation of the words (*śabda*) in their 'declined forms' (*pada*) for sustaining the convention, helps to understand the words forming a sentence. A sentence is a group of words conveying a complete sense. [In other words, if the relation between words and objects is merely conventional, what can be the use of grammar? Vātsyāyana answers that grammar conveys and sustains the convention.]

Therefore, there is not even a grain to infer a natural relation between the word and the object.

Sūtra 56

[Answer continued] [There can be no natural relation between the word and the object] further because there is no fixed law [for the use of words] in the cases of 'different groups of people' (*jāti-viśeṣa*). // ii. 1. 56 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The object is known from the word because of convention and not because of any natural relation, for words are used to denote specific objects according to the [arbitrary] wishes of the seers (*ṛṣi*-s), the nobles (*ārya*-s) and the barbarians (*mleccha*-s). If the capacity of words to denote objects were due to natural relation, then [the use of words] would not have been in accordance with their [arbitrary] wishes, just as the capacity of light to reveal colour has no exception in the case of any group of people.

Elucidation

Uddyotakara and Jayanta say that by 'different groups of people' of the *sūtra* is to be understood 'different groups of peoples belonging to the different countries.' Thus, from the fact that in different countries the same word is used to mean different objects

is proved that the relation between words and objects is due to convention rather than to any natural relation.

But whose view does Gautama refute in this section? The Mīmāṃsakas and Grammarians are of course the well-known representatives of the view that the relation between words and objects is a natural one. But they do not reduce verbal testimony to inference, which is done only by Kaṇāda. From this Phaṇibhūṣaṇa conjectures that the view refuted here could have been that of Kaṇāda, for though Śrīdhara, a later representative of the Vaiśeṣika, rejects the theory of natural relation between words and objects, Kaṇāda himself is silent on this point.

As against the Vaiśeṣika claim that verbal testimony is only a form of inference, later Naiyāyikas argue that the speciality of verbal testimony is that because of this the individual components of a sentence merge into a coherent whole, which represents the meaning of the sentence and which can never be due to inference. Thus, though the sentence, "The cow exists," contains many words, yet the sense conveyed by it is one coherent whole, viz. cow-characterised-by-existence. Further, the after-knowledge of the knowledge due to verbal testimony is different from the after-knowledge of the knowledge due to inference. Thus, after knowing something through verbal testimony, it is impossible to have the internal perception in the form : "I have inferred this."

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF VERBAL TESTIMONY IN GENERAL

(*śabda-sāmānya-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

IX. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC FORM OF VERBAL TESTIMONY (VEDA)

Sūtra 57

[Objection] It [i.e. Veda] has no validity, because it is vitiated by 'falsehood' (*anṛta*), 'self-contradiction' (*vyāghāta*) and 'repetition' (*punarukti*). // ii. 1. 57//

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Thus, in the cases of 'the rite for having a son' (*putrakāma-iṣṭi*), 'making oblation' (*havana*) and 'recurring recital' (*abhyāsa*), [we have the typical examples of the defects mentioned].

By the word 'it' in the *sūtra*, the noble sage (Gautama) refers to a particular form of verbal testimony [i.e. Veda]. There is no validity of this form of verbal testimony. Why ?

Because there is the defect of falsehood in the case of 'the rite for having a son.' In spite of the Vedic injunction that a person desirous of having a son should perform the prescribed rite for having a son and in spite of the performance of the rite, the birth of a son is not observed. From the falsehood of the injunction, the result of which is capable of being observed, follows that injunctions like, "One desirous of heaven should perform the Agnihotra rite," the results of which cannot be observed, must also be false.

Because, moreover, of the defect of self-contradiction in the Vedic injunctions concerning the offerings of oblations. After prescribing, "Make oblations after sunrise," "Make oblations before sunrise," "Make oblations when neither the sun nor the star is in the sky"—these are contradicted by disparaging remarks [about the same prescriptions as] : "The Śyāva dog devours the oblations which one offers after sun-rise," "The Śavala dog devours the oblation which one offers before sunrise" and "The Śyāva and Śavala dogs devour the oblation which one offers when there is neither the sun nor the star in the sky." Because of the self-contradiction involved, either [group of statements] must be false.

Because, moreover, of the defect of repetition in the Vedic injunctions concerning 'recurring recital'. There is the defect of repetition in the injunctions : "The first spell is to be uttered thrice and the last spell is to be uttered thrice." Statements vitiated by repetition are like the ravings of a lunatic.

Therefore, verbal testimony [i.e. Veda] has no validity, because it is vitiated by falsehood, self-contradiction and repetition.

Sūtra 58

[Answer] No [i.e. the alleged defect of falsehood does not exist], because [the non-attainment of the results of the Vedic injunctions] is due to the imperfections of the ritual performance, of the performer and of the means employed. // ii. 1. 58 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] There is no defect of falsehood in the injunction concerning the rite for having a son. Why ? Because of the imperfections of the ritual performance, of the performer and of the means employed. The mother and the father, conjoined together, obtain the son through the rite. The means employed for the rite are the prerequisites for its performance, [viz. the impliments used, the spell uttered, etc]. The performers of the rite are the parents. The ritual performance is the specific form of their union. The son is obtained from the perfection of these three. From the imperfection [of all or any of these three] results the opposite.

In the case of a rite, the imperfection in the performance consists in the violation of its details.

When the performer is ignorant or immoral, there is imperfection of the performer.

There is imperfection of the means concerned when the clarified butter offered [as oblation] is impure or polluted, or when the spell uttered falls short of or exceeds [the prescribed spell] or when the spell is 'wrongly pronounced' (*svara-hīna*) or is 'incomplete' (*varṇa-hīna*), or when the sacrificial fee is evil-earned and is bad or despised.

In the case of the procreative activity [of the parents], the imperfection of the performance is perverse union. Female disease and male sterility are the imperfections of the performer. The imperfections of the means concerned are those already mentioned [in connection with the rite].

In ordinary practice also, there is the rule : "One desiring fire should strike the pieces of wood (*araṇi*). In this case, the imperfection of the performance is the wrong way of striking, the imperfection of the performer is due to the error in understanding and making effort, the imperfection in the means employed consists in the wetness and hollowness of the striking wood. The absence of the desired result in this case is not indicative of the defect of falsehood, because the result is found to be produced in the presence of perfection.

The [Vedic injunction, namely,] "A person desirous of having a son should perform the prescribed rite for having a son" is not different from the rule of ordinary practice.

Sūtra 59

[Answer continued] [There is no defect in the form of self-contradiction] because [in the injunctions concerning making oblations] the denunciation refers to the violation of the time of observance after resolving [in favour of one]. // ii. 1. 59 //.

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The expression "there is no self-contradiction in the injunctions concerning the offering of oblations" is to be read along with this *sūtra*. If a person violates the time of making oblations already resolved by himself, i.e. offers oblations in some other time,—in such a case, because of the violation of the time resolved, there is the denunciation [e.g.]: "The Śyāva dog devours the oblation that one offers after sunrise." This is a denunciation of the violation of the injunction.

Elucidation

The main point of the Vedic injunction is that the oblation is to be offered in any of the hour specified. However, a person who has once resolved to observe a particular hour for offering oblations must never violate it. In case it is violated by somebody, his offerings are denounced as going to the dogs.

Sūtra 60

[Answer continued] [There is no defect of repetition in the Vedic injunctions concerning recurring recital] because of the justification of 'reiteration' (*anuvāda*). // ii. 1. 60 //.

Bhāṣya

[Answer] From the context is to be understood that there is no defect of repetition in the Vedic injunctions concerning recurring recital. 'Purposeless recurring recital' (*abhyāsa*) is 'repetition' (*punarukti*), while purposive recurring recital is 'reiteration' (*anuvāda*). Thus, the recurring recital [prescribed in the injunction] : "The first spell is to be uttered thrice and the last spell is to be uttered thrice", is reiteration, because of its purposiveness. The Śāmidhenī spells [i.e. the spells to be uttered while lighting the ritual woods] become fifteen in number as a result of the first and the last being uttered thrice. [The Sāmidhenī spells are actually eleven in number, but the injunction is that at least fifteen of these spells should be uttered. This is done by uttering the first and the last thrice and the rest only once]. This is corroborated by the spell itself : "To the enemy, who harms us and whose harm we desire, I inflict injury by at least fifteen 'weapons in the form of spells' (*vāk-vajra*)." Fifteen weapons of Sāmidhenī spells are mentioned here, but this is not possible without recurring recital.

Sūtra 61

[Answer continued] [Veda is valid], because proper exposition [of the Vedic texts] conveys meaning. // ii. 1. 61 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Verbal testimony [in the form of Veda] is valid, just like statements in ordinary life.

Elucidation

After defending the validity of the Veda negatively by way of answering the three-fold typical charges against it, Gautama now offers positive proof for its validity. Just as in ordinary life, statements make sense only when properly understood, so also in the case of the Vedas proper exposition of the texts reveals real sense.

Bhāṣya

[The Vedas are traditionally divided into two parts, called *mantra* and

brāhmaṇa. After defending the validity of the *mantra* part, Gautama passes on to discuss the *brāhmaṇa* part]. The statements contained in the *Brāhmaṇa*-s are classified under three heads—

Sūtra 62

Because these are classified as 'injunction' (*vidhi-vacana*), 'explanatory stataments' (*arthavāda-vacana*) and 'reiteration' (*anuvāda-vacana*). // ii. 1. 62 //

Bhāṣya

The statements contained in the *Brāhmaṇa*-s are classified under three heads: injunctions, explanatory statements and reiterations. Of these—

Sūtra 63

Injunction is the statement which prescribes [some act]. // ii. 1. 63 //

Bhāṣya

Injunction is the statement which prescribes or incites [to some action]. Injunction employs [one to some activity] and prescribes [it]. As for example, "One desirous of heaven should perform the Agnihotra rite", etc.

Sūtra 64

Statements eulogising (*stuti*), denouncing (*nindā*), 'mentioning contrary injunctions' (*parakṛti*) and 'referring to traditional practice' (*purākalpa*) are called 'the explanatory statements' (*arthavāda*). // ii. 1. 64 //

Bhāṣya

Eulogising is praising by way of stating the results obtained from injunction. It aims at generating veneration, because what is praised is venerated. It also incites to action, because one is led to action on being told of the result. Thus, e.g. "The gods conquered all by performing the Sarvajit rites. It is the means of obtaining everything and conquering all. Everything can be obtained by this and all can be conquered". (*Tāṇḍya-mahā-brāhmaṇa* xvi. 7. 2).

Denouncing is stating the evil results of an action. It is for the purpose of avoiding [the action], because that which is denounced is not performed. Thus, e.g., "This rite [i.e. Jyotiṣṭoma] is the foremost of all rites. One who does not perform this rite but performs some other rite becomes emaciated 'like the soil that succumbs or perishes' (*gartapatya*)." [*Tāṇḍya-mahā-brāhmaṇa* xvi. 1. 2] [Thus by denunciation or *nindā* as a form of *arthavāda* is really meant deprecation of the non-performance of a rite : it amounts in fact to the extolling of the rite itself].

'Mentioning contrary injunction' is stating an injunction contradicted by [the performance of] others. Thus, e.g., the priests of the Śukla Yajurveda after offering oblations, first pours clarified butter into the fat (*vapā*) and then pours clarified butter into the 'mixture of butter and curd' (*pṛṣat-ājya*). The priests of Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda first pours clarified butter into the mixture of butter and curd and say that this mixture of butter and curd is the very life of fire.

'Referring to traditional practice' is stating the custom traditionally followed. Thus, e.g., "In the ancient times, the Brahmins praised the Vahispavamāna hymns [of the *Sāmaveda*] by the spells with which we are now performing the rites."

[Objection] Why should 'mentioning contrary injunction' (*parakṛti*) and 'referring to traditional practice' (*purākalpa*) be regarded as 'explanatory statements' (*arthavāda*) ?

[Answer] These are regarded as *arthavāda* because, being related to statements eulogising and denouncing, these bring out the implications contained in injunctions.

Elucidation

The Mīmāṃsakas, however, speak of three forms of *arthavāda*, viz. 1) *guṇavāda*, 2) *anuvāda* and 3) *bhūtārthavāda*.

Arthavāda in the form of *guṇavāda* [literally, the statement of a secondary meaning] is a statement taken in its 'secondary sense' (*gauṇa*) because its primary sense is palpably contradicted by some other source of knowledge. Thus, e.g., the statement *yajamānaḥ-prastaraḥ*, meaning "The 'person paying the cost of the rite' (*yajamāna*) is the 'bed of

kuśa grass' (*prastara*)", is palpably absurd. It is, therefore, to be understood in the sense that the *yajamāna* is similar to *prastara*, inasmuch as both are indispensable for the ritual performance.

Arthavāda in the form of *anuvāda* [literally, re-statement] means the reiteration of what is already established by some other source of knowledge. Thus, e.g., the statement *agniḥ himasya bheṣajam*, meaning "Fire is the medicine for cold."

Arthavāda in the form of *bhūtārthavāda* [literally, the statement of an event of the past] is a statement neither contradicted nor already established by any other *pramāṇa*, but merely refers to an event. For example, "Indra raised the *vajra* against Vṛtra."

But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that the four forms of *arthavāda* mentioned by Gautama are also recognised by Śabara in his *Bhāṣya* on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* ii. 1. 33.

Sūtra 65

Reiteration (*anuvāda*) is the 'purposive restatement by [the same] words' (*vidhi-anuvacana*) and '[the purposive restatement] by [the same] implication' (*vihita-anuvacana*). // ii. 1. 65 //

Bhāṣya

Reiteration is the purposive restatement by words as well as the purposive restatement by implication. The former is reiteration of words and the latter is reiteration of implication. Like repetition, reiteration also is twofold.

What is the purpose of the reiteration of the prescribed [i.e. of the implication or the *vihita*] ? The purpose is to refer to it. With reference to the prescribed praising or denouncing is understood or the continuation of the injunction is stated. It [i.e. reiteration] may also be for the purpose of indicating the order of the prescribed. Other similar purposes are to be understood.

In ordinary life also there are three forms of statements, viz. injunction (*vidhi*), 'explanatory statement' (*arthavāda*) and reiteration (*anuvāda*). "Cook the rice",—this is a statement of injunction. "Longivity, vigour, strength, happiness and 'gifted intelligence' (*pratibhā*) are all derived from food",—this is an explanatory statement. "Please cook, cook",—this repetition is reiteration, because its purpose is either [to imply] "Please cook quickly" or "Please cook over again" or "Please do the cooking yourself."

Just as statements in ordinary life, since these convey sense when properly analysed, are regarded as sources of valid knowledge, so also the statements of the Veda, since these convey sense when properly analysed, should be regarded as sources of valid knowledge.

Elucidation

Though Vātsyāyana says that there are many purposes of reiteration, he mentions specifically only four of these, namely, 1) praising, 2) denouncing, 3) completing the injunction and 4) indicating the order of the performance. The respective examples of these are :

1) After expressing the injunction, "One should perform the Aśvamedha sacrifice", it is reiterated for praising it : "One who performs the Aśvamedha overcomes death, overcomes evil." 2) After prescribing that one should make oblations before sunrise, it is reiterated for denouncing the violation of the resolved time : "The Śavala dog devours the oblation offered before sunrise", etc. 3) After prescribing that one should perform the Agnihotra *homa*, it is reiterated for completing the injunction that one should perform it with curd. 4) After separately prescribing the Soma sacrifice and the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa sacrifices, it is reiterated for indicating the order, "One should perform the Soma sacrifice after the performance of the Darśa and Pūrṇamāsa."

Sūtra 66

[Objection] There is no difference between reiteration (*anuvāda*) and repetition (*punarukta*), because in both cases the words are said over again. // ii. 1. 66 //

Bhāṣya

[The distinction which you make that]

[Objection] Repetition is unjustified (*asādhu*) and reiteration is justified (*sādhu*),—this differentiation between the two is not logical. Why ? Because in both cases words already understood are said over again. Therefore, both being the re-utterances of words already understood are [equally] unjustified.

Sūtra 67

[Answer] There is difference [between repetition and reiteration] because it [i.e. reiteration] becomes justified like the imperative : "Go faster." // ii. 1. 67 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] There is no absence of difference between repetition and reiteration. Why ? Because reiteration is purposive repetition. Repetition is redundant when it is mere [i.e. purposeless] restatement. Reiteration is purposive restatement. By restating, "Go quick and quick"—is sought to be expressed the increased tempo of movement, just as [this is done] by the imperative : "Go faster." This is just an instance. There are other similar cases of restating. [For example,] "One is cooking and cooking", [expresses] the uninterruptedness of the activity [of cooking]. "Beautiful are villages and villages" [expresses] the extensity of beauty. "The deity has rained avoiding and avoiding the Trigarta country [i.e. Jalandhar]" [expresses] the avoidance. "One is seated on the foundation, on the foundation" [expresses] the contiguity. "It is [as if] bitter and bitter" [expresses] similarity [of taste]. Thus reiteration is purposive, because it is taken recourse to for praising, denouncing, completing the injunction and also for indicating the order of the performance.

Is the validity of the Veda proved merely by refuting the objections raised against it ? No. Moreover, by [the evidence]—

Sūtra 68

Like the validity of *Mantra* and *Āyurveda*, its [i.e. of the Veda] validity is proved because of the trustworthiness of the person uttering it. [The validity of an utterance is established by the trustworthiness of the person uttering it. A trustworthy person is a speaker who has the direct knowledge of an object and is motivated by the desire of communicating the object as directly known by him. See Vātsyāyana on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 7. This is palpably so in the case of *Mantra* and *Āyurveda*. On the same ground is established the validity of the Veda]. // ii. 1. 68 //

Bhāṣya

What is meant by the validity of the *Āyurveda* ? It consists in its veracity, i.e. the absence of any opposition to facts. This means that the recommendation of the

Āyurveda, viz. "One performing this attains the desirable and one avoiding it avoids the undesirable," when properly followed, the promised results actually take place. The validity of the mantras consists [in their veracity, i.e.] in this that when the spells intended to remove or dispel poison, evil spirit and lightning are uttered,—these actually take place [i.e. poison etc. are actually removed].

What is this [validity] due to ? It is due to the veracity of the trustworthy persons. But what, again, constitutes the veracity of the trustworthy persons ? The direct knowledge of what is prescribed, compassion for the living beings and the desire to communicate the objects rightly. The trustworthy persons, who have the direct knowledge of what they prescribe, express their compassion for the living beings [by way of advising] : "This is to be avoided" and "This is the cause of pain", or "This is to be attained" and "This is the means of its attainment." For the ordinary living beings, who cannot themselves understand, there is no other way of knowing all these except such advice. Without the knowledge there can be no effort for their attainment and avoidance. And without such effort, there is no benefit for them. And there is no other means for attaining this benefit except such advice. [The trustworthy persons resolve :] "We are going to advise them correctly, as we have ourselves observed, so that by listening to us they [i.e. ordinary persons] will acquire knowledge and thereby avoid the undesirable and attain the desirable." Thus the communications of trustworthy persons, being characterised by the three-fold veracity of their trustworthiness, when actually followed, become fruitful. Therefore, the communication of the trustworthy persons are sources of valid knowledge and the trustworthy persons are themselves the sources of valid knowledge.

From the [validity of the] *Āyurveda*, which is but the communication of an authoritative person about directly perceptible objects, is to be inferred the validity of the Veda [which is also a communication of trustworthy persons] about objects imperceptible. Further, the Veda is in part—e.g. in the injunction, "One desirous of a village should perform a rite"—a communication about perceptible objects. From [the validity of] this part is to be inferred [the validity of those parts of the Veda that communicate about objects imperceptible].

In ordinary life also, there are many practices based on the advice [of authoritative persons]. The trustworthiness of the advisers in ordinary life also is constituted by the direct knowledge of the objects spoken of, the compassion for others and the desire to communicate the objects rightly. [The communications of trustworthy persons in ordinary life] are also sources of valid knowledge because they are characterised by these [three].

The validity of Veda is also inferred from the identity of the seers and speakers. The trustworthy persons, who are the seers and speakers of the Veda, are themselves [the seers and speakers of] *Āyurveda*, etc. Therefore, the validity of the Veda is to be inferred like [the inference of] the validity of *Āyurveda*.

Elucidation

The later Naiyāyikas like Viśvanātha and his followers claim that the Mantras, viz. the spells to remove poison etc, as well as Āyurveda are but parts of Veda. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa does not accept this. It may be argued that these Mantras and Āyurveda mean *Atharvaveda*. But Phaṇibūṣaṇa argues that without overlooking the close relation between Āyurveda and the *Atharvaveda*, it is wrong to include the former into the latter. From the clear statements of Caraka and Suśruta themselves, it is evident that they do not consider Āyurveda to be a part of the *Atharvaveda* : the word *veda* in Āyurveda does not stand for *śruti*. Further, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa strongly argues for the recognition of the *Atharvaveda* as a Veda, but he clearly denies the same status to Āyurveda. Gaṅgeśa also does not consider Āyurveda to be a Veda.

Gautama argues that the validity of the Veda rests on the trustworthiness of its speaker. But who can be this trustworthy speaker ? Udayana, Vācaspati and the later Naiyāyikas in general almost take it for granted that by this trustworthy speaker is meant God and God alone. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that it is significant that Gautama in this *sūtra* uses the expression 'from the trustworthiness of the speaker'(*āpta-prāmāṇyāt*) and not 'from the trustworthiness of God'(*īśvara-prāmāṇyāt*). Vātsyāyana also does not mention God as the speaker of the Veda. On the contrary he refers to a number of trustworthy speakers as the seers of the Veda : *ya eva āptāḥ vedārthānāṃ draṣṭāraḥ pravaktāraḥ ca*. From the use of this plural, it is evident that he refers to the "seers" rather than to the Omniscient God as the speaker of the Veda. Uddyotakara also does not mention God as the trustworthy person referred to in this *sūtra*.

In the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, Kaṇāda says : "The Veda is valid because it is spoken by him"—*āmnāyasya tat-vacanāt prāmāṇyam* (x. 2. 9). Though Śaṃkara Miśra, a later commentator, finally concludes that the expression 'because spoken by him' (*tat-vacanāt*) means 'because spoken by God,' the earlier exponents of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy like Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara categorically state that the speakers of the Veda are the seers and not God : *āmnāyaḥ vedaḥ, tasya vidhātāraḥ kartāraḥ ye ṛṣayaḥ*. That is, 'the spoken' (*āmnāyaḥ*) means Veda ; its makers mean its authors, namely the seers.

Nevertheless, argues Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, the statements of Gautama, Vātsyāyana and others need not necessarily mean that the Vedic seers themselves could have composed the Veda completely independent of God. These statements may as well be taken to mean that the "seers" spoke the Veda under the inspiring grace of God. However, concludes Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, it is for the learned to come to any final conclusion as to the real implication of Vātsyāyana.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Since the validity of the Veda is due to its eternality, it is illogical [to argue] that the validity of the Veda is due to the trustworthiness of its

speakers. [Answer] The validity of words is due to their conveying objects by virtue of their expressiveness and [the validity] is not due to their eternality. If the words uttered are assumed to be eternal, then there will be no rule of specific words denoting specific objects, because [in that case] all words would denote all objects.

It cannot be argued that in the event of non-eternality [of words], there would be non-expressiveness, because this is not observed to be so in the case of ordinary words. It cannot be argued that these [i.e. ordinary words] are also eternal, because in that case there is no explanation of wrong apprehension from the words of those who are not trustworthy, since, all words being eternal, even these words are [to be viewed] as sources of valid knowledge. If claimed that [the ordinary words] are non-eternal, then there is the absence of any specific ground, i.e. a specific ground is to be shown why the ordinary words of untrustworthy persons are not eternal. The validity of 'denoting words' (*nāmadheya-śabda*) in ordinary life is due to their conveying objects when these are used according to the convention. Their validity cannot be justified if these are eternal. A denoting word, when used in ordinary discourse to convey a specific object, denotes the specific object on the strength of convention and not [on the strength of] its eternality.

The eternality of the Veda consists in the uninterrupted continuation of its schools, its recurrent recitals and application through 'the aeons associated with Manus' (*manvantara*), the different ages, the past and the future times. The validity of the Veda is due to the trustworthiness of its speakers and this in common with the validity of ordinary words.

HERE ENDS THE FIRST ĀHNIKA OF THE SECOND CHAPTER OF VĀTSYĀYANA'S COMMENTARY ON THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana shows here the fundamental difference between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Naiyāyikas on the question of the validity of the Veda. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, the Veda is not due to any personal agency and hence is eternal. From this eternality of the Veda, follows its validity, for if there is no personal agency involved there cannot be any chance of erorr as well. According to the Naiyāyikas, however, words can never be eternal and the validity of the Veda is derived from the trusworthiness of its speaker.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC FORM OF VERBAL TESTIMONY (VEDA)

(*śabda-viśeṣa-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

FIRST AHNIKA OF THE SECOND CHAPTER ENDS

I. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF VALID KNOWLEDGE BEING SPECIFICALLY FOUR

Bhāṣya

Apprehending that the enumeration of *pramāṇa*-s [*Nyāya-sūtra* 1.1.3] has not been correct, [Gautama raises the objection]—

Sūtra 1

[Objection] [The *pramāṇa*-s] are not four, because of the validity of 'traditional hearsay' (*aitihya*), 'postulation' (*arthāpatti*), 'inclusion' (*sambhava*) and 'absence' (*abhāva*, i.e. knowledge of absence). // ii. 2. 1 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] *Pramāṇa*-s are not merely four. Why ? Because traditional hearsay, postulation, inclusion and absence also are instruments of valid knowledge.

Traditional hearsay means an assertion current for a long time in the form : "Thus it is said", but the original speaker of which is untraceable. [For example, the assertion : "It is said that a spirit dwells in this tree."]

Postulation [or *artha-āpatti*] means 'that which follows' (*āpatti*) from 'logical implication' (*artha*). *Āpatti* in *arthāpatti* means the attainment, i,e. arriving at the 'inevitably incidental' (*prasaṅga*). Postulation is thus the implication which inevitably follows from the implication of what is stated. For example, "If there is no cloud there is no rain." What is [the implication] that follows [from the implication] in this case ? [It is] "There is rain when there is cloud."

Inclusion means the knowledge of the existence of an object derived from the knowledge of another object which is invariably related to it [i.e. the former]. For example, the knowledge of the existence of *āḍhaka* [i.e. a comparatively smaller unit of weight] from the knowledge of the existence of *droṇa* [i.e., a comparatively heavier unit of weight] and the knowledge of the existence of

prastha [i.e. a unit of weight comparatively lighter than *āḍhaka*] from the knowledge of the existence of *āḍhaka*.

Absence is [the source in which the knowledge of] non-existence as contrary to the existent [leads to the knowledge of something else]. For example, [the knowledge of] the non-existence of rain is a definite indication of the conjunction between wind and cloud, because there is no falling of rain-water in spite of its heaviness when the obstructing conjunction between wind and cloud exists. [Because of its heaviness, rain-water falls to the ground. However, it does not rain when there is strong wind to prevent raining. Thus, from the knowledge of the non-existence of rain is known the existence of the conjunction of strong wind with cloud].

Elucidation

The source of knowledge referred to here as *abhāva* or absence, which is interpreted by Phaṇibhūṣaṇa as the instrument of knowledge in which "the knowledge of the absence of something leads to the knowledge of something else", is clearly to be distinguished from non-apprehension or *anupalabdhi* of the Mīmāṃsakas, which is simply an instrument of knowing non-existence. In the example of absence given here by Vātsyāyana, the object known is an existent or *bhāva-padārtha*. Further, the non-apprehension of the Mīmāṃsakas is viewed by the Naiyāyikas as an auxiliary cause of the perceptual knowledge of non-existence, whereas *abhāva* or absence mentioned here is equated by them to a form of inference.

Sūtra 2

[Answer] It cannot be denied that *pramāṇa*-s are four, because 'traditional hearsay' is not different from verbal testimony, while postulation, inclusion and absence are not different from inference. // ii. 2. 2 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] It is acknowledged that these are sources of valid knowledge; but these are not independent sources of valid knowledge. The objector raises his objection [against *pramāṇa* being four-fold] by viewing these as independent sources of valid knowledge. But such an objection is untenable. Why ?

Verbal testimony is the communication of a trustworthy person. This definition of verbal testimony is not inapplicable to traditional hearsay. This different [*pramāṇa*, i.e., traditional hearsay] is already covered by the general definition [of verbal testimony].

Inference is the knowledge of an invariably related unperceived object from a perceived object. Similar are the cases of postulation, inclusion and absence.

Postulation is nothing but inference, because it is the knowledge of something not stated derived from the right understanding of what is stated, the two being related by [the relation of] contrariety.

Inclusion also is nothing but inference, because it is the knowledge of 'what is included' (*samudāyī*) from the knowledge of 'that which includes it' (*samudāya*), since 'that which is included' and 'that which includes it' are related by the relation of invariable co-existence.

[Absence is nothing but inference] because when it is ascertained, "This being present that does not exist",—from the [knowledge of the] absence of the effect is inferred the counter-agent of the cause.

Therefore, the enumeration of the *pramāṇa*-s is perfectly justified.

[Objection] It is acknowledged that these are sources of valid knowledge, though these are not independent sources of valid knowledge. However, the acceptance of the validity of postulation is not justified. Thus,—

Sūtra 3

[Objection] Postulation is not valid, because of [the fallacy of] irregularity. // ii. 2. 3 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] [From the statement] "When there is no cloud, there is no rain" is obtained by logical implication [i.e. by postulation], "When there is cloud, there is rain." But in spite of the presence of cloud, sometimes it does not rain. Hence, postulation is not valid.

[Answer] there is no fallacy of irregularity in postulation—

Sūtra 4

[Answer] Because of the imputation of postulation in what is not postulation. // ii. 2. 4 //

Bhāṣya

From the statement "Where there is no cause, there is no effect" is obtained by logical implication [i.e. postulation] its contrary significance : "When there is the cause, there is the effect." Because the existent is contrary to the non-existent. This production of the effect in the presence of the cause, which is known by logical implication, does not violate the existence of the cause, because when the cause is absent the effect is not produced. Therefore, there is no fallacy of irregularity in postulation. However, the circumstance that in spite of the presence of the cause there is no production of the effect, because of the counter-agents [inhibiting the production of the effect], is only a characteristic of the cause and is not something established by postulation. What, then, is to be established by postulation ? [It is] that in the presence of the cause the effect is produced. The fact to be established by this postulation is that the production of the effect does not violate the existence of the cause. Thus, the refutation rests on the imputation of postulation to what is not postulation. The characteristic of the cause ascertained by observation cannot be denied.

Elucidation

From the statement, "When there is no cause, there is no effect" is known by postulation : "When there is the cause, there is the effect." The objector contends that this is invalid, because there are cases of the absence of the effect in spite of the presence of the cause. Vâtsyâyana answers that such a refutation is irrelevant. The absence of the effect in spite of the presence of the cause is due to some counter-agent, with the discussion of which postulation has nothing to do. By postulation is simply indicated here that when the cause is present, the effect takes place. And that is all.

Sūtra 5

[Answer] The argument [of the opponent] refuting [the validity of postulation] is not valid, because it is itself vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity. // ii. 2. 5. //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The argument refuting [the validity of postulation is] : "Postulation is not valid, because of the fallacy of irregularity." By this is denied the validity of

postulation, but not its existence. And thus it becomes irregular. By this argument nothing can be denied, because being vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity, it is itself not valid.

If you [objector] admit that, there being restriction of *pramāṇa*-s to their respective objects, there can be irregularity [of a *pramāṇa*] only in respect of its specific object and the point of the refutation is not the existence but the validity of postulation,—in that that case,

Sūtra 6

[Answer] It [i.e. the argument of the opponent] being valid, there will also be the validity of postulation. // ii. 2. 6 //

Bhāṣya

In the case of postulation also, the point established is that the production of the effect does not violate the existence of the cause and not that the characteristic of the cause is its inefficacy in producing the effect in the presence of a counter-agent.

Elucidation

The objector may claim that the real point of his argument is the refutation of the validity of postulation and this has nothing to do with the existence of postulation. Therefore, the charge that his argument does not apply to the existence of postulation,—and as such is irregular,—is an irrelevant one.

In defence of postulation it is argued that on the same ground the charge of irregularity against postulation is itself irregular. The main point of the postulation under consideration is that in the presence of the cause the effect takes place, and nothing else. Thus, the evidence of the counter-agents preventing the cause from producing the effect has nothing to do with the real point of postulating.

Bhāṣya

But, then, the acceptance of the validity of absence (*abhāva*) is not justified. Why ?

Sūtra 7

[Objection] Absence [i.e. the knowledge of non-existence as a source of knowledge] is not valid, because its object [i.e. the object of the knowledge of non-existence] is unproved. // ii. 2. 7 //

Bhāṣya

In spite of there being innumerable objects of absence accepted by the people, the objector, out of sheer impertinence, says that absence is not valid because its object is itself unproved.

Now, since there are innumerable objects [of absence], only a few of these objects are cited.

Sūtra 8

[Answer] The object of it [i.e, of absence] is proved, because when there are certain objects marked, the unmarked objects are characterised by the non-existence of the mark. // ii. 2. 8 //

Bhāṣya

The objects of this absence are proved. How ? Because when there are some marked clothes that are not to be fetched, the unmarked clothes that are to be fetched are characterised as not marked, i.e., characterised by the non-existence of the mark. When there are certain clothes marked along with certain clothes unmarked, and a person is instructed : "Fetch the unmarked clothes"—he knows the clothes as unmarked by the non-existence of the mark and thus knowing brings these. And what gives right knowledge is a *pramāṇa*.

Sūtra 9

It cannot be claimed that there is no non-existence if there is no object, because the mark exists in other clothes. // ii. 2. 9. //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The non-existence of an object can be rightly known only where the object does not exist after being [previously] produced. In the case of the

unmarked clothes, the mark cannot be non-existing after being [previously] produced. Therefore, the non-existence of the mark in those is not established.

[Answer] No, because the mark exists somewhere else [i.e. in other clothes]. Just as the person instructed [to fetch the unmarked clothes] finds the mark present in other clothes, so does he find the absence of the mark in the unmarked clothes. Such a person, apprehending the absence of the mark, knows the object [i.e. the unmarked clothes] by absence.

Sūtra 10

[Objection] It cannot be claimed that because of the presence of [the mark in the marked clothes], the non-existence of the same mark in the unmarked [clothes is apprehended]. // ii. 2. 10 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The marks, which exist—i.e. are present—in the clothes marked, cannot be non-existing. It cannot be claimed that in the unmarked clothes, there is the non-existence of the marks which already exist in the marked clothes. It is self-contradictory to speak of the non-existence of those which exist.

Sūtra 11

[Answer] No, because [the non-existence of the mark] is apprehended with reference to the marks existing. // ii. 2. 11. //

[Answer] We do not claim that there is the non-existence of the same marks which already exist. But [we assert that] in certain clothes the marks exist and in certain others [these] do not [exist] ; a person having the relative knowledge [of the two] ascertains those [unmarked clothes] by the non-existence of the mark in those clothes where he cannot find the mark.

Sūtra 12

[Answer continued] Moreover, because there can be non-existence even before the origination. // ii. 2. 12 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Non-existence is of two forms, namely the non-existence before origination and the non-existence due to the destruction of the originated. Of these, the non-existence of the marks in the unmarked clothes is actually non-existence in the form of non-existence before origination and not the other.

Elucidation

Though Gautama denies to absence the independent status of a *pramāṇa*, he admits nevertheless its validity. As against this admission of validity, the objection is raised that non-existence being itself inadmissible, the knowledge of non-existence cannot be regarded as an instrument of valid knowledge. As against this objection, Gautama shows that non-existence in its two forms, viz. non-existence before origination and non-existence after destruction must be admitted. But Phaṇibhūṣaṇa adds that the admission of these two forms of non-existence must not be understood as definite denial of the other forms of non-existence accepted by the Naiyāyikas.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PRAMĀṆA BEING ONLY FOUR-FOLD

(*pramāṇa-catuṣṭva-parīkṣā-prakaraṇa*)

II. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF NON-ETERNALITY OF SOUND

Bhāṣya

It is [already] indicated that sound is of different kinds, inasmuch as [in *Nyāya-sūtra* i.1.7 Gautama says] "Verbal testimony is the communication from a trustworthy person"—and thus qualifies verbal testimony as [that form of] sound which has the characteristic of being the communication from a trustworthy person. It [sound] is now going to be critically examined in its general aspect, viz. [by raising the question] Is sound eternal or non-eternal ? If there is any question as to the cause of the doubt, this doubt is [to be understood] as due to contradictory statements [as follows].

According to some [i.e. the older Mīmāṃsakas], sound is a quality of empty space, is all-pervasive, eternal, and has the potentiality of being manifested.

According to others [i.e. the Sāṃkhyas], along with other qualities like smell etc sound resides in substances and has the potentiality of being manifested, just like smell etc, which are pre-existing.

According to others [i.e. the Vaiśeṣikas], sound is a quality of empty space having both origin and destruction, just like knowledge.

According to others [i.e. the Buddhists], sound is produced by the upheaval of 'matter' (*mahābhūta*), is without substratum and has both origin and destruction.

Hence there is doubt as to the real nature of sound.

Elucidation

The view, viz. sound is produced by the upheaval of *mahābhūta* is identified by Vācaspati as the view of the Buddhists. But the exact meaning of *mahābhūta* here is not clear. It usually means matter in its gross form. But there are cases in which the word refers to earth and 'empty space' (*ākāśa*). In the *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, Mādhava says that according to the Buddhists sound is produced by *ākāśa*. Thus it may be that *mahābhūta* here means *ākāśa*.

Bhāṣya

The conclusion is that sound is non-eternal. How ?

Sūtra 13

[Sound is non-eternal] 'because it has origin' (*ādimattvāt*), 'because it is perceived by a sense-organ' (*aindriyakatvāt*), and because it is referred to as non-eternal. // ii. 2. 13 //

Bhāṣya

The word *ādi* means the source, i.e. the cause,—i.e. that from which it originates. Whatever is found to have a cause is known to be non-eternal. Sound, which is produced by conjunction and disjunction, is non-eternal, because it has a cause. What exactly is the meaning intended to be conveyed ? "Because it has a cause" (*utpatti-dharmakatvāt*) means "because it has the characteristic of being produced." And, "sound is non-eternal" means "it ceases after origination", i.e. "has the characteristic of being destroyed."

But there may be a doubt about this. Are conjunction and disjunction the causes of the production of sound or are these the causes of the manifestation of sound ? That is why [i.e. to dispel this doubt] Gautama says : "Because it is perceived by a sense-organ." The expression "perceived by a sense-organ" means "perceived through sense-object contact." [But the question arises] "Is this sound like colour etc, manifested by being co-extensive with 'that which manifests it' (*vyañjaka*) ?" Or, "Is sound perceived as inhering in the [empty space enclosed by the] ear-hole, after a series of consecutively produced sounds results from a sound originally caused by conjunction ?" Since sound is perceived even after the cessation of the conjunction, it is not perceived as coextensive with that which manifests it. In the case of splitting a piece of wood, sound is perceived by a person at a distance even after the cessation of the conjunction of the wood and the axe [which originally produces the sound]. 'That which is manifested' cannot be apprehended in the absence of 'that which manifests it.' Therefore, conjunction is not 'that which manifests' [sound]. If conjunction is viewed as 'that which produces' (*utpādaka*) [sound], then the perception of sound even after the cessation of the conjunction is logically acceptable, because sound is perceived as inhering in the [empty space enclosed by the] ear-hole after a series of consecutively produced sounds results from a sound originally caused by conjunction.

Sound is produced rather than manifested also because of the further ground that "it [sound] is referred to as non-eternal." Only that which is non-eternal is spoken of as being intense (*tīvra*) or mild (*manda*) : for example, "intense pleasure", "mild pleasure", "intense pain" and "mild pain." [Sound is also] spoken of as "intense sound" and "mild sound."

Elucidation

As against the Mīmāṃsā view that sound is eternal, Vātsyāyana argues that it must be non-eternal because it has origin and destruction. Sound originates from a conjunction,—e.g. of the axe with the wood,—or from disjunction,—e.g. in the case of the splitting of a bamboo. And that which has origin must have destruction.

But, then, how is sound perceived? According to the Nyāya view, after being originally produced by a conjunction or disjunction, it gives rise to a series of successive sounds—each preceding ones of which produces the immediately successive ones—and the final sound in the series is the one that inheres in the empty space enclosed by the ear-hole. What is actually perceived is this final sound of the series and when it is being perceived the conjunction or disjunction producing the original sound has already ceased to exist. The production of a series of successive sounds from an original one is usually explained by the Naiyāyikas with the analogy of a series of waves in water produced by an original wave and this is known as *vīci-taraṅga-nyāya.*

Bhāṣya

[Objection] It is claimed that the intensity or mildness of the perception of sound is because such is the nature of 'that which manifests' it, as in the case of the perception of colour.

[Answer] No. [i.e. this cannot be claimed], because of the fact of one sound 'being drowned' (*abhibhava*) by another.

[Objection explained] The intensity or mildness of the perception of sound is due to the intensity or mildness of the conjunction which manifests it. Sound itself shows no such difference. Just as the [intensity or mildness of] the perception of colour is due to the intensity or mildness of that which reveals it [viz. light].

[Answer explained] But this is not so, because one sound is found to be drowned by another. The sound of the drum, which is more intense, drowns the sound of the string instrument, which is milder. But not the milder [i.e. the milder sound does not drown the more intense one]. The perception of sound itself cannot be the agent that drowns. [In your view], neither does sound itself differ [because, in your view, sound is but one]. This fact of drowning is explained only by admitting sounds to be different.

Therefore, sound is produced rather than is manifested.

Elucidation

According to the Mīmāṃsakas, sound is eternal and is one. Therefore, they claim

that sound is never produced ; it is only manifested. What is considered by the Naiyāyikas as that which produces or causes sound, viz. conjunction or disjunction, is claimed by the Mīmāṃsakas as that which only manifests the eternal and one sound.

As against this, Vātsyāyana argues that the intensity or mildness of sound proves that it is not one. Intensity and mildness cannot characterise the same sound ; from the intensity of some sound and the mildness of another, therefore, follows that the two sounds are different.

As against this, it is argued that intensity and mildness really belong to that which manifests the sound ; we wrongly attribute these to the sound itself, just as the brightness or dullness of colour depends on the light that manifests it and not on the colour itself. Vātsyāyana argues that this is untenable. The fact is that the more intense sound drowns the milder one and this fact shows that intensity and mildness are characteristics of the sounds themselves rather than of that which manifests sound.

Bhāṣya

If claimed that sound is manifested as coextensive with that which manifests it, there can be no explanation of one sound being drowned by another, because of the absence of any relation. According to the thesis that sound is manifested as co-extensive with that which manifests it, there can be no explanation of the drowning of one sound by another, because the sound of the drum has no relation with the sound of the string instrument.

If argued that one sound drowns another without the two being related, then there will be the absurdity of the drowning of any sound by any other. You may think that one sound is drowned by another in spite of there being no relation between the two. In that case, just as the sound of the drum sometimes drowns the sound of the string instrument, so also [the sound of the drum] will drown the sound of the string instrument even when [the string instrument] is at a distance as it does when [the string instrument] is near [the drum], because the absence of any relation is equally there in the two cases. Assuming the possibility of this, the beating of the drum [anywhere in the world] will make inaudible the sounds of the string instruments played all over the world at that time. [But in our view] admitting the existence of different 'series of sounds' (*śabda-santāna-s*), it is quite logical that, when these come in contact with the sense-organ, some of the milder sounds are drowned by some others that are more intense.

Now, what is meant by this drowing (*abhibhava*) [literally, overpowering] ? Drowning is the lack of perception of an object due to the perception of another object, which is similar in nature and is perceptible. For example, the lack of perception of the perceptible light of the meteor because of the perception of the light of the sun [i.e. in daytime].

Elucidation

How can the Mīmāṃsakas explain the fact of one sound drowning another? Does it take place when the two sounds are related or are unrelated? From the Mīmāṃsā point of view, there is no possibility of two sounds being related, for each sound exists only where it is manifested: the sound of the drum exists where there is the conjunction of the drum with the beating stick while the sound of the string instrument exists where there is the conjunction of the finger with string. If, however, it is argued that a sound can drown another without being related to it, there results the absurdity of one sound drowning all simultaneous sounds all over the world.

Sūtra 14

[Objection] No [i.e. the three grounds mentioned in the previous *sūtra* do not prove that sound is non-eternal], because of the eternality of the non-existence of the jar [after its destruction], because of the eternality of the universal and because of the eternal being customarily treated as the non-eternal. // ii. 2. 14 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Sound cannot be proved as non-eternal [on the ground] "because it has origin." Why? For there is the fallacy of irregularity. The non-existence of the jar [after its destruction] is found to be eternal in spite of having an origin. Why it has an origin? Because the non-existence of the jar [after its destruction] results from the disjunction of its causes [viz. the component parts]. Why is this [non-existence after its destruction] eternal? Because the non-existence [after destruction] of the jar, which non-existence results from the disjunction of its causes [viz. component parts], can never be negated by the existent [i.e. the jar]. [Since the jar once destroyed can never come to being again, its non-existence is never destroyed].

As to the ground, viz. "because it is perceived by a sense-organ",—[we answer that] this also is vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity. [Since in your own view] the universal is eternal as well as is perceived through sense-object contact.

As to the ground, viz. "because it is referred to as non-eternal",—[we answer that] this is also vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity. Since the eternal is found to be [customarily treated] as the non-eternal. Just as there are assertions

[regarding non-eternal objects like] "the part of the tree" or "the part of the blanket", so also there are assertions [regarding eternal objects like] "part of the empty space" or "part of the self".

Sūtra 15

[Answer] There is no fallacy of irregularity, because of the clear apprehension of the difference between eternal in a 'primary sense' (*tattva*) and eternal in a 'secondary sense' (*bhākta*). [The non-existence of the jar after destruction is said to be eternal in a secondary sense while sound is claimed by the Mīmāṃsakas to be eternal in a primary sense].

// ii. 2. 15 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] What exactly is meant by eternality when something is characterised as eternal ? Eternality means the absence of the destruction of objects that are by nature without origin. Eternality in this sense does not exist in non-existence after destruction. In it [i.e. in this non-existence] eternality exists only in its secondary sense,—in the sense of an object surrendering its own nature, i.e. which is destroyed after being produced and never comes to being again. Now, the category "non-existence of the jar [after its destruction]" is eternal in the sense of "as if being eternal." There is no fallacy of irregularity, because no effect having the nature similar to the nature of sound is found to be eternal.

Elucidation

Eternality in its primary sense implies the absence of origin as well as of destruction. Eternality in its secondary sense implies the mere absence of destruction. Naiyāyikas claim that sound cannot be eternal in the primary sense. Therefore, it is no use citing against them the evidence of the non-existence of the jar after destruction, which non-existence is eternal only in the secondary sense.

Bhāṣya

As to the objection, "because of the eternality of the universal"—[i.e. the objection, that the universal in spite of being eternal] is perceived through the contact with the sense-organ, [Gautama answers]—

Sūtra 16

[Answer continued] [The fallacy of irregularity is ruled out] because there is palpable difference in the inference of the series of sounds [from which is further inferred the non-eternality of sound]. // ii. 2. 16 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] From the context is to be understood that there is no fallacy of irregularity even in the cases of eternal objects. [We do not claim] that sound is non-eternal merely because of its perceptibility by the sense. What, then, [is our claim] ? From "being perceptible through sense-contact" is inferred the series and from this is [further inferred] the non-eternality [of sound].

Elucidation

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains as follows the steps involved in the inference of non-eternality of sound from its being perceptible through sense-object contact.

Since sound is perceived through sense-contact, there must be a contact between sound and the sense. However, the auditory sense, which is of the nature of empty space, cannot go out to come in contact with sound where it is produced. Therefore, from the sense-contact with sound is to be inferred a series of successive sounds originating from some conjunction or disjunction and ultimately reaching the auditory sense. But such a series means that each preceding member of it is destroyed after producing the succeeding member. From this, therefore, is finally inferred the non-eternality of sound.

Thus the real argument of Gautama is not that whatever is the object of sense-contact is non-eternal. In view of the steps involved in Gautama's inference of the non-eternality of sound from its perceptibility through sense-contact, it is no use citing the evidence of the universal also being perceptible through sense-contact.

Bhāṣya

As to the objection [that there is the fallacy of irregularity] because of the eternal being customarily treated as non-eternal, [Gautama answers] : No.

Sūtra 17

[Answer continued] Because by the word 'part' is meant only the substance causing the whole [i.e. the component parts causing the whole]. // ii. 2. 17 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] [You have claimed in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 14], "similarly the part of empty space and the part of the self." But in these cases are not meant the substances causing [empty space and self] as in the case of non-eternal objects [by the word 'part' is meant the 'substances causing the whole']. Because how can that which is non-existent be meant ? [The parts of *ākāśa* and self are non-existent and therefore, by these cannot be meant the substances causing *ākāśa* and self]. The component parts of *ākāśa* or self are non-existent, because these are not apprehended by any *pramāṇa*. What, then, is meant [by the word 'part'] in these cases ? The non-coextensiveness of the conjunction. That the conjunction of empty space with substances 'of perceptible magnitude' (*paricchinna*) does not pervade the whole of empty space, i.e. [the conjunction] exists as being non-coextensive with empty space. Thus is explained its [i.e. of empty space] similarity with a non-eternal object, because the conjunction of two *āmalaka* fruits is not coextensive with its substratum [i.e. the two fruits]. Due to this similarity is the secondary use : "part of empty space." By this is also explained the "part of self." Sound, knowledge, etc are also non-coextensive [with their substrata]. Intensity and mildness of sound are already shown to be intrinsic in sound and [sound is not thus characterised] in the secondary sense.

Why do we not find any *sūtra* with this purport from the author of the *sūtra* himself ? It is the practice (*śīla*) of the noble (*bhagavān*) author of the *sūtra*-s that in many cases he does not explain the two opposite theses, because he considers that the knowledge of the right nature of objects is obtained from the accepted doctrines of the branch of study. The accepted doctrines of the branch of study known by the name Nyāya consists of inferences having all the real marks and not contradicted by perception or verbal testimony.

Elucidation

The main point of the objection is that sometimes even eternal objects are treated as non-eternal. For example, *ākāśa* and self, which are eternal, are sometimes spoken of as having parts, which are the characteristics only of the non-eternal. Vātsyāyana answers that when we speak of the parts of *ākāśa* or self, the word 'part' is used in a clearly scondary seuse to mean 'non-coextensive conjunction' while by parts of tree etc are meant their constituent causes and this is the primary sense of the word 'part'. In the case of sound, the word 'non-eternal' is used in its clearly primary sense, just as in respect of jar etc. Therefore, the evidence of the use of clearly secondary sense in the case of the parts of *ākāśa* or self cannot disprove the non-eternality of sound on the ground that it is spoken of as being so.

Referring to the concluding remarks of Vātsyāyana in this commentary, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa hints at some possible textual corruption of the *Nyāya-sūtra* in the form of interpolation which might have provoked these.

Bhāṣya

In spite of all these [refutations of objections], it may be asked : How to determine "It exists" or "It does not exist" ? [The answer is]—on the grounds of being apprehended or not apprehended by *pramāṇa*. Therefore, sound does not exist [before and after its production]—

Sūtra 18

Because it is not apprehended before being uttered and because of the absence of the apprehension of any cause preventing [the apprehension of sound] etc. // ii. 2. 18 //

Bhāṣya

Sound does not exist before being uttered. Why ? Because it is not apprehended. Neither can it be legitimately claimed that in spite of its existence it is not apprehended because of some preventing factor. Why ? Because there is no knowledge of any factor in the form of obstruction etc preventing the apprehension. There is no knowledge of any factor responsible for the non-awareness of sound in the form : "Sound, being obstructed by this, is not apprehended" and "Sound is not perceived because, owing to separation, it is not coming in contact with the sense." Therefore, sound does not exist when it is not uttered.

[Objection] The utterance is only "what manifests sound" and, in the absence of this, sound is not perceived before being uttered.

[Answer] What exactly is meant here by utterance ? [Utterance is] the 'violent conjunction' (*pratighāta*) of the wind, located inside the belly and moved by an internal exertion due to the desire of uttering with throat, palate etc. Different letters are manifested according to the different sites [i.e. throat, palate, etc] of this violent conjunction. This violent conjunction is but a form of conjunction. The possibility of conjunction being 'that which manifests' (*vyañjaka*) is already refuted [in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 13]. Therefore, [it must be admitted that] there is no

awareness of sound not because of the absence of 'what manifests it', but because it is itself non-existent.

Thus, sound is heard when it is uttered and it is inferred that the sound heard is produced as previously non-existent. It is not heard also after the utterance. Therefore, it is destroyed after being produced and [at that time] it is not heard because of its non-existence. Why ? As already said, because of the non-awareness of any preventing factor.

Therefore, sound has the characteristic of being produced as well as being destroyed.

In spite of this being so [i.e. the non-eternality of sound being already established, Gautama] covering truth as it were with a cloud of dust [in the next two *sūtra*-s] says—

Sūtra 19

[Objection] There is an obstructing factor, because of the non-apprehension of the non-awareness of the obstructing factor. // ii. 2. 19 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] If [you claim] there is no obstructing factor, because of its non-apprehension, then [we argue] there is no non-apprehension of obstructing factor because of the non-apprehension of it [i.e. of the non-apprehension of obstructing factor itself].

[This is answered by Vātsyāyana as follows] How do you know that there is no apprehension of the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor ? [In answer it is said], what is there to know about it ? Because, it is the same in the cases of the apprehension of both apprehension and non-apprehension, inasmuch as both are known by the internal sense [i.e. mind]. A person, not being aware of any obstructing factor, apprehends by the internal sense : "I am not aware of any obstructing factor" just as he, on being aware of the obstructing factor when something is obstructed by a cottage, acquires the knowledge [that is, the apprehension of the obstructing factor] by the internal sense. Thus, the non-apprehension of an obstructing factor is known just in the same way as the apprehension of the obstructing factor. If this is so, [i.e. if the apprehension of the non-apprehension of obstruction is admitted], this [objection in the form of futile rejoinder] cannot arise at all.

Elucidation

Gautama says that the obstructing factor does not exist because it is not apprehended. As against this, the objector argues that the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor does not exist, because it [i.e. the non-apprehension itself) is not apprehended. In other words, the non-apprehension of the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor amounts to the assumption of the existence of the obstructing factor.

Vātsyāyana shows that this futile rejoinder is self-destructive. He forces the objector to admit that there can be the apprehension of both apprehension and non-apprehension through the internal sense and, if this is so, the objector is obliged to admit that there can be the apprehension of non-apprehension. Therefore, the objector cannot claim that non-apprehension itself is not apprehended.

Bhāṣya

The objector resorting to futile rejoinder, even admitting the existence of the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor, says—

Sūtra 20

[Objection] There can be no non-existence of the obstructing factor due to its non-apprehension, because in spite of the non-apprehension there can be the existence of the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor. // ii. 2. 20. //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as there may be non-apprehension of the obstructing factor which [non-apprehension] is not known, so also there may be the obstructing factor which is not known. You may admit that there can be the non-apprehension of the obstructing factor in spite of its being not apprehended and even admitting this you further assert that there is no obstructing factor because of its non-apprehension—but even admitting this there can be no rule regarding apprehension [in the form] : "If there is non-apprehension there is absence."

Sūtra 21

[Answer] [The ground mentioned by the objector in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 19, viz.] "because of the non-apprehension of the non-awareness of the obstructing factor"—is not a real ground. Because the non-apprehension [of the obstruction] is of the nature of absence. // ii. 2. 21 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] That which is apprehended exists. And that which is not apprehended does not exist. It is well-established that the absent is of the nature of the non-existent. Non-apprehension is nothing but non-existence of apprehension. This non-apprehension is not apprehended, because of being of the nature of non-existence. The obstructing factor, however, is an existent. It should have been known. But it is not known. So it does not exist.

Therefore, the claim "there can be no non-existence of the obstructing factor due to its non-apprehension" [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 20] is not tenable.

Now, what is the ground by which the objector [claims to] prove the eternality of sound ?

Sūtra 22

[Objection] [Sound is eternal] because it does not possess the quality of touch. // ii. 2. 22 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] 'Empty space' (*ākāśa*), which does not possess the quality of touch, is found to be eternal. Similar is sound.

[To this Vātsyāyana answers] This is vitiated by the fallacy of irregularity in both ways [i.e. in both instances]. The atom, which possesses the quality of touch, is known to be eternal and action (*karma*), which does not possess the quality of touch, is known to be non-eternal. The instance based on 'similarity with the subject' (*sādhya-sādharmya*) for the probans, viz. "because it does not possess the quality of touch"—

Sūtra 23

[Answer] Cannot be cited, because of the non-eternality of action. // ii. 2. 23 //

Bhāṣya

The instance based on 'dissimilarity with the subject' (*sādhya-vaidharmya*) [for the probans]—

Sūtra 24

[Answer] Cannot be cited, because of the eternality of the atom. // ii. 2. 24 //

Bhāṣya

There being irregularity in both the instances, it is not a real ground.

Elucidation

The objector claims that sound is eternal because it does not possess the quality of touch. Here the probandum is "eternality" and the probans is "the absence of the quality of touch." The instance to be cited for this inference must be based either on similarity (*sādharmya*) or on dis-similarity (*vaidharmya*) with the subject (*pakṣa*). As against the former, Gautama shows that action, in spite of not possessing the quality of touch, is non-eternal. As against the second possibility, he shows that the atoms, in spite of possessing the quality of touch, are eternal. Thus, the probans of the opponent is really a pseudo-probans, inasmuch as it shows irregularity in the cases of both forms of instances.

Gautama's mention of the instance of the atoms being eternal in spite of possessing the quality of touch shows that the *vyatireka-vyāpti* underlying the exemplification he has in mind is : "Wherever there is no 'absence of the quality of touch' there is no 'eternality." In this case, the absence of the probandum is ascertained from the absence of the probans. Usually, however, in the case of a *vyatireka-vyāpti*, the absence of the probans is ascertained from the absence of the probandum. See in this connection the Elucidation on *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 37.

Bhāṣya

Then, let the ground [for the inference of the eternality of sound] be—

Sūtra 25

[Objection] [Sound is eternal], 'because it is being imparted'. // ii. 2. 25 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] That which is given away is found to exist beforehand. And this sound is imparted by the preceptor to the disciple. Therefore, sound exists beforehand.

Elucidation

The preceptor imparts knowledge to the disciple through words which are but sounds. Therefore, the objector views this as a case of imparting sound. But the act of imparting sound presupposes the existence of sound even before it is uttered, for that which does not already exist cannot be imparted. Therefore, sound cannot be proved as non-eternal on the ground that it does not exist before being uttered.

Sūtra 26

[Answer] This is no real ground, because it is not apprehended in 'between the two' (*antarāla*) [viz. the preceptor and the disciple]. // ii. 2. 26. //

Bhāṣya

By what mark is known the existence of sound in between the two, viz. 'one who imparts' [i.e. the preceptor] and 'one to whom is imparted' [i.e. the disciple] ? It is admitted no doubt that what is given exists beforehand, leaves the donor and reaches the donee.

Sūtra 27

[Objection] [The refutation mentioned in the previous *sūtra* is] untenable, because [of the presence of the mark] of teaching. // ii. 2. 27 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Teaching is the mark [to show the existence of the sound in between the two]. In the absence of the act of imparting, there can be no teaching.

Elucidation

Just as in the case of teaching archery, the bow and arrow exist in between the preceptor and the disciple, so also in the case of teaching through sound, the sound exists in between the two.

Sūtra 28

[Answer] By the act of teaching can be rejected neither of the theses [viz. eternality and non-eternality of sound], because of the possibility of teaching on both alternatives. // ii. 2. 28 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Teaching is equally possible in both the alternatives, because of the absence of dispelling the doubt [which is as follows] : Does teaching mean that the sound residing with the preceptor is attained by the disciple, or is teaching the imitation [by the disciple] of what is observed, as in the case of instructing the art of dancing ? Thus teaching cannot be the mark of giving away.

Elucidation

Teaching is not necessarily the mark of imparting something. In the case of dancing, e.g., teaching means only the imitation of the preceptor by the disciple.

Bhāṣya

Let then the ground [for inferring the eternality of sound] be—

Sūtra 29

[Objection] [Sound is eternal] because of 'recurring recital' (*abhyāsa*) [of sound]. // ii. 2. 29 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] That which is recurringly recited is found to exist beforehand. As in the case, "He looks at for five times" is meant that the colour already existing

is being repeatedly perceived. In the case of sound also, there is recurring recital. For example, [it is said] "The *anuvāka* is studied ten times," or, "The *anuvāka* is studied twenty times." Therefore, recurring recital is only the repeated utterance of the same sound.

Elucidation

If sound is produced when it is uttered, then there cannot be the utterance of the same sound over again. But the fact of repetition proves that the same sound is uttered over and over again. Therefore, sound is eternal.

Sūtra 30

[Answer] No, because repetition is possible in spite of 'there being difference' (*anyatva*) [of the repeated ones]. // ii. 2. 30 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Repetition is spoken of even in respect of different [though similar aetions]. For example, "Please dance twice," "Please dance thrice," "You danced twice," "You danced thrice," "He twice performs the Agnihotra rite" and "He eats twice." Because of such irregularity [repetition is no real mark of the sameness of the sound repeated].

The use of the word *anya* (different) in the assertion negating the ground of the opponet [i.e. in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 30] is being refuted.

Sūtra 31

[Objection] The concept "different" (*anya*) is unreal, because that which is called different has no difference with what is called different [i.e. with itself], and it [i.e. the different] does become actually "identical" (*ananya*). // ii. 2. 31 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] That which you consider as the different cannot be different,

because it is identical with its own self. Thus, there is absence of difference [i.e. 'the different' is a fiction]. So your assertion, "because repetition is possible in spite of there being difference" is untenable.

As against those objecting to the use of the word [viz. 'different'], the use of the other word, [viz. 'identical'] is being refuted.

Sūtra 32

[Answer] The "different" being denied, there cannot be the "identical", because both are established with reference to each other.

// ii. 2. 32 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] You propose to prove identity from 'the different' [i.e. prove the different to be identical with itself] and by proving this you want to discard the different. You are admitting the word *ananya* or "not different from the different" [i.e. identical] and you use the compounded form *ananya* [i.e. *na* + *anya*, 'not-different from the different"]. Here the word *anya* (different) is compounded with the negative particle [i.e. *na*=not-different]. If, however, the latter word [i.e. *anya*] does not exist, with which then is compounded the negative particle? Therefore, of the two words namely *anya* and *ananya*, one,—namely the word *ananya*,—attains itself by being dependant on the other, namely the word *anya*. Therefore, your claim that there can be no concept of the different is untenable.

Let, then, the eternality of sound be proved on the ground, viz.,—

Sūtra 33

[Objection] Because there is no apprehension of the cause of its [i.e. of sound] destruction.

// ii. 2. 33 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] That which is non-eternal is destroyed, because of specific cause. For example, the destruction of a piece of stone is caused by the

disjunction of its 'component parts' (*kāraṇa-dravya*). If sound is non-eternal, then the cause by which it it destroyed should as well be apprehended. But it is not apprehended. Therefore, [sound is] eternal.

Sūtra 34

[Answer] There results the absurdity of perpetual hearing, because there is no apprehension of the cause preventing hearing. // ii. 2. 34 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Just as in the absence of the apprehension of any cause of destruction there results the [alleged] non-destruction of sound, so also in the absence of the apprehension of any cause preventing the hearing there results the absurdity of perpetual hearing. It cannot be claimed that there will be no hearing because of the absence of 'that which manifests' (*vyañjaka*), for 'that which manifests' is already disproved. If you claim that sound, though existing, is not perpetually heard even in the absence of any cause [then we shall answer] that the non-existing sound is destroyed without any cause. Thus the contradiction with observed facts equally exists [in the cases of the two theses]: that there is destruction of sound without any cause and that there is the absence of hearing sound without any cause.

Sūtra 35

[Answer continued] Further, [if any cause of the destruction of sound] is known [if not by perception at least by inference], there being the absence of the non-apprehension [of the cause destroying sound] it [i.e. the claim of the opponent] will commit the 'fallacy of the unproved' (*anapadeśa=asiddha*). // ii. 2. 35 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The cause of the destruction of sound being known through inference, the ground [of the opponent, viz.] "because of the absence of the cause

of destruction due to its non-apprehension" [claimed to prove eternality of sound] commits the 'fallacy of the unproved,' like the inference : "This is a horse, because it has horns."

What is the inference [proving a cause of destruction of sound] ? [We answer] : The existence of the series. The series of sounds is established as follows : From an original sound resulting from conjunction or disjunction is produced another sound, from this another and from this still another. In this series, the sounds in the form of effects [i.e. the succeeding sounds in the series] destroy the sounds in the form of causes [i.e. the preceding ones]. The ultimate sound in the series is destroyed by the final conjunction with an object which offers a stubborn resistance to it. It is observed that a person, though remaining near [the source of] sound, does not hear the sound if he is partitioned from it by a cottage, but he can hear the sound even from a distance if there is no such obstruction.

When a bell is struck, because of the audible difference of [the sound being] loud and louder, or mild and milder, a number of sound-series is continuously heard. Assuming sound to be eternal, to account for the series of hearing must be cited the cause of the manifestation of sound which is either in the bell or is elsewhere or is already existing or is in the series itself. If no difference in sound is admitted, then the difference in the series of hearing is to be explained. [In other words, there is no conceivable explanation of this if sound is assumed to be eternal and one]. However, assuming sound to be non-eternal, there follows the impression in the form of speedier or slower motion, which resides in the bell as well as in the series of sounds, [which impression] is an auxuliary cause helping the conjunction. From the continuity of this [i.e. of the impression of speedier or slower motion] follows the continuity of the series of sounds. The loudness or mildness of sound is due to the speediness or slowness of this impression and the difference in hearing is due to the loudness or mildness of sound.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana concludes by citing the evidence of a number of sound-series, differing in loudness or mildness, which originate from the striking of the bell. This cannot be explained on the assumption of the eternality and oneness of sound. What, according to the opponent, can be the cause of the manifestation of such sound ? The opponent cannot argue that the cause of this manifestation resides in the bell itself and is already existing, for in that case there is no explanation of the sound being sometimes loud and sometimes mild, because the cause of manifestation remains the same. The objector cannot claim that the cause of manifestation resides in the bell as well as in the sound-series, for in that case there will result the absurdity of the simultaneous hearing of the

sound as loud and mild. Thus the objector cannot explain any cause of the manifestation of such sound-series. From the point of view of the non-etrenality of sound, however, the differences in loudness or mildness of the different sound-series resulting from the striking of the bell can be reasonably explained.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Impression in the form of an auxiliary cause is not appreheded. Because of its non-apprehension it does not exist.

Sūtra 36

[Answer] There is no non-apprehension of that impression [in the form of speedier or slower motion], because of the absence of sound due to the pressing of the bell by the hand. // ii. 2. 36 //

Bhāṣya

Pressing of the bell by hand results from the movement of the hand. When this pressing takes place, the sound-series is not produced. As a consequence, no sound is heard. From this is inferred that the conjunction with an object that offers stubborn resistance destroys the auxiliary cause of sound in the form of impression [that is, speedier or slower motion]. Because of its destruction, the sound-series is not produced. Since it is not produced, it is not heard—just as, when as a consequence of the conjunction of an arrow with an object offering stubborn resistance, the cause of movement in the form of the impression being destroyed, there is no movement of the arrow. The vibration-series, which can be perceived by the tactual sense, also comes to an end. The pressing of the hand on an object made of brass is the probans for the inference of the series of the impressions. Therefore, there is no non-apprehension of the impression in the form of an auxiliary cause.

Sūtra 37

[Answer to objection raised in *Sūtra 33*] If sound is claimed to be always existing [i.e. eternal] because of the non-apprehension of the cause of its destruction, then there will be the absurdity of eternal hearing. // ii. 2. 37 //

Bhāṣya

[You claim that] an object, the cause of whose destruction is not apprehended, exists always and, because of this perpetual existence, becomes eternal. So also you will not be able to show any cause of destruction of the hearing of the different sounds, which, in your view, is known as the manifestation of sound. In the absence of pointing to any cause of destruction, it [i.e. the hearing] will exist always and, because of this perpetual existence, it will also be eternal. If you deny this, then sound cannot be [claimed as] etrenal, because of its perpetual existence as a consequence of the non-apprehension of the cause of destruction.

Elucidation

In *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 34, a closely similar refutatation of the Mīmāṃsā position already occurs. Viśvanātha and others do not comment on the present *sūtra*, from which it appears that they do not consider it to be a genuine one. On the authority of Vācaspati's *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha*, however, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa gives it the status of a genuine *sūtra*.

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The sound co-existing with the vibration in the bell comes to an end, just like the vibration itself, by the pressing of the hand which removes the cause [of both vibration and sound that exist in the bell]. If the substrata of the sound and the pressing of the hand are different, then there would be the cessation only of that which is co-existing with [the pressing of the hand, i.e. only of the vibration in the bell], because of the conjunction with the object offering stubborn resistance. [Sound must have for its substratum the vibrating bell and not *ākāśa*, for it comes to an end because of the conjunction of the bell with the hand. If sound has *ākāśa* for its substratum, then it cannot be destroyed by the conjunction of the bell with the hand].

Sūtra 38

[Answer] [The view that empty space is the substratum of sound] cannot be refuted, because the substratum is without the quality of touch. // ii. 2. 38 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] You try to refute the view that sound is the quality of empty space.

But the refutation is untenable, because the substratum of sound does not possess the quality of touch. Sound has for its substratum a substance which is pervasive and without the quality of touch and not a substratum which is also the substratum of the vibration, because the non-apprehension of sound as co-extensive with colour etc proves the sound-series.

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana here raises an objection from the Sāṃkhya point of view. It is observed that the striking of the bell results in its vibration as well as the sound. As a consequence of the pressing of the bell by the hand, both the vibration and sound come to an end. This proves that the sound exists in the vibrating bell. If sound had for its substratum empty space, the pressing of the bell by the hand could not have destroyed it.

Vātsyāyana answers that the vibrating bell cannot be the substratum of sound, because it cannot be disproved that sound has *ākāśa* for its substratum. Assuming sound to be existing in the vibrating bell, there is no explanation of the perception of sound, for sound is never perceived as existing in the bell in the way in which the colour etc of the bell are perceived. Only by admitting that a sound-series originating in the vibrating bell and ultimately reaching the auditory sense can there be an explanation of the perception of sound. Therefore, sound has for its substratum a substance which is all-pervasive and which is without the quality of touch.

But how from the Nyāya point of view. is to be explained the fact that by pressing the hand on the bell is destroyed the sound which exists in empty space ? Uddyotakara answers that the pressing of the hand is not the cause of the destruction of sound ; it destroys only the impression in the form of motion, which is an auxiliary cause of the production of sound. In the absence of this auxiliary cause, sound is no longer produced.

Bhāṣya

It is not logical to claim that sound, which exists in the substances along with colour etc is manifested with them [i.e. with colour etc]. Why ?

Sūtra 39

Because, [even admitting] a complex [of colour, sound, etc.] there remains also (*ca*) the fact of the apprehension of difference [in intensity and mildness]. // ii 2. 39 //

Bhāṣya

The word 'also' (*ca*) [in the *sūtra*] implies the ground : "because of the existence of the sound-series." This is already explained.

If colour etc and sound collectively exist in the substances and form the complex, there will be the perception of colour etc as having precisely the same nature that exists in the complex. In that case, sound also should be perceived like colour etc [i.e. as having precisely the same nature that exists in the complex]. Assuming this there is no explanation of the perception of the differences in sounds in either of the following ways. [First], sounds, which are of various nature, which give different forms of auditory experience and which may have contrary characteristics, are perceived as manifested in the same substance. [Secondly], sounds, in spite of being similar as giving auditory experiences of the same nature and having similar characteristics, are perceived as differing in loudness or mildness. Neither of these alternatives is explained, because these differences must belong to differently produced sounds and not to a single sound which is manifested. But differences and differences like these exist. Therefore, these differences being accomplished facts, we consider that sound cannot be manifested as co-existing with colour etc in the different substances.

Elucidation

According to the Sāṃkhya view, the substances like the 'string instrument' (*vīṇā*), flute (*veṇu*) and conch-shell (*śaṅkha*) are but the complexes of colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. There is no substance apart from such complexes of colour etc. Sound is manifested only as a part of this complex, and there is nothing called a sound-series apart from it.

As against this, Vātsyāyana argues that it is an accomplished fact that the colour etc of a musical instrument are not perceived as varying from moment to moment, whereas the sounds coming from the same musical instrument vary from moment to moment in intensity etc. This proves that sound cannot belong to the said complex and has the same status with colour etc. As the Naiyāyikas show, colour etc are the qualities of the substances like the musical instruments while sound is the quality of *ākāśa*.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE NON-ETERNALITY OF SOUND

(*śabda-anityatva-prakaraṇa*)

III. TRANSFORMATION OF SOUND (LETTER)

Bhāṣya

Sounds are of two forms—'embodied in letters' (*varṇātmaka*) and 'mere sounds' (*dhvanimātra*). Regarding sound embodied in letters—

Sūtra 40

There is doubt, because of the contrary teachings [purporting to] transformation (*vikāra*) and substitution (*ādeśa*). // ii. 2. 40 //

Bhāṣya

According to some, there is transformation in the combination of *dadhi*+*atra* resulting in *dadhyatra*, the letter *i* [in *dadhi*] renounces its own nature and becomes *y* [in *dadhyatra*]. According to others, the legitimate place of *i*, when vacated by it, is taken up by *y*. In the case of a possible vowel-conjunction, *i* is not used but gives place to *y*. And this is [an example of what is called] substitution.

Both of these [viz. transformation and substitution] are taught. Therefore, it is not clear which of the two teachings is the correct one.

The teaching of substitution (*ādeśa*) is the correct one. On the admission of the teaching of transformation, the transformation cannot be inferentially proved, because of the absence of the perception of 'basic agreement' (*anvaya*). [Thus e.g., when gold is transformed into ear-ring, there is perceived the 'basic agreement' (*anvaya*) between the two, inasmuch as the ear-ring also is perceived as made of gold]. Only when there is basic agreement, it is possible to infer transformation, because there is partial renunciation of old characteristics and partial acquisition of new characteristics. But [in the case of vowel-conjunction] no basic agreement is perceived and therefore there can be no transformation.

Further, of two letters being uttered by different kinds of internal exertions, the use of one is justified in the absence of the use of the other. The internal exertion in the utterance of *i* is known as *vivṛta*; the internal exertion in the utterance of *y* is known as *īṣat-spṛṣṭa*. Thus, these two are uttered by the instrumentality of two different internal exertions. Of these two, the use of one [viz. *y*] is justified in the absence of the use of the other [viz. *i*].

Moreover, there is no difference in a letter even when there is no transformation. The internal exertion of the person uttering [the letters *i* and *y*] is the same in both the cases, viz. 1) when the letters *i* and *y* are not the results of

transformation, namely in the words *yatate*, *yacchati* and *prāyaṃsta* or *ikāra* and *idam* ; 2) when the letters *i* and *y* are the results of transformation, namely in the combinations *iṣṭyā* (*iṣṭi*+*ā*) and *dadhyāhara* (*dadhi*+*āhara*).

Besides there is no difference in hearing. Therefore, substitution (*ādeśa*) is proved.

Also because of the absence of the knowledge that one letter is changed into another. We do not have the knowledge that the letter *i* already employed is being transformed into *y*. What, then, do we know ? [We know] that *y* is used in the place of *i*. Therefore, there can be no transformation.

If transformation is denied, there is no transgression of the rules of grammar. Letters are not transformed. Admitting this point of view, the futility of grammatical rules does not follow so that we should be forced to admit the transformation of letters. One letter does not produce another letter. The *y* is not produced by *i* nor the *i* by *y*. These letters have different loci of utterances and have different internal exertions. It is but logical that one of them should be used in place of the other.

Transformation can only mean either modification or the cause-effect relation and nothing else. But none of these possibilities exists. Therefore, there can be no transformation of letters.

Just as there can be no transformation in the case of a combination of letters [i.e. of words], so also there can be no transformation in the case of individual letters. Just as in spite of the rules "The root *as* becomes *bhū*," or, "The root *bru* becomes *vac*,"—there is neither any modification nor any cause-effect relation of the combination of letters comprising the roots and therefore no transformation of one group of letters into another, but there is as a matter of fact the substitution of one word by another, so also in the case of letters there is the substitution of one by another.

There cannot be the transformation of letters also on of the ground, viz.—

Sūtra 41

Because [in the case of transformation], there is increment in 'the transformed' (*vikāra*) as a consequence of the increment of 'the original element' (*prakṛti*). // ii. 2. 41 //

Bhāṣya

'The transformed' is found to vary concomitantly with 'the original element'.

[Thus, e.g., the ear-ring made of one gram of gold weighs one gram while the ear-ring made of two grams of gold weighs two grams].

But there is no concomitant variation of *y* [i.e. of the transformed or *vikāra*] with the short or long *i* [i.e. the original element or *prakṛti*]—from which transformation may be inferred. [That is, the same *y* results from the conjunction of both the short and long *i* with any vowel other than *i*].

Sūtra 42

[Objection] [The ground by which in the previous *sūtra* you refute the transformation of letters] is not a real ground, because the transformed is found to be less or equal or more [compared to the original element]. // ii. 2. 42 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The transformed objects are found to be less, equal and more [compared to the original element]. [Thus, e.g., from a heap of cotton only a small bundle of thread is produced ; from a gram of gold is produced an ear-ring of just one gram ; from a small seed grows a large tree.] Similarly, [in the transformation of *i* into *y*] the transformed [i.e. *y*] may be less than [the original element *ī*].

Sūtra 43

[Answer] In default of both forms of the probans [i.e. probantia based on similarity and dis-similarity], the instances do not prove anything. // ii. 2. 43 //

Bhāṣya

There is no probans here based on either similarity or dis-similarity with the instance cited. A mere instance without a well-ascertained probans proves nothing. There can be no rule on the basis of heterogeneous instances. Just as a horse employed to carry load in place of a bull does not indicate the transformation of

the bull [into a horse], so also the *y*, put in the place of *i*, does not indicate any transformation. There is no logic behind the rule that an instance will prove something while a counter-instance will prove nothing.

Elucidation

This *sūtra* is generally read as a part of Vâtsyâyana's commentary. Uddyotakra and Viśvanātha also do not recognise it to be an independent *sūtra*. On the authority of Vācaspati, however, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa gives it the status of an independent *sūtra*.

Bhāṣya

The instances cited of the transformed objects [in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii.2.42.] are —

Sūtra 44

Not relevant, because there exist differences in the cases of unequal (*atulya*) original elements. // ii. 2. 44. //

Bhāṣya

In the cases of unequal substances, the relation of the original element [with the unequal substances, i.e. with the transformed] may differ. Nevertheless, the transformed must be in accordance with the original element.

But the *y* [i.e. the transformed] does not follow the nature of *i* . Therefore, the instances of the transformed objects are no real instances.

Elucidation

In cases of genuine transformation, there is regularity in spite of the alleged irregularity. Thus, e.g., the mango-tree grows only out of the mango seed and the apple tree grows only out of the apple seed. However, there is no such regularity in the alleged transformation of *i* into *y* : the *y* results sometimes from *i* and sometimes from *ī*. From this irregularity is proved that there is no real transformation here.

Sūtra 45

[Objection] There is irregularity (*vikalpa*) in the case of the transformation of letters, just as there is irregularity in the case of the transformation of substances. // ii. 2. 45 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as there is irregularity in the transformation of the original elements which are same from the point of view of being substances, so also there is irregularity in the transformation of the original letters which are the same from the point of view of being letters.

Sūtra 46

[Answer] No [i.e. *y* is not the transformation of *i*], because the characteristic of the transformed is not found in it [i.e. in *y*]. // ii. 2. 46 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Now is explained the characteristic of the transformed in case of the substances in general. That is known as [a case of] the transformed when a substance—be it of the nature of earth or gold—loses its previous structure and attains a new structure in spite of retaining its intrinsic nature. In the case of letters in general, there is no intrinsic nature of sound, which remains basically the same and yet loses *i*-ness to attain *y*-ness. Therefore, just as in spite of there being irregularity of transformation [with the sameness] from the point of view of being substances, the horse is not claimed as the transformation of the bull since no characteristic of the transformed is perceived in it, so also *y* is not a transformation of *i*, since no characteristic of the transformed is found in it.

There cannot be the transformation of the letters, also on the ground [namely]—

Sūtra 47

[Answer continued] Because [in the case of real transformation] the transformed cannot revert back to the original element. // ii. 2. 47 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] [On the assumption of] transformation of letters, there is no explanation for the reverting back of the letters. Why ? Because [in the case of real transformation] there is no inference to prove the reverting back. [The fact is that] the *i*, after being changed into *y*, can again be reverted back to *i*. Not that there is no inference to prove that *y* takes the place of *i* and [in the case of not making the conjunction] *y* does not take the place of *i*.

Elucidation

In the case of real transformation, e.g. in the case of milk being transformed into curd, there is no coming back from the transformed to the original element, e.g., from the curd back to the milk. But in the case of *y* taking the place of *i*, such reversion is possible. This shows that it is not a case of genuine transformation.

Sūtra 48

[Objection] The ground [metioned in the previous *sūtra*] is not a real ground, because [of the fact] of the reversion of gold etc. // ii. 2. 48 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The claim that there is no inference to prove [the reverting back] is untenable. Here is the inference : The gold in the form of ear-ring may, by surrendering its form of the ear-ring, be transformed into a *rucaka* [i.e. a decoration for the horse] and the *rucaka* again may, by surrendering its form of the *rucaka*, be transformed into the ear-ring. Similarly, *i*, after being transformed into *y*, may again become *i*.

This inference is not a real inference, because of the fallacy of irregularity. Are you going to explain the reverting back of the letters just like the milk, which after being transformed into curd, again reverts back to milk [—a possibility which is palpably absurd], or like the reverting back of the gold ? However, the legitimacy of the example of gold also is—

Sūtra 49

[Answer] Not there; because in the transformed objects of gold there is no absence of goldness. // ii. 2. 49 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The gold, remaining as gold, becomes specific objects [like ear-rings etc] by surrendering some of its features and by acquiring some new features. But there is no sound-substance which acquires the new feature of *y*-ness by surrendering the feature of *i*-ness. Therefore, the instance of gold does not hold good.

[Objection] [The transformation of letters] cannot be rejected because there is no absence of letter-ness in the transformed letters. The transformed letters also do not exist without having letter-ness, just as the transfromed golden objects do not exist without goldness.

[Answer] There may be various forms of the basic substance but not of its essence as being substance. The ear-ring and the *rucaka* are but forms of gold, but not of gold-ness. This being so, of what sound-substance can *i* and *y* be considered as the forms ? Letter-ness is a universal and these two [viz. the letters *i* and *y*] cannot be its forms. The form which is renounced cannot be the basis of the form which is acquired. Therefore, the *i*, surrendering its own form, cannot be the basis of the emerging *y*.

The transformation of letters is unproved on the further ground, namely—

Sūtra 50

[Answer continued] Because, in the case of eternality [of letters] there can be no transformation, and in the case of non-eternality [the letter] cannot exist. // ii. 2. 50 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] On the assumption that letters are eternal, both *i* and *y* —being letters—would be equally eternal and [therefore] there can be no transformation. In the case of eternality, i.e. non-destructibility [of both], which will be transfromed into what ? Supposing, then, the letters are non-eternal ? In that case, letters cannot remain. What is meant by letters not-remaining ? The destruction after origination. Thus, the *y* is produced after the origin and subsequent destruction of *i* and the *i* is produced after the origin and eventual destruction of *y*. [In such circumstance], which is the transformation of what ? Such not-remaining of letters is to be understood [both] in case of 'conjunction after disjunction' and in the case of 'disjunction after conjunction.'

[Supposing the opponent takes recourse to *jāti* or futile rejoinder and seeks to show that the transformation of letters can be explained on the assumption of

both eternality and non-eternality of letters]. [The transformation] is proved on the assumption of eternality [as follows]—

Sūtra 51

> [Objection] The transformation of letters is not ruled out because of the imperceptibility as well as the irregularity of other features of the eternal. // ii. 2. 51 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] It cannot be denied that the eternal letters are transformed. Just as among the eternal objects some [e.g. the atoms] are imperceptible, but the letters [in spite of being eternal] are perceptible. Similarly, among the eternal objects, some [e.g., the atoms] are not transformed while the letters [in spite of being eternal] are transformed.

[Vātsyāyana's answer to this *jāti*] The irregularity of the features of the eternal [taken as the ground by the opponent] is not a real ground, because of the fallacy of the contradictory. The eternal [by definition] is that which has neither origin nor destruction, i.e. the eternal is that which is without the characteristic of being produced or being destroyed. On the contrary, the non-eternal is that which has the characteristic of being produced and being destroyed. Without origination and destruction, there can be no real transformation. If the letters are [actually] transformed, then these cannot be eternal. If these are eternal, then these cannot have any real transformation. Therefore, [your alleged ground] of the irregularity of the features [of the eternal] is only a pseudo-probans called the contradictory.

The solution [of the opponent employing *jāti*] from the point of view of non-eternality of letters is—

Sūtra 52

> [Objection] The transformation of letters is admissible, just like the perception of the transitory letters. // ii. 2. 52 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as there can be the hearing of the transitory letters, so also there can be transformation of these.

[Vâtsyâyana's answer to this *jāti*] The perception of [transitory] letters assumed [by the opponent] to be the ground for proving his point [i.e. the transformation of letters] cannot prove his point, because of the absence of any invariable relation [between the perception of the transitory letters and their transformation], the preception of which can lead to the inference of the transformation of letters. Such a claim [i.e. the claim of the opponent] is as good as the claim : "Since earth has the qualities of smell etc, it has also the qualities of sound, pleasure, etc." The perception of a transitory letter does not exclude the possibility of the use of another letter after the removal of the other letter. If the letter *y*, which comes to fill the vacancy caused by the removal of *i*, could be removed by the perception of a letter, then there would have been the knowledge that the *i*, while being perceived [as *i*], becomes *y*.

Therefore, the perception of letter cannot be the ground for proving the transformation of letters.

Sūtra 53

[Gautama's answer to the *jāti*] The refutation [by the above *jāti*] is untenable, because on the assumption of transformation [of letters] there will be the absence of eternality and because transformation can take place in a different temporal context. // ii. 2. 53 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The refutation [by the ground, namely] "Because of the irregularity of the features of the eternal" [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 51] is untenable. Something subject to transformation is not found to be eternal. The refutation [by the ground, viz]. "Just like the perception of transitory letters" [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 52] is not tenable. A person, after using for a long time the disjoined form, viz. *dadhi+atra*, uses the conjoined form, viz. *dadhyatra*. The *i* being destroyed long ago, whose transformation is to be viewed the *y* to be ? The point that inevitably arises here is that in the absence of the cause there is also the absence of the effect.

The transformation of letters is unproved on the further ground, viz.—

Sūtra 54

[Answer] Because there is no uniformity of the original element [in the case of the transformation of letters]. // ii. 2. 54 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Sometimes *y* takes the place of *i* [e.g. *dadhi+atra=dadhyatra*] and sometimes *i* takes the place of *y*, e.g. *vidhyati*. [The root *vyadh* takes the form *vidh* in conjugation]. Had there been the 'relation of the original element and the transformed' (*prakṛti-vikṛti-bhāva*) among letters, there should have been a uniformity about the original element. Because, in the case of real transformation, there is uniformity of the original element [i.e. the original element always remains the original element].

Sūtra 55

> [Objection] There being a regularity about the irregularity itself, there is no absence of regularity. // ii. 2. 55 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The absence of uniformity of the original element referred to, being invariably present in respective objects, amounts to regularity, because of this invariable presence. This being so, there is no absence of regularity. Therefore, the argument viz. "Because of the absence of the uniformity of the original element" [*Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 2. 54] is untenable.

Sūtra 56

> [Answer] [The opponent cannot offer] the above refutation, because of the contradiction between uniformity and non-uniformity and because the non-uniformity itself is subject to [some form of] uniformity. [That is, the very claim that non-uniformity is subject to some uniform rule amounts to the assumption of the facthood of non-uniformity itself]. // ii. 2. 56 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] By uniformity is meant the admission of some fixed rule and by non-uniformity its denial. There being a contradiction between the admitted and the denied, the two cannot be the same. Moreover, in spite of the invariable

presence, non-uniformity cannot amount to uniformity, because by this statement the essential nature of non-uniformity is not negated. What then ? The uniformity is established with regard to the rule signified by uniformity, because of its [i.e. of the rule] uniform presence. Therefore, the refutation that "because of regularity about irregularity" is not tenable.

Further, this transformation of letters cannot be the result of either modification or cause-effect relation. What then ?

Sūtra 57

The transformation of letters [really] means nothing but changes resulting from 'qualitative change' (*guṇāntara-āpatti*), 'transmutation' (*upamarda*), 'shortening' (*hrāsa*), 'elongation' (*vṛddhi*), 'condensation' (*leśa*) and 'addition' (*śleṣa*). [That is, transformation of letters in the sense of modification or effectuation—i.e. transformation in its real sense—is not admitted. Hewever, changes of letters only in the specific cases of changes enumerated are admitted and by transformation of letters is meant nothing but these changes]. // ii. 2. 57 //

Bhāṣya

Transformation [of letters only means] the substitution of one letter by another. Transformation in this sense may be of various forms. Thus : qualitative change, e.g. replacement of *udātta* accent by *anudātta* accent. Transmutation means the emergence of a new form in place of a destroyed one. [E.g., the use of the root *bhū* in placc of the root *as*]. Shortening means cutting a long vowel into a short one. Elongation means stretching a short vowel into a long one or stretching either of the two vowels into the 'protracted' (*pluta*) form. Condensation means compression, e.g., the change of *as* [into *s*] in the form *staḥ*. Addition means the intrusion of the 'base' (*prakṛti*) or of a suffix. These alone are the forms of transformation of letters. However, all these mean nothing but substitution. If the objector agrees to mean by transformation of letters these changes, then there may be transformation of letters.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOUND (LETTER)

(*śabda-pariṇāma-prakaraṇa*)

IV. THE DETERMINATION OF THE MEANING OF A TERM

Sūtra 58

They [i.e. groups of letters] become terms (*pada*) when suffixes are added to them.
// ii. 2. 58 //

Bhāṣya

The gruop of letters, which are changed according to rules, become terms when suffixes are added to them. Suffixes are of two forms, viz. 'suffixes added to substantives' (*nāmikī*) and 'suffixes added to verbal roots' (*ākhyātikī*). Thus, e.g., *brāhmaṇaḥ pacati* ["The Brahmin is cooking" : the term *brāhmaṇaḥ* exemplifies the addition of a suffix to a substantive and the term *pacati* exemplifies the addition of a suffix to a verbal root].

[Objection] This means that the prefixes (*upasarga*) and the 'indeclinable particles' (*nipāta*) are not regarded as terms. Therefore, the definition of term [given above] will have to be changed.

[Answer] The elision (*lopa*) of the suffixes in the case of the indeclinable particles is prescribed [in grammar] for extending the definition of terms to *upasarga* and *nipāta*.

[Determination of the exact meaning of terms] is necessary because right knowledge is obtained through the terms. Let us have the critical examination [of the exact meaning of terms] with reference to the substantive *gau* [cow]. [Throughout this discussion of the exact meaning of terms] the term 'cow' is to be taken as the instance.

In respect of the exact meaning [of a term]—

Sūtra 59

There is doubt, because it [term] is found to be in use as 'invariably related' (*sannidhi*) to [i.e. as conveying] the individual (*vyakti*), the shape (*ākṛti*) and the class-essence (*jāti*).
// ii. 2. 59 //

Bhāṣya

The word *sannidhi* [in the *sūtra*] means 'being invariably related'. The term 'cow' (*go*) is used to convey the individual, the shape and the class-essence, which are invariably related to it. From this it is not ascertained whether the term actually signifies any one of these three or all the three.

Elucidation

This is considered as an independent *sūtra* on the authority of Vācaspati.

Bhāṣya

The exact meaning of a term is determined from the capacity in which it may be used. Therefore—

Sūtra 60

[Objection] The term means the individual (*vyakti*),
because in the following cases, viz.—
by the pronoun 'that',
by group,
by gift,
by acceptance of gift,
by numbers,
by growing fat,
by becoming emaciated,
by colour,
by the use of compound, and
by reproduction—
the term is used to mean the individual. // ii. 2. 60 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The term means the individual. Why ? Because in the cases of the use of 'that' etc, it is employed to mean the individual. By being 'employed to mean' is signified 'conveying'.

"The cow that stands", or "The cow that is sitting"—in these expressions [the term cow] does not signify the class-essence, because there is no difference in the class-essence but [in these sentences the term 'cow' means] individual cows in which alone the differences exist.

In the expression, "group of cows" [the term 'cow'] means the individuals, because these are different,—and not the class-essence, because it is the same.

In the sentence, "A person making gift of cow to the learned"—the thing renounced cannot mean the class-essence, because the class-essence is abstract and cannot be the object of the ceremony preceding and following the gift.

Acceptance means making something one's own. [In the sentences] "The cow belongs to Kauṇḍinya", or "The cow belongs to the Brahmin",—if [by the term 'cow'] are meant individuals, the difference in the relation due to the difference of individuals can be explained. But the class-essence is not different [and therefore cannot be referred to by the term 'cow'].

[In the case of] number—in the expressions, "ten cows", "twenty cows", the individual cows are counted and not the class-essence, which has no difference.

"Growing fat"—means the nourishment of the limbs of an object having parts [i.e. of the cow]. [Thus, e.g.,] "The cow has grown fat"—[here the term 'cow' cannot mean] the class-essence, which has no parts.

This also explains the case of emaciation.

[In the case of] colour—in the expressions "a white cow", and "a brown cow", the quality can belong to the individual and not to the class-essence.

[In the case of] compound—[in the expressions] *go-hitam* ("the welfare of the cow") and *go-sukham* ("the pleasure of the cow"), welfare etc can be related to the individual and not to the class-essence.

Reproduction means giving birth to offsprings of similar kinds. For example : "a cow is born of a cow." Reproduction can refer to the individuals, which have the characteristic of being born, and not to the class-essence, because of the absence of the characteristic of being born [in the class-essence].

The individual means an individual member.

This view is being refuted thus—

Sūtra 61

[Answer] No [i.e. the term does not mean the bare individual], because of the absence of any fixed determination of the individual. // ii. 2. 61 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The term does not mean the bare individual. Why ? Because of the absence of any fixed determination of the individual. That which is specifically referred to by the expressions 'that' etc is what is meant by the term 'cow'. In the expressions, "the cow that stands" and "the cow that sits" [the term cow] does not mean the bare individual without being characterised by the class-essence. What [does it mean] then ? It means the cow as characterised by the class-essence. Therefore, the term does not mean the bare individual.

The cases of group etc are to be similarly understood.

If the term does not mean the bare individual, then how is it used to mean the individual ? In spite of the absence of the capacity to mean the individual, terms are used to mean individuals because of some specific conditions. It is observed that—

Sūtra 62

[Answer continued] 'In spite of the absence of the capacity to mean' (*a-tadbhāve api*) [the objects other than those signified by them], words 'are used

to mean' (*tat-upacārah*) a Brahmin, the platform, straw-mat, the king, the enemy, the sandal-wood, the Ganges, a gown, food, and a person,—on the following conditions: association (*sahacaraṇa*), place of residence (*sthāna*), need (*tādarthya*), behaviour (*vṛtta*), measurement (*māna*), container (*dhāraṇa*), nearness (*sāmīpya*), relation (*yoga*), cause (*sādhana*) and prominence (*ādhipatya*). // ii. 2. 62 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The expression *a-tadbhāve api tat-upacārah* means that something which is not the actual meaning of a term is being signified by that term. [Examples :]

Due to association : In the expression "Feed the sticks", [the sticks] mean the Brahmins carrying the sticks.

Due to place of residence : In the expression "The platforms are crying", [the platforms] mean the persons on the platform.

Due to need : When the straws are woven for the purpose of making a mat, the exapression used is : "One is weaving a mat".

Due to behaviour : The expressions "The king is a Yama" or "The king is a Kuvera" mean that the king behaves like them.

Due to measurement : The expression "An *āḍhaka* of pounded barley" means that amount of pounded barley as measured by an *āḍhaka*.

Due to the container : The expression *tulā-candana* ("sandal-wood in the balance") means sandal-wood intended to be weighed by the balance.

Due to nearness : In the expression "the cows graze in the Ganges" (*gaṅgāyāṃ gāvaḥ caranti*), the term Ganges means the fields on the bank of the Ganges.

Due to relation : the expression "black-cloth" means a cloth with black colour.

Due to cause : "Food is life"

Due to prominence : there are expressions like "this person is the family," "this person is the *gotra*."

The term 'cow', signifying the class-essence, is secondarily used to mean the individual because of [two of the above] conditions, viz. 'due to association' and 'due to relation.'

If the term 'cow' does not mean the individual, then let it mean—

Sūtra 63

[Objection]The shape (*ākṛti*), because the knowledge of the existence of the animal is dependent on it [i.e. on the shape]. // ii. 2. 63 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The term signifies the shape. Why ? Because the knowledge of the existence of the animal depends on it.

Shape means the structure constituted by the limbs of the animal as well as the parts of these limbs. When this shape is known, there is the definite knowledge of the existence of the animal as "this is a cow" or "this is a horse" ; but when [this shape] is not known [there is no such definite knowledge]. The term should mean only that the knowledge of which leads to the definite knowledge of the existence of the animal. Therefore, this shape is meant by it [i.e. by the term].

But this view is not established. By the term cow is meant the object characterised by the class-essence, i.e. which has relation with the class-essence [viz. cowness]. There is no connection of the class-essence with the structure of the limbs etc [i.e. the shape]. With which then is it [i.e. the class-essence] connected ? It is connected with the animal as a whole, constituted by the structure of the limbs. Therefore, the term does not mean the shape.

Let the term, then, mean the class-essence—

Sūtra 64

[Objection] The term means the class-essence, (*jāti*) because in spite of the presence of individuality and shape in an earthen cow, it is not made the object of the ceremony of sprinkling water etc [observed in connection with the gift of a cow]. // ii. 2. 64 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The term means the class-essence. Why ? Because, in spite of the presence of the individual and the shape in an earthen cow, it is not made the object of the ceremony of sprinkling water etc [observed in connection with the gift of a cow]. The expressions, "sprinkle water on the cow," "bring the cow" and "give away the cow"—are not used in respect of an earthen cow. Why ? Because of the absence of the class-essence in it. Both individuality and shape exist in it. However, the term must mean that in the absence of which there is no right knowledge of the cow.

Sūtra 65

[Answer] No [i.e. the term does not mean the class-essence alone], because the knowledge of the class-essence is not irrespective of [the knowledge of the shape and the individual]. // ii. 2. 65 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The knowledge of the class-essence depends on the knowledge of the shape and the individual. Without the apprehension of the shape and the individual, there is no apprehension of the bare class-essence. Therefore, the term does not mean mere class-essence.

However, it is not that the term does not mean anything. What, then, does the term mean ?

Sūtra 66

[Gautama's final conclusion] But (*tu*) the term means the individual-cum-shape-cum-class-essence. // ii. 2. 66. //

Bhāṣya

The word *tu* [in the *sūtra*] is used to convey a special significance. What is the special significance ? The absence of any fiixed rule as to the primacy and relative unimportance [of either of the three] in the case of the meaning of a term. When by the term the difference is sought to be expressed and is known a particular member,—there is in the meaning the primacy of the individual and relative unimportance of the class-essence and the shape. When, however, the difference is not sought to be expressed, and the class is known as a whole,—there is in the meaning the primacy of the class-essence and relative unimportance of the shape and the individual. There are many instances of this. Cases of the primacy of the shape may accordingly be understood.

How to ascertain that the individual, the shape and the class-essence are different ? From the differences in their definitions. Of these—

Sūtra 67

Individual means the 'specific image' (*mūrti*), which is the substratum of some qualities [like colour etc.] // ii. 2. 67 //

Bhāṣya

Individual (*vyakti*) is that which is manifested, i.e. becomes the object of the senses. All substances are not individual. Individual means that substance which is the substratum of qualities beginning with colour and ending with touch [i.e. colour, taste, smell and touch] as well as heaviness, density, impression (*saṃskāra*) and non-pervasive magnitude ; because the specific image is constituted by parts conjoined together.

Sūtra 68

Shape is that by which is known the class-essence or its mark. // ii. 2. 68 //

Bhāṣya

That is to be known as the shape by which is indicated the class-essence or the marks of the class-essence. This shape is nothing but the fixed structure constituted by the limbs of an animal as well as the parts of these limbs. The limbs of the animal, which are themselves constituted by a fixed combination of the parts, are the marks for inferring the class-essence. For example, people infer the cow from its head or feet. If there is a fixed structure of the limbs of the animal [viz. the cow], cowness is known. Where the class-essence is not manifested by the shape,—for example in the cases of clay, gold, silver, etc,—the shape is excluded [from the meaning of the terms gold, silver, etc., i.e. these terms do not signify the shape] which means that these signify only the class-essence and the individual.

Sūtra 69

Class-essence is that which produces the knowledge of commonness. // ii. 2. 69 //

Bhāṣya

The class-essence is that which produces the knowledge of commonness in different objects, i.e. that by the presence of which the different objects are not mutually differentiated, i.e. the entity which is the cause of the continuation of the same knowledge in different objects. That which points to similarity [of something] with some individuals and at the same time differentiates [it] from other individuals is also a class-essence, though of a special type.

HERE ENDS THE SECOND CHAPTER OF VĀTSYĀYANA'S COMMENTARY ON THE NYĀYA-SŪTRA

Elucidation

Class-essence or *jāti* forms a special theme of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. The Vaiśeṣikas speak of two types of *jāti*, called *sāmānya-jāti* and *viśeṣa-jāti*, both of which are refrred to by Vātsyāyana in this commentary.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE MEANING OF A TERM

(*padārtha-nirūpaṇa-prakaraṇa*)

LIST OF SŪTRA-S

Adhyāya II   *Āhnika I*

ii.1.1/samāna-aneka-dharma-adhyavasāyād anyatara-dharma-adhyavasāyād vā na saṃśayaḥ

ii. 1. 2 / vipratipatti-avyavasthā-[1]adhyavasāyāt ca.

1. B, nvr : avyavasthāyāḥ ca.

ii. 1. 3 / vipratipattau ca sampratipatteḥ.

ii. 1. 4 / avyavasthā-ātmani vyavasthitatvāt ca avyavasthāyāḥ.

ii. 1. 5 / tathā[2] atyanta-saṃśayaḥ tat-dharma-sātatya-upapatteḥ.

2. NVr : Some of the editions include the tathā in Nbh which justifies the reading of i. 1. 23.

ii. 1. 6 / yathokta-adhyavasāyād eva tat-viśeṣāpekṣāt saṃśaye na asaṃśayaḥ na atyanta-saṃśayaḥ vā.

ii. 1. 7 / yatra saṃśayaḥ tatra evam uttara-uttara-prasaṅgaḥ.

ii. 1. 8 / pratyakṣādīnām aprāmāṇyam traikālya-asiddheḥ.

ii. 1. 9 / pūrvaṃ hi pramāṇa-siddhau na indriya-artha-sannikarṣāt pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ[3].

3. NVi, nvr, B : -siddhiḥ.

ii. 1. 10 / paścāt siddhau na pramāṇebhyaḥ prameya-siddhiḥ.

ii. 1. 11 / yugapat siddhau prati-artha-niyatatvāt krama-vṛttitva-abhāvaḥ buddhīnām.

ii. 1. 12 / traikālya-asiddheḥ[4] pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ.

4. ASS : -asiddhiḥ

ii. 1. 13 / sarva-pramāṇa-pratiṣedhāt ca pratiṣedha-anupapattiḥ[5].

5. R, B, nvr :-asiddhiḥ. The sūtra is lacking in NVi.

ii. 1. 14 / tat-prāmāṇye vā na sarva-pramāṇa-vipratiṣedhaḥ.[6]

6. ASS, R :-pratiṣedhaḥ. B, nvr : sarva-pratiṣedhaḥ.

ii. 1. 15 / traikālya-apratiṣedhaḥ ca[7] śabdāt ātodya-siddhivat tat-siddheḥ.

7. The words up to *ca* are absent in *Tattvāloka*, but are vindicated by the Ṭīkā. NV repeats the sūtra in a terse form.

ii. 1. 16 / prameyā[8] ca tulā prāmāṇyavat.

8. Though others read prameyatā, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading of prameyā agrees with VSS, ASS, NV, NSN, NVTT, ChSS and *Nyāya-tattvāloka*.

ii. 1. 17 / pramāṇataḥ siddheḥ pramāṇānāṃ pramāṇāntara-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ.

ii. 1. 18 / tat-vinivṛtteḥ vā pramāṇa[9]-siddhivat prameya-siddhiḥ.[10]

9. NV, Bibl. Ind., VSS, ASS : pramāṇāntara

10. NVi, R, nvr, B, V : prameya-tat-siddhiḥ.

ii. 1. 19 / na pradīpa-prakāśa-siddhivat[11] tat-siddheḥ.

11. R reads tadīya-prakāśavat tat-siddhiḥ. Others read pradīpa-prakāśavat; but Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading agrees with ChSS, B, nvr, NSN and VSS.

ii. 1. 20 / kvacit nivṛtti-darśanāt anivṛtti-darśanāt ca kvacit anekāntaḥ.[12]

12. This is not accepted by all as a separate sūtra : see *Elucidation.*

ii. 1. 21 / pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa-anupapattiḥ asamagra-vacanāt.

ii. 1. 22 / na ātma-manasoḥ sannikarṣa-abhāve pratyakṣa-utpattiḥ.

ii. 1. 23 / dik-deśa-kāla-ākāśeṣu api evaṃ prasaṅgaḥ.

ii. 1. 24 / jñāna[13]-liṅgatvāt ātmanaḥ na[14] anavarodhaḥ.[15]

13. VSS : ātma- 14. VSS omits na.

15. NVi, NV : anavabodhaḥ ;

ii. 1. 25 / tat-ayaugapadya-liṅgatvāt ca[16] na[17] manasaḥ.[18]

16. nvr omits ca. 17. VSS, NVi, B, nvr, omit na.

18. R : tat-ayaugapadyāt manasaḥ.

ii. 1. 26 / pratyakṣa-nimittatvāt ca indriya-arthayoḥ sannikarṣasya sva-śabdena[19] vacanam

19. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading follows VSS, ChSS, NSN, NV. Bibl. Ind. : śabdena. Instead of sva-śabdena vacanam. Ruben prefers the reading : pṛthak-vacanam

ii. 1. 27 / supta-vyāsakta-manasāṃ ca indriya-arthayoḥ sannikarṣa-nimittatvāt.

ii. 1. 28 / taiḥ ca apadeśaḥ jñāna-viśeṣāṇām.

ii. 1. 29 / vyāhatatvāt ahetuḥ.[20]

20. Though mentioned in most of the editions, Ruben does not read it as an independent sūtra.

ii. 1. 30 / na artha-viśeṣa-prāvalyāt.[21]

21. Though mentioned in most of the editions, Ruben does not read it as an independent sūtra.

ii. 1. 31 / pratyakṣam anumānam ekadeśa-grahaṇād upalabdheḥ.

ii. 1. 32 / na pratyakṣeṇa yāvat tāvat api[22] upalambhāt.[23]

22. R, B, nvr and NVi omit api.

23. Though many read the following as an independent and the next sūtra, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa (see *Elucidation*) takes it as forming part of the *Bhāṣya*: na ca ekadeśa-upalabdhiḥ avayavi-sadbhāvāt.

ii. 1. 33 / sādhyatvāt avayavini sandehaḥ.

ii. 1. 34 / sarva-agrahaṇam avayavi-asiddheḥ.

ii. 1. 35 / dhāraṇa-ākarṣaṇa-upapatteḥ ca.

ii. 1. 36 / senā-vanavat[24] grahaṇam iti cet na atīndriyatvāt aṇūnām.

24. R, B, nvr, NVi : vana-ādi-vat.

ii. 1. 37 / rodha-upaghāta[25]-sādṛśyebhyaḥ vyabhicārāt anumānam apramāṇam.

25. VSS : -upadhāna-

ii. 1. 38 / na ekadeśa[26]-trāsa-sādṛśyebhyaḥ arthāntara-bhāvāt.

26. NVi : ekadeśa-rodha

ii. 1. 39 / vartamāna-abhāvaḥ patataḥ patita-patitavya-kāla-upapatteḥ.

ii. 1. 40 / tayoḥ api abhāvaḥ vartamāna-abhāve tat-apekṣatvāt.

ii. 1. 41 / na atīta-anāgatayoḥ itara-itara-apekṣā-siddhiḥ.

ii. 1. 42 / vartamāna-abhāve sarva-agrahaṇam pratyakṣa-anupapatteḥ.

ii. 1. 43 / kṛtatā-kartavyatā-upapatteḥ tu[27] ubhayathāgrahaṇam.

27. R, B, nvr, NVi omit tu.

ii. 1. 44 / atyanta-prāya-ekadeśa-sādharmyāt upamāna-asiddhiḥ.

ii. 1. 45 / prasiddha-sādharmyāt upamāna-siddheḥ yathokta-doṣa-anupapattiḥ.

ii. 1. 46 / pratyakṣeṇa apratyakṣa-siddheḥ.

ii. 1. 47 / na apratyakṣe[28] gavaye pramāṇa-artham upamānasya paśyāmaḥ.

28. NVi : na apratyakṣeṇa

ii. 1. 48 / tathā iti upasaṃhārāt upamāna-siddheḥ na aviśeṣaḥ.

ii. 1. 49 / śabdaḥ anumānam arthasya anupalabdheḥ anumeyatvāt.

ii. 1. 50 / upalabdheḥ a-dvi-pravṛttitvāt.[29]

29. NVi : a-dvi-pravṛttikatvāt.

ii. 1. 51 / sambandhāt ca.[30]

30. NVi : ca iti.

ii. 1. 52 / āpta-upadeśa-sāmarthyāt śabdāt[31] artha[32]-sampratyayaḥ.

31. NV, B, Bibl. Ind : śabda-arthāt.
32. R, B, NVi, nvr, Bibl. Ind : arthe sampratyayaḥ

ii. 1. 53 / pūraṇa-pradāha[33]-pāṭana-anupapatteḥ[34] ca sambandha-abhāvaḥ.

33. B, nvr : -dāha-
34. R, B, nvr, NSN, NVi, read anupapatteḥ instead of anupalabheḥ which is the reading of others.

ii. 1. 54 / śabda-artha-vyavasthānāt apratiṣedhaḥ.

ii. 1. 55 / na sāmayikatvāt[35] śabda-artha-sampratyayasya.

35. B, nvr : sāmayikāt.

ii. 1. 56 / jātiviśeṣe ca aniyamāt.

ii. 1. 57 / tat-aprāmāṇyam anṛta-vyāghāta-punarukta-doṣebhyaḥ.

ii. 1. 58 / na karma-kartṛ-sādhana-vaiguṇyāt.

ii. 1. 59 / abhyupetya kāla-bhede doṣa-vacanāt.

ii. 1. 60 / anuvāda-upapatteḥ ca.

ii. 1. 61 / vākya-vibhāgasya ca artha-grahaṇāt.

ii. 1. 62 / vidhi-arthavāda-anuvāda-vacana-viniyogāt.

ii. 1. 63 / vidhiḥ vidhāyakaḥ.

ii. 1. 64 / stutiḥ nindā parakṛtiḥ purākalpa iti arthavādaḥ.

ii. 1. 65 / vidhi-vihitasya anuvacanam anuvādaḥ.

ii. 1. 66 / na anuvāda-punaruktayoḥ viśeṣaḥ śabda-abhyāsa-upapatteḥ.

ii. 1. 67 / śīghratara-gamana-upadeśavat abhyāsāt na aviśeṣaḥ.[36]

36. nvr : abhyāsāt aviśeṣaḥ. B : abhyāsāt viśeṣaḥ.

ii. 1. 68 / mantra-āyurveda-prāmāṇyavat[37] ca tat-prāmāṇyam āpta-prāmāṇyāt.

37. nvr, B, NVi omit -prāmāṇya-

Adhyāya II *Āhnika II*

ii. 2. 1 / na catuṣṭvam aitihya-arthāpatti-sambhava-abhāva-prāmāṇyāt.

ii. 2. 2 / śabda aitihya-anarthāntara-bhāvāt anumāne arthāpatti-sambhava-abhāva[38]-anarthāntara-bhāvāt ca apratiṣedhaḥ

38. NVi, nvr : abhāvānām arthāntara...B, V : abhāvanām anarthāntare...

ii. 2. 3 / arthāpattiḥ apramāṇam anaikāntikatvāt.

ii. 2. 4 / anarthāpattau arthāpatti-abhimānāt.[39]

39. R : anarthāpatti-abhimānāt. Some read the *avataraṇikā* of the Nbh na anaikāntikatvam arthāpatteḥ as part of the sūtra.

ii. 2. 5 / pratiṣedha-aprāmāṇyam ca anaikāntikatvāt.

ii. 2. 6 / tat-prāmāṇye vā na arthāpatti-aprāmāṇyam.

ii. 2. 7 / na abhāva-prāmāṇyam prameya-asiddheḥ.

ii. 2. 8 / lakṣiteṣu alakṣaṇa-lakṣitatvāt alakṣitānām tat-prameya-siddhiḥ.[40]

40. VSS, ASS, NV, Bibl. Ind., B, R : -siddheḥ

ii. 2. 9 / asati arthe na abhāvaḥ iti cet na anya-lakṣaṇa-upapatteḥ.

ii. 2. 10 / tat-siddheḥ alakṣiteṣu ahetuḥ.

ii. 2. 11 / na lakṣaṇa-avasthita-apekṣa[41]-siddheḥ.

41. Though others read -apekṣā-, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading agrees with NV, NSN, Bibl. Ind., nvr, R and NVi.

ii. 2. 12 / prāk utpatteḥ abhāva-upapatteḥ ca.

ii. 2. 13 / ādimattvāt aindriyakatvāt kṛtakavat[42] upacārāt ca.[43]

42. B, nvr : kṛtakāt.
43. NM adds : anityaḥ śabdaḥ. Same is the case with the beginning in NVr.

ii. 2. 14 / na ghaṭābhāva-sāmānya-nityatvāt nityeṣu api[44] anityavat upacārāt ca.

44. ASS : kvacit

ii. 2. 15 / tattva-bhāktayoḥ nānātvasya[45] vibhāgāt avyabhicāraḥ.

45. Though others read nānātva-vibhāgāt, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading agrees with NV, NVTT, NSN, R, nvr, B, NVi and V.

ii. 2. 16 / santāna-anumāna-viśeṣaṇāt.

ii. 2. 17 / kāraṇa-dravyasya pradeśa[46]-śabdena abhidhānāt[47]

46. NVi : pradeśa-viśeṣa.
47. Nbh, NV add : nityeṣu api avyabhicāraḥ iti. Against this are NSN, NVTT, V, ChSS, R, nvr, B and NVi.

ii. 2. 18 / prāk uccāraṇāt[48] anupalabdheḥ[49] āvaraṇādi-anupalabdheḥ ca[50]

48. Though others read uccāraṇādi-anupalabdheḥ, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading agrees with R, B, nvr, NVi, V, NSN, NV, VSS and ChSS.
49. nvr, NVi and B : anupalambhāt.
50. B and nvr omit ca.

ii. 2. 19 / tat-anupalabdheḥ anupalambhāt āvaraṇa-upapattiḥ.[51]

51. NVi, B, V and nvr : -upalabdhiḥ.

ii. 2. 20 / anupalambhāt api[52] anupalabdhi-sadbhāvāt[53] na āvaraṇa-anupapattiḥ anupalambhāt.[54]

52. R omits api.
53. Though others read -sadbhāvavat, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading is in accordance with NSN, ChSS, VSS and ASS. V reads sadbhāva-vat āvaraṇa...
54. B and nvr drop this sūtra. NVr juxtaposes the sūtras 19 and 20.

ii. 2. 21 / anupalambha-ātmakatvāt anupalabdheḥ ahetuḥ.

ii. 2. 22 / asparśatvāt.

ii. 2. 23 / na karma-anityatvāt.

ii. 2. 24 / na aṇu[55]-nityatvāt.

55. VSS and ASS : na aṇuḥ.

ii. 2. 25 / sampradānāt.[56]

56. NVi : sampradānatvāt.

ii. 2. 26 / tat-antarāla-anupalabdheḥ ahetuḥ.

ii. 2. 27 / adhyāpanāt apratiṣedhaḥ.

ii. 2. 28 / ubhayoḥ pakṣayoḥ anyatarasya adhyāpanāt apratiṣedhaḥ.

ii. 2. 29 / abhyāsāt.

ii. 2. 30 / na[57] anyatve api abhyāsasya upacārāt.

57. B and nvr omit na.

ii. 2. 31 / anyat anyasmāt ananyatvāt ananyat iti anyatā-abhāvaḥ.

ii. 2. 32 / tat-abhāve na asti ananyatā tayoḥ itara-itara-apekṣa-siddheḥ.

ii. 2. 33 / vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ.[58]

58. NSN adds ca.

ii. 2. 34. / aśravaṇa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ satata-śravaṇa-prasaṅgaḥ.

ii. 2. 35 / upalabhyamāne ca anupalabdheḥ asattvāt anapadeśaḥ.[59]

59. R : anupadeśaḥ.

ii. 2. 36 / pāṇi-nimitta-praśleṣāt śabda-abhāve na anupalabdhiḥ.

ii. 2. 37 / vināśa-kāraṇa-anupalabdheḥ ca avasthāne tat-nityatva-prasaṅgaḥ.[60]

60. See *Elucidation.*

ii. 2. 38 / asparśatvāt apratiṣedhaḥ.

ii. 2. 39 / vibhaktyantara-upapatteḥ ca samāse.

ii. 2. 40 / vikāra-ādeśa[61]-upadeśāt saṃśayaḥ.

61. B and nvr : -apadeśa-.

ii. 2. 41 / prakṛti-vivṛddhau vikāra-vivṛddheḥ.[62]

62. NSN (not in ChSS), nvr, B and NVi : vivṛddheḥ ca.
VSS, ASS and ChSS : vṛddheḥ.

ii. 2. 42 / nyūna-sama-adhika-upalabdheḥ[63] vikārāṇāṁ ahetuḥ.

63. B, nvr, NVi, R : -upapatteḥ.

ii. 2. 43 / dvividhasya api hetoḥ abhāvāt asādhanaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ.[64]

64. NSN, ChSS and NV do not mention this sūtra at all.

ii. 2. 44 / na atulya-prakṛtīnāṃ vikāra-vikalpāt.

ii. 2. 45 / dravya-vikāra[65]-vaiṣamyavat varṇa-vikāra-vikalpaḥ.[66]

65. Though others read dravya-vikāre vaiṣamyavat, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading agrees with R, B, NSN, NV, NVi and nvr.

66. nvr and B : vikāra-avikalpaḥ.

ii. 2. 46 / na vikāra-dharma-anupapatteḥ.

ii. 2. 47 / vikāra-prāptānām a-punaḥ-āpatteḥ.[67]

67. R, B, nvr, Bibl. Ind. and B : -āvṛtteḥ.

ii. 2. 48 / suvarṇādīnāṃ punaḥ āpatteḥ ahetuḥ.

ii. 2. 49 / na tat-vikārāṇāṃ suvarṇa-bhāva-avyatirekāt.

ii. 2. 50 / nityatve avikārāt[68] anityatve ca anavasthānāt.

68. Bibl. Ind. and nvr drop the *avagraha* after nityatve which amounts to the reading : nityatve vikārāt.

ii. 2. 51 / nityānām[69] atīndriyatvāt tat[70]-dharma-vikalpāt ca varṇa-vikārāṇām apratiṣedhaḥ

69. NV adds api. 70. B, nvr and NVi omit tat.

ii. 2. 52 / anavasthāyitve ca varṇa-upalabdhivat tat vikāra[71]-upapattiḥ.

71. R, B, nvr and NVi omit vikāra.

ii. 2. 53 / vikāra-dharmitve[72] nityatva-abhāvāt kālāntare vikāra-upapatteḥ ca apratiṣedhaḥ.

72. NVTT : -dharmatve.

ii. 2. 54 / prakṛti-aniyamāt.[73]

73. Though others add at the end the expression varṇa-vikārāṇām, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's reading agrees with R, B, nvr, NVi and NSN.

ii. 2. 55 / aniyame niyamāt na aniyamaḥ.

ii. 2. 56 / niyama-aniyama-virodhāt aniyame niyamāt ca apratiṣedhaḥ.

ii. 2. 57 / guṇāntarāpatti-upamardda-hrāsa-vṛddhi-leśa-śleṣebhyaḥ tu vikāra[74]-upapatteḥ varṇa-vikārāḥ.[75]

74. B, nvr, ASS and VSS : varṇa-vikāra-.

75. R. VSS, NV, NSN, B, nvr, NVi and Bibl. Ind. : vikāraḥ. NV reads santi vikārāḥ. R reads : tu varṇa-vikārāḥ.

ii. 2. 58 / te vibhaktyantāḥ padam.

ii. 2. 59 / vyakti-ākṛti-jāti-sannidhau upacārāt saṃśayaḥ.

ii. 2. 60 / yāśabda-samūha-tyāga-parigraha-saṃkhyā-vṛddhi-apacaya[76]-varṇa-samāsa-anuvandhānām vyaktau upacārat vyaktiḥ.

76. ASS, NV, NSN, V, Bibl. Ind., VSS and R : -upacaya.

ii. 2. 61 / na[77] tat-anavasthānāt.

77. R, B and nvr omit na.

ii. 2. 62 / sahacaraṇa-sthāna-tādarthya-vṛtta-māna-dhāraṇa-sāmīpya-yoga-sādhana-ādhipatyebhyaḥ brāhmaṇa-mañca-kaṭa-rāja-saktu[78]-candana-gaṅgā-śāṭaka[79]-annapuruṣeṣu a-tat-bhāve api tat-upacāraḥ.

78. R, Bibl. Ind., nvr, NVi and V : śaktu.

79. NV, NVr, nvr, B and ASS : śakaṭa ;
NSN and NVi : śākaṭa.

ii. 2. 63 / ākṛtiḥ tat-apekṣatvāt sattva-vyavasthāna-siddheḥ.

ii. 2. 64 / vyakti-ākṛti-yukte api aprasaṅgāt prokṣaṇādīnām mṛdgavake jātiḥ

ii. 2. 65 / na ākṛti-vyakti-apekṣatvāt jāti-abhivyakteḥ.[80]

80. NVi adds ca.

ii. 2. 66 / vyakti-ākṛti-jātayaḥ[81] tu padārthaḥ.

81. NVi, R, B and nvr : jāti-ākṛti-vyaktayaḥ.

ii. 2. 67 / vyaktiḥ guṇa-viśeṣa-āśrayaḥ mūrtiḥ.

ii. 2. 68 / ākṛtiḥ jāti-liṅga-ākhyā.

ii. 2. 69 / samāna-prasavātmikā jātiḥ.